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T H E B I B L I C A L FOUNDATION OF ATHANASIUS' 
UNDERSTANDEVG OF THE NTCENE HOMOOUSION 
By: Athanasius G. Paparnakis Degree: Master of Arts Year: September 1993 
In this thesis we attempt to investigate St. Athanasius' defence of the bibHcal character of the 
crucial Nicene term "homoousios" which has been called into question from the very first 
moment of its emergence in the official ecclesiastical documents until today. 
In the Introduction we explore two themes: first, the position of the "homoousios" in modem 
Athanasian scholarship in which we identify three main problems: a) that very little attention 
has been paid to the relations of the term with the Bible, b) that it is still regarded as a 
doctrinal development which marked the beginning of importation into the Christian doctrine 
of ideas alien to the genuine biblical message and c) that the twofold option between 
"generic" and "numerical" identity is the prevailing view of understanding the meaning of the 
term. Second, we briefly explore the data provided by the Athanasian pro-homoousion texts 
which show that he dealt with two problems: a) that the term was not biblical and b) that it 
implied division of God. As a result, he relates the term with two fundamental biblical 
doctrines: the natural generation of the Son from the Father and the unity of essence of the 
Son / with the Father. His main argument is that the objections raised against the 
"homoousion" spring out of objection to these biblical doctrines and although the term is not 
included in the Scriptures it fully preserves their message. In view t)f this, we divided our 
thesis into two corresponding parts. 
In the first part we look into the biblical evidence which Athanasius recalls as the source of 
the doctrine of the Generation of the Son from the Father. We follow his attempt to establish 
it starting from the conception of the Father as Begetter, going to the act of begetting and 
finally to the Son as the O f f i ^ i n g of the Father. In the first chapter we investigate his 
interpretation of the biblical texts to which he refers with regard to the first two points: the 
Son has the beginning of his existence in the being (=essence) of the Father and therefore the 
biblical verb which describes his generation is "to beget" and not "to create". We investigate 
the understanding of the Son as Offspring in the second chapter together with the other 
Christological titles 'Word' and 'Wisdom' with which he establishes the indivisible nature of 
the divine generation. In the third chapter we look into the Biblical Paradigms 'light-
effulgence', 'fountain-river' and 'image' which illustrate his understanding emphasizing the 
spiritual dimension of divine generation. 
In the second part we look into the biblical doctrine of the Unity of the Son with the Father 
which Athanasius mainly bases on the Gospel of St. John. He identifies absolute community 
of attributes between Father and Son in the biblical descriptions of them except the 
designations 'Father' and 'Son' which are uniquely attributed to them individually. Thus 
Athanasius concludes in explaining his understanding as unity of being, essence or divinity 
and duality of names or persons. Both are equally real and true without subordination of the 
one to the other. The 'homoousion' is understood to maintain both the distinction and the 
unity of the Father and the Son. 
Finally in the Conclusions we summarize the results of our discussion focusing on the 
meaning of the 'homoousion' and the hermeneutical principles that arise out of Athanasius 
exegesis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The affirmation that the Son is "homoousios"' with the Father was the response of 
the Church to the Arian challenge. Although proclaimed by the majority of Christian 
bishops through an Ecumenical Council at Nicea (325), it was by no means immediately 
accepted. Indeed the term "homoousios" was to appear at the centre of numerous 
theological debates during the following decades and suffer several contradicting 
interpretations and renderings. On one side of the battlegroxmd were the Arians, extreme 
and moderate. They read in the "homoousios" the doctrines of the division of God and 
'ditheism', which derived from a generic understanding of the term and had already been 
condemned by the Church. They backed their arguments with the fact that the term itself 
was not included in the Scriptures. Arius and his followers carried this view to extremes 
and were eventually to be expelled from the Church as heretics. Eusebius of Caesarea and 
his companions had their own reasons for maintaining a more moderate attitude and 
complied eventually with the decisions of the Council. On the other side of the 
battlegroimd was a party of Nicene fathers, who unreservedly employed the "homoousios" 
and, being guided by their anti-Arian zeal, stretched its meaning to the other, unitarian, 
extreme. Then: most representative figure is Marcellus of Ancyra, who developed a 
' The term has been traditionally translated in English as "consubstantial" that comes from the latm 
"consubstantialis" (cf. also Athanasius' De Synodis, 28, Migne P.G. 26,741B). Modem English speaking 
scholars, however, use different translations, aiming to a more precise rendering of its meaning. The 
following have been suggested: "Coessential" (Schaff-Wace), "Consubstantial" (Pollard, Lonergan, 
Williams, Kelly), "Of One essence or substance" (Bright, Muhlenberg, Barnes, O'Donnell, Tacelli, 
Fouyas), "Of the same Substance" (Kelly), "One m being" (Kelly), "Of one being" (Torrance, Heron). But, 
i t is also being used to a large extent untranslated probably in order to avoid further explanations due to the 
English terms. In this thesis we wi l l follow the latter method, because we wiU see the term is more 
inclusive of the notions which the translations tend to single out. 
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unitarian interpretation of the term, based on what he understood from it as being a 
"numerical" identification of the Son with the Father.^  
St. Athanasius, Archbishop of Alexandria (326-373), although not a member of the 
Council, is acknowledged as the person who expressed the Nicene doctrine in its fullness 
and maintained the balance between the two tendencies. He defended the legitimacy of the 
term "homoousios" and through it expounded the Nicene doctrine as the genuine 
expression of the Church's faith. To accomplish this task on safe and firm grounds, he 
appealed to the authority of biblical revelation. He drew from it the texts and the doctrines 
which he used both as sources and as boundaries for the correct understanding of the term 
and its significance. In this way, Athanasius laid the foundations upon which the 
Cappadocian Fathers would give the final answer to the Trinitarian problem through the 
Second Ecumenical Council at Constantinople in 381. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the biblical grounds upon which Athanasius 
claims to have based his understanding of the "homoousios" and look into the exegesis of 
the particular biblical texts he used. It pays special attention to the way in which 
Athanasius handles the biblical material in connection to the "homoousios" and to the 
points of difference of his exegesis from the one that the Arians proposed with the view to 
find out which one does justice to the biblical text and doctrine. Finally, it attempts a 
comprehensive summary of the meaning of the "homoousios" and an evaluation of the 
Athanasian exegesis. It is necessary, however, taking into consideration the data of modem 
investigation, firstly to draw the main guidelines for the meaning of the term as understood 
by Athanasius. 
^ We use this terminology ('generic'-'numerical' identity) because, as we shall see, it is the 
prevailing one among modem scholars. For fijrther details on the views of the pro-Nicenes see R.P.C. 
Hanson, who explores extensively their teaching in the second and thfrd part of his The search for the 
Christian Doctrine of God (pp. 208ff), and gives a brief summary of the most important of them m pp. 
824ff; also J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, pp. 240ff 
Introduction 
1. The data of the Athanasian texts 
Because of its vital importance for the Trinitarian dogma, the way that Athanasius 
and his contemporaries understood the term "homoousios" has been the subject of much 
investigation in modem scholarship. It not only constitutes a special chapter in most of the 
systematic handbooks and histories of dogma but is also the subject-matter of special 
essays, which examine it from ahnost every possible angle, among them theological, 
philosophical, historical, ecclesiastical and political.' Extensive as this scholarship has 
been, it cannot be said to have been exhaustive: the biblical significance of the term has 
been neither fiiUy appreciated nor as yet appropriately investigated.'' C. Kannengiesser, 
who acknowledges the nature of the dispute during the fourth century controversy as 
"essentially one of hermeneutics", underlines the fact that "Arius' teaching led to conflicts 
within the ecclesiastical community about the interpretation of certain biblical 
passages...Even when it was entangled in the political relations between bishops of 
different Eastern provinces, the controversy of the Alexandrians remained as essentially 
hermeneutical dispute".^ Commenting on the state of research today in 1985, he remarks 
that "a rich field of hermeneutical discoveries is still waiting for exploration, i f someone 
would undertake a comprehensive research on the role of the Bible in Athanasius' thought 
and writings".* In 1988 and in the latest edition of his The Search for the Christian 
' For a complete list of all these essays see our Bibliography, 1. 
There is only one essay, which directly examines the relationships of the "homoousios" with the 
biblical revelation. It is by T.F. Torrance, "The evangelical significance of the homoousios" (in The 
Trinitarian Faith, pp. 132ff), but the discussion is general and does not go into details. It only deals with 
the affirmation of the divinity of Jesus Christ as the core of the biblical message in its relation to the 
'homoousion'. However, references to the biblical links of the term are made to many of the essays we have 
taken into consideration, but none of them takes up the task for a fu l l investigation. 
' He also remarks: "Since the beginning of the twentieth century, writers have been so obsessed by 
the political and denominational aspect of Athanasius' work that they have completely overlooked another 
characteristic, his frequent resource to the Bible. Though writers constantly repeat that Athanasius was a 
man of the Bible, no one has ever fried to study him seriously under this aspect"; See C. Kannengiesser, 
Holy Scripture and Hellenistic hermeneutics in Alexandrian Christology: the Arian Crisis, pp. 1-3. R.P.C. 
Hanson also agrees with this, asserting that "It would of course be absurd to deny that discussion and 
dispute between 318 and 381 were conducted largely in te^ of Greek philosophy. The reason for this was, 
paradoxically, because the dispute was about the interpretation of the Bible" {The Search, p. xx-xxi). 
* "The Athanasian Decade 1974-84: A bibhographical report". Theological Studies, 46 (1985) 539; 
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doctrine of God, Prof. Hanson gave a comprehensive but short account of the exegetical 
differentiations over the biblical texts that appeared during the controversy. However, it is 
illuminating enough of the exegetical problems of the interpretations to which these texts 
were subjected during the controversy.^ Also, the importance and interpretation of the 
Gospel of St. John in the first four centuries and especially in the Arian controversy has 
been thoroughly investigated by Prof. T.E. Pollard in his treatise Johannine Christology 
and the early Church.^ Among the biblical texts that most frequently appear in the debates, 
John 10:30 and Prov. 8:22 have attracted special attention, hence the studies by T.E. 
Pollard,' V. Marangoni,'" and A. Clayton." 
As we have said, the essays, which especially investigate the "homoousios", mainly 
focus on a literal, philosophical and theological analysis of its meaning and usage. In this 
account the reader faces a twofold option, as Prof J.N.D. Kelly, who has dominated the 
field since the 1960's, presents it, 
"Are we to understand 'of the same nature' in the 'generic' sense in which 
Origen, for example, had employed onoovoioq, or are we to take it as 
having the meaning accepted by later Catholic theology, viz. numerical 
identity of substance? The root word ouoia could signify the kind of 
substance or stuff common to several individuals of a class, or it could 
connote an individual thing as such".*^ 
other works on the biblical aspect of Athanasius are produced by V. Olson, Athanasius' use of Scripture 
with special reference to the doctrine of the Trinity, PhD thesis, St. Andrews 1966; H.J. Sieben, 
"Hermeneutique de I'exegese dogmatique d'Athanase", Politique et theologie, Paris 1974; H. Nordberg, 
"On the Bible text of St. Athanasius", Arctos. Acta Philologica Fennica, 7 (1962) 119-141; T.F. Torrance, 
"The hermeneutics of St. Athanasius", Eccl. Ph., 52:1-53:1 (1970-71). 
' pp. 832-838 and the analysis of biblical exegesis during the controversy in The influence of the 
Scripture in pp. 824-849. 
* Cambridge 1970; see also his articles "The exegesis of John X. 30 in the early Trinitarian 
confroversies", New Testament Studies, 3 (1957) 334-349; "The exegesis of Scripture and the Arian 
Confroversy", Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 41 (1958-59) 414-429; "That they all may be one (John 
xvii . 21) - and the unity of the Church", The Expository Times, 70 (1959) 149-150. 
' "The exegesis of John X. 30 in the early Trinitarian conttoversies". New Testament Studies, 3 
(1957) 334-349. 
" "Juan 10,30 en la argumentacion escrituristica de San Atanasio", Stromata, 26 (1970) 3-57 and 
"Un solo dios y el dios Trino: En tomo a la interpretacion atanasiana de Jn. 10:30", Stromata, 29 (1973) 
279-95. 
" The Orthodox Recovery of a Heretical Proof Text: St. Athanasius of Alexandria's Exegesis of 
Proverbs 8.22fin conflict with the Arians, PhD Dissertation, Perkins School of Theology, 1987. 
Early Christian Doctrines, p. 243; also R.P.C. Hanson, The search, p. 170; P. Schepens m a brief 
literary investigation of words compoimd with the prefix "onoq" also identifies two kinds of unity, which 
he calls "numerical" and "specific unity" ("OMOOYSIOi;", Reck Sc. Relig, 35 (1948) 289-90). 
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Although from the study of the sources scholars discern a strong generic meaning 
of the term both in Athanasius and his contemporary environment,the emphasis that was 
given to the unity of the Son with the Father by the Nicenes and Athanasius, in response to 
the Arians, appears to have led them to accept the "numerical identity" of the two persons 
of the Trinity as the primary meaning of the term." As a consequence, their attempts to 
indicate the distinction of the two persons followed suit, and therefore G.L. Prestige, for 
example, called the three persons "three distinct presentations" of a single object, i.e., the 
numerical One God.^ ^ 
This twofold option has been legitimately criticised by Prof G.C. Stead, who 
points out the danger of reading either generic or numerical identity in the "homoousios". 
He observes that this approach follows in the main the guidelines of an Aristotelian pattern 
of logic, namely the distinction between "first" and "second substance" (TtpcoTT], SeuTspa 
ouata) "with which most of the dogmatic theologians have linked the 'homoousios"', but it 
cannot be adequately applied to this context.'* He asserts that the definition "generic 
" J.N.D. Kelly has comprehensively gathered the extant evidence about the use of the 'homoousion' 
in the earlier and contemporary environment which shows its 'generic' meaning (so in Porphyrius, Plotinus, 
Tertullian, Valentinians, Irenaeus, Heracleon, Origen, etc.); so also R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit., pp. 190-202. 
An extensive investigation of this evidence before Nicea, especially in the Valentinian system, has been 
produced by L . M . Mendizabal in "El Homoousios preniceno exfraecclesiastico" {Estudios eclessiasticos, 30 
(1956) 147-196). 
" Prof Kelly justifies this point as follows, "As later theologians perceived, since the divine nature 
is immaterial and indivisible, i t follows that the Persons of the Godhead Who share it must have, or rather 
be, one identical substance" {Doctrines, ibid.). Since, however, the dominant sense was the generic one, he 
is in doubt of whether the numerical identity could be "an entirely novel and unexpected sense". He seems 
however to avoid answering to the point drawing attention to the fact that the Nicenes merely intended to 
affirm the fu l l divinity of the Son in view of the Arian problem and therefore the objective was "more 
limited than is sometimes supposed" (pp. 235-236). The same point of view is also taken by R.P.C. Hanson 
who argues that "the word homoousios when it was inserted in N did not have the great importance in the 
eyes of the people at that time which it was later supported to have", because it had a rather looser meaning 
{op. cif.,pp. 436-437). 
God in Patristic thought, p. 168. 
C. Stead also considers it "misleading", see "The significance of the homoousios", Studia 
Patristica, 3 (1961) 398 and 410. The association with the AristoteUan philosophy is also denied by G.D. 
Dragas, Athanasiana, pp. 63-64, R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit, p. 197, C. Konstandmidis, "Ousia and hypostasis 
in Athanasius the Great", Theologia, p. 571. For the history and the meaning of the term "ousia" see also 
T.B. Sfrong, "The history of the theological term 'substance'", The J.T.S, 1 (1900), 3 (1901), 4 (1902); C. 
Stead, "The Concept of Divine Substance", Vig. Chr., 29 (1975) 1-14 and especially his book on Divine 
Substance, Oxford 1977. 
Introduction 11 
sense" is "a phrase to be abandoned" and he tends to accept some sort of combination of 
the two, which is "elastic" towards both directions." Al l the accounts scholars give of the 
meaning of the term in Athanasius, while they are in the main comprehensive and 
representative, seem to lack the appropriate terminology at the final formulation. It is no 
surprise therefore to find Prof. C. Stead remarking that, in the last analysis, the problem is 
a matter of "care with which we choose our descriptive terms''.'^ 
Prof. Hanson, on the other hand, taking into consideration all the relevant evidence 
and bibliography produced so far, denies that 'numerical identity' was suggested by the 
"homoousios" and points out that the results of recent studies tend to show that the term 
"was of a much looser, more flexible, indeed less specific and therefore less controversial 
significance"." In his interpretation this suggests that the "homoousios" was a highly 
confusing term that puzzled rather than helped the Church in a struggle to express her 
faith, leaving "a dangerous legacy of confusion for the future".^" As it concems its relation 
with the Bible, Hanson regards the "homoousios" as marking the beginning of the 
Divine Substance, p. 247-8. We draw special attention to his learned article "The significance of 
the homoousios" in which he very carefully examines and analyses the meaning of 'sameness', 'likeness' 
and 'identity' in their numerical and generic sense. The 'numerical identity' has afready been sfrongly 
criticised earlier by E.R. Craven who prefers the term "specific oneness". He extensively analyses it 
against "numerical identity" supported by Shedd in his History of Christian Doctrine (See: "The Nicene 
docfrine of the homoousion", Bibliotheca Sacra, 41 (1884) 698-760). Craven, however, considers 'specific' 
to mean 'homogeneity', which has the same meaning with the term 'generic' as used here. But, we think that 
his whole argxunent lends to his term 'specific' a wider sense, because although he defends the 'homoousios' 
as applying to the Father and the Son generic identification between memebrs of the same species, at the 
end he remarks that Father and Son are coimted as one because they are immaterial. This concept we think 
is not included in a mere 'homogeneity' of beings because of divisions which bodily beings suffer. 'Specific' 
has a wider sense and designates the peculiar character of the Father and Son 'homogeneity'. In this account 
it probably comes closer to Stead's view. 
Div. Sub., p. 266 and the preceeding analysis in pp.242-266; also "The significance of the 
homoousios". Stud. Patr., 3 (1961) 397-412. The problem of terminology seems to be the reason for him 
not formulating a final definition of the meaning of the "homoousios". 
" R.P.C. Hanson, The Search, p. 170 and 202. 
^° ibid. It is Prof. Hanson's conviction, which, in consequence, regulates his approach to the subject, 
that the case at the time was not the fraditionally accepted "defence of orthodoxy against heresy and error", 
but "a search for orthodoxy, a search conducted by the method of tiial and error" (The Search, p. xix-xx). 
Therefore, throughout his book, he tends to porfray the situation over theological and other issues as being 
confiised and perplexed by conttadicting interpretations of rival parties. 
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importation into the Church of Hellenistic pagan terms and associated philosophy that 
ultimately "blurred the New Testament" message.^ ' 
However, those Athanasian texts in which the defence of the "homoousios" is 
direct, handle the term from a rather different point of view and with different 
presuppositions. Neither can they fit into the two-sided pattern of generic-numerical 
identity, nor can they be represented fully and accurately with the more "flexible" 
rendering. First of all, it has to be strongly emphasized that the character of those writings 
is primarily and predominantly biblical. Athanasius' principal concern was to establish 
firmly the legitimacy of the term on biblical evidence alone. His appeal directly to the 
Bible for the justification of his arguments is extensive and constant.^ ^ Therefore, the 
^' As i t concerns the relations of the 'homoousios' with the Bible and philosophy. Prof Hanson 
acknowledges that the subjects of dispute in the Arian conttoversy "were not those raised by Greek 
theology or philosophy and as such could only have been raised by people thinking in Greek terms. It was 
not simply a quarrel about Greek ideas... but arise directly from the earliest Christian tradition". The use of 
philosophical terms was unavoidable since "the deepest questions which face Christianity cannot be 
answered in purely biblical language, because the questions are about the meaning of biblical language 
i tself . But he finds also unavoidable the fact that obscured philosophy was introduced together with them, 
since, as he points out, "No other alternative was available, even though this expression brought with it 
unavoidably a certain distortion and blurring of the thought of the New Testament" {ibid., p. 426). 
Therefore he emphatically asserts that "The pro-Nicenes are at their worst, their most grotesque, when they 
fry to show that the new terms borrowed from the pagan philosophy of the day were really to be found in 
the Scripture" {ibid., 846). This argument, from our point of view, echoes the theory of the so called 
"hellenisation" of the Gospel by the early Church which has been infroduced namely by A. Hamack 
{History of Dogma, ttansl. by N . Buchanan, v. I , pp. 49ff & 107ff) and has highly influenced the majority 
of modem scholars (see the accounts of the scholarly opinions by Werner, The Formation, pp. 3 f f and the 
presentation of the views of Baur, Hamack, Loots, Seeberg etc.; R. WiUiams, Arius, pp. 6-8; 21-25; E. 
Muhlenberg, "The Divinity of Jesus", pp. 136ff). We believe that the main guidelines of this theory are still 
manipulated in different ways in a great munber of modem textbooks and essays from moderate to extreme 
expressions (Cf O. Culhnan, The Christology, pp. 4-5; J. Bernard, The Gospel of John, v. I , pp. 365-366; 
and R.P.C. Hanson above). A large number, however, of others have opposed to this view; for e.g. see the 
relevant discussion in S. Laeuchli, "The Case", p. 409f; G.D. Dragas, Athanasiana, pp. 41-43; E. 
Muhlenberg, "The Divinity of Jesus", p. 145f; A. Heron, "Homoousios", p. 73f; H. Wolfson, The 
philosophy of the Church Fathers, Cambrige: Harvard Un. Pr., 1956, v. I , p. 362. For a collection of the 
most recent studies and the diverse approaches to the Nicene Creed today see Faith to Creed, Ecumenical 
Perspectives on the Affirmation of the Apostolic Faith in the Fourth Century, ed. by M . Him, Michigan: 
Eerdmans 1991. 
" C. Kannengiesser regards as especially important the biblical aspect of Athanasius' writings. As he 
explains, " I emphasize this because it is important for our contemporary critical interest in early 
Christology that the initiative of Athanasius in this domain would never have taken on lasting historical 
significance i f i t had not benefited from his very original method of having resource to the Bible as a 
theologian" ("Athanasius of Alexandria and the foundation of ttaditional Christology", Theological 
Studies, 34 (1973) 103-113; C. Stead also underlines the biblical character of Athanasius' doctrine above 
any discussion on the other grounds; see "The significance of the homoousios", p. 410. 
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material for the investigation of the meaning of the "homoousios" is primarily biblical, and 
it is biblical data which give the content and the direction for understanding them and the 
various expressions with which it is associated. The problem which Athanasius is 
addressing lies originally in the question of whether the term represents biblical teaching 
and, in consequence, the faith of the Church. The positive answer to this question would 
have two consequences: firstly, that Athanasius appears not to attempt to settle a fixed, in 
some ways novel meaning for the term, but to establish it as being in accordance with the 
traditional teaching of the Church; secondly, that the term itself is not an import or 
development, but it represents a doctrine that has been handed down to the Church by God 
in his Christ through the Apostles and the Fathers. '^ Athanasius was as a result very careful 
to insist on the msertion of the "homoousios" in the Creed as the outcome of an exegetical 
process during which the Nicenes "collected the mind of the Scripture" and "expressed 
more clearly" its "obvious teaching".^" 
This implies that he treats the term as having a meaning aheady defined to a certain 
extent and investigates whether it is viable for theological use, namely for answering the 
" Athanasius' famous statement, "The sound faith, which Christ gave, the aposties preached and the 
fathers who met at Nicea handed down" (AFRO 1:26,1029A), expresses the heart of his faith and his 
theology. This side seems to have been disregarded in modem scholarship, where the prevailing view has 
been the so-called "development of dogma". The "homoousios" is considered a development that did not 
exist in the Bible and therefore it lacks the interest for its bibhcal links. Prof M . Wiles, for example, 
argues that the doctrine of the eternal generation has been infroduced by Origen in a cosmologicaJ context 
and developed by Athanasius in the anti-Arian context ("Eternal Generation", Joum. Theol. Stud., p. 291). 
Also, J.N.D. Kelly believes that the Nicene Creed and its later development in Constantmople was a 
"revolution against a prior Origenistic view of the Godhead dominating the Church". The Nicene Creed 
was a "turning point" inasmuch as it constitutes a turn from the fraditional ecclesiastical faith (see J.N.D. 
Kelly, "The Nicene Creed: A turning point", pp. 29-39). However, i f Athanasius is correct in his claims of 
the biblicity of the term, then the problem rather turns out to be a matter of emphasis, which depends on 
the particular demands of every period and not of development. The formulation of the dogmas, is not a 
matter o f exchange of ideas in the course of history, but a matter of representation of the multifold and ever 
existing divine revelation according to the particular demands. G.D. Dragas argues: "The so-called problem 
of the Development of Dogma, of which we have been today totally informed, finds its solution in the 
Dogma of the Church by means of which she preserves her faith in the total Christ, the eternal Son of God 
who has become truly man for her and for the whole world. And she does this constantiy as she faces new 
challenges from partial anthropological and theological human discoveries. In doing this she interprets the 
Dogma of her faith in new language and categories appropriate to the demands of the times. But her 
message is at root the datum of the Eternal Son become man who reveals the Triune God and his man as 
his adopted Son" (Athanasiana, p. 46). 
DECR 20:25,452B; SYNO 45:26,773D; AFRO 5-6:26,1037Af 
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theological dilemma of compromising the unity of God with the duality of the Father and 
the Son.^' We could characterize the way m which Athanasius employs it as simple and 
natural as opposed to sophisticated definition of philosophers.^* This means that in spite of 
the hermeneutical differences^^ the fact of the matter remains that the word 'homoousios' 
is a compound adjective, which consists of the prefix "homo-" (6|j,o0, together, co-) and 
the noun "essence" (ouaia, essence, being). It presupposes two distinct beings and 
describes some kind of unity between them. The dominant sense of this unity was the 
"generic" in its wider application; i.e., the "homoousios" designated two beings that were 
classed in the same category of species, because they had the same origins or consisted of 
the same "s tuff or "material".^* The Sabellian version of the "homoousios", which 
implied absolute identification of the Son with the Father in a single being and denied the 
distinction between them, was rather elaborate and it appears not to Athanasius at all.^' 
Besides, it was already condemned at an earlier Council at Antioch in 268 and therefore 
out of the question from the very beginning. The term is not employed by Athanasius m an 
anti-Sabellian, but in an anti-Arian sense, and therefore it has to be examined under this 
" C f R.P.C. Hanson {op. cit, p. xx): "It was the problem of how to reconcile two factors which 
were part of the very fabric of Christianity: monotheism and the worship of Jesus Christ as divine". 
Explaining the reasons for the condemnation of the "homoousios" at the Antiochean Council of 
268, Athanasius says that the fathers of the Council "understood it simply" (OOTCOC; cbq e^etXficpacn) in the 
context of their concern against Paul of Samosata and he ascribes the same motives also to the Nicenes 
(SYNO 45:26,772A). He follows the same tradition and therefore he does not get involved in discussion 
about the meaning of the term in philosophical terms, but as a vehicle which carries biblical doctrine. In 
fact, he denies any links with Greek philosophy, which he regards as a negative element in theology, 
because the philosophers "do not know the Son" (CARl 34:26,81B; also CAR3 16:26,356B, SYNO 
35:26753B, 51:26,7840 et al). 
" For these differences especially concerning the people who took part in the Council see J.N.D. 
Kelly, Doctrines, pp. 248-253 and R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit., p. 190. Although their conclusion is that the 
meaning of the term varied, we do not see any of these variations to wander off the main guidelmes of the 
concept of generic identity, since 'common species' apphes to living beings and 'common stuff or material' 
to lifeless things. 
Although scholars set the twofold option between generic and numerical identity, they do not 
produce sufficient evidence for the second meaning io the pre- and extta-Athanasian context, except for the 
Sabellian version. C f especially the essay by P. Galtier, "L' 6|iOOuaio<; de Paul de Samosate", RSR, pp. 
31-45. 
J.N.D. Kelly lays great emphasis on Eusebius' reaction to the term, which he regards as major 
evidence of not reading the Sabellian sense of numerical identity in the "homoousios" at Nicea. His 
objections rather focused on the "materialistic flavour" of the term and the associated divisions {Doctrines, 
p. 236). R.P.C. Hanson (ibid., p. 202) and E.R. Craven (The Nicene, p. 730) also deny 'numerical identity'. 
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light. Bearing this in mind, we might be confident of two things. First, that dixring the 
debate the absolute distinction between the Father and the Son was taken for granted by all 
parties and was never called into question. Second that although they shared common 
ground on this, the two sides were, nevertheless, diametrically opposed in their efforts: the 
primary objective of Athanasius was to maintain united those that Arius tore apart, while 
Arius was keen to keep completely separated those that Athanasius held as essentially 
united. Interestingly, each claimed for its opponents' teaching the same consequences, 
namely ascription of bodily passions to God.^ " 
Thus, the real problem seems to arise not from what the "homoousios" actually 
means, but from the terms under which it should be acceptable. Both Athanasius and the 
Arians were aware of the generic sense of the term, but they had different presuppositions: 
the Arians began fi-om the application of the term to created beings and transferred the 
associated divisions to God, i.e., they defined the features of the process of divine 
begetting according to the features of human begetting. On the one hand, considering the 
Son begotten from the Father, they argued that the "homoousios" implied division of the 
ousia of God because an offspring exists as "part" of its father.^' On the other hand, 
considering "ingeneratedness" (CIYEVVTITOV ) the primary characteristic of the essence of 
God, they argued that the "homoousios" would suggest "two ingenerate" divine beings." 
For Arius, the term carried materialistic connotations and as a consequence portrayed the 
Father as "composite, divisible, mutable and body, and in addition to these, the bodiless 
God suffering all the passions of a body"." 
For Arius' statement see his Letter to Alexander of Alexandria, Opitz, H.G., Athanasius Werke, 
Urkunde 6, 3:1:1, p. 13; for Athanasius' counter argument see CAR2 34:26,220A. 
" Cf. the expressions "consubstantial part" (onoouoiov laepoc;), "part of God" (ixepoq GEOO ) , "part 
of the Ingenerate" (jiepoq ayevvfixou) in his Letter to Alexander, ibid, and Letter to Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, ibid, pp. 2-3; also in Athanasius C A R l 15:26,44A, CAR2 32:26,216C, 34:26,220A, DECR 
13:25,463A. 
Arius' Letter to Alexander, and to Eusebius; also Athanasius in C A R l 22:26,57C. 
" Letter to Alexander, ibid. 
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Athanasius' argument points in exactly the opposite direction. While he defended 
the generic sense of the homoousios as applicable to God, he was scrupulous enough in 
making the clarifications necessary to clear away those connotations of division which the 
Arians so emphasized as grounds for denying the natural divinity of the Son. The 
regulative concept of his arguments is that the presuppositions for accepting the term are to 
be defined by the nature of the beings concerned. Athanasius' identification of the 
divisions as involving bodily beings and occurring in space and time excluded the divine 
being which is of spiritual nature and exists beyond such definitions. His basis for the 
justification of those clarifications was dual. First, the absolute distinction between two 
categories of existence or "essence": the created, to which human beings belong and the 
uncreated, which refers to God alone. Second, the understanding of human language as 
limited to description of the divine reality because the latter cannot be comprehended by 
the human mind.^" The particular words employed, he argues, should be understood in a 
provisional sense and under certain qualifications. The images from the natural world, 
which the Scripture takes up to describe God, cannot be pushed too far and they convey a 
meaning only as long as the understanding of God as spiritual and bodiless existence is not 
affected or contorted by the features of the created existence.^ ^ According to his 
hermeneutical principle priority belongs to the realities which lie behind the particular 
words and define the extent of the meaning of the words, but not vice versa.^ * In this sense, 
he regards the "homoousios" as yet another descriptive term of this reality and therefore it 
is the nature of God itself which defines its meaning. It maintains the generic continuity of 
CAR2 32:26,216B; DECK 12:25,436Df; For a full analysis of Athanasius' understanding of the 
economical nature of the human language and its significance for the interpretation of Scripture see T.F. 
Torrance, "The hermeneutics", EPh, 52:2-3 (1970) 87-106. 
" DECR 24:25,457B; SYNO 42:26,768A-B et al. 
"Let them not dispute about the words that the biblical writers use of the Word himself, for there 
need be no question about them since they are confessedly used in accordance with his nature. For words 
do not detract from nature; rather does nature draw the words to itself and transform them. For words are 
not prior to essences, but essences come first and words come second" CAR2 3:26,152C; cf T.F. Torrance, 
"The hermeneutics", EPh, 53:1 (1971) 136. 
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the Son from the Father and with it the distinction of the former from the latter as 
'begotten' (yevvriTOc;) from 'unbegotten' (ayev[v]T\xoc,). This distinction denies the 
Sabellian sense of absolute numerical identification in a single being. At the same time the 
"homoousios" affirms the unity of the Son with the Father in their inner being which, in 
turn, rejects the Arian sense of division. Also, on the one hand, because the "homoousios" 
refers to "the one of whom the offspring is", the doctrine of the generation ensures the 
unity of the divine being in the sense of dispelling the suspicion of a monotheism that 
derives from an absolute unity of two separate divine beings, as i f "another and another" 
(aXXo Ktti dXXo)." On the other hand, the doctrine of the unity excludes any division of 
God on account of the generation, because it refers the generation to the spiritual reality 
which does not suffer bodily divisions.^^ Athanasius summarizes the meaning of the 
"homoousios" in the following statement: 
"They [the Nicenes] were compelled immediately to collect the mind of the 
Scripture and what they were saying earlier, they said and wrote again with 
more clarity, that the Son is homoousios with the Father; [in this way,] they 
would indicate that the Son is not simply like the Father, but has identical 
likeness, which he received from the Father and that the likeness and 
immutability of the Son is different than our imitation, as it is called, which 
we acquire through the observance of the commandments. For it is possible, 
the bodies, which are like one another, be divided and distant the one from 
the other, as the human sons are from their begetters, according to what is 
written about Adam and Seth, who was begotten from him 'in his own 
likeness, after his image'. But because the generation of the Son from the 
Father is different from human nature, he is not only like, but also 
indivisible from the essence of the Father and he and the Father are one, as 
he said, and the Word is always in the Father and the Father in the Word, as 
it is the effulgence in the light for this is what the term designates. The 
Council having understood this, wrote the homoousios correctly, so that it 
would abolish the wickedness of the heretics and show that the Son is other 
than the creatures".^' 
" SYNO 42:26,768B. 
This is also the conclusion of E.R. Craven, who summarizes the specific oneness designated by the 
'homoousion' in two points: a) that "division of substance is not implied in the generation of immaterial 
substances" and b) that "the generated substance is to be regarded as referred back to that which generates 
and so is to be counted one with it" ("The Nicene", p. 760). 
3' DECR20:25,452B-C. 
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To meet the demands of this thesis, we have collected the biblical material, which 
Athanasius produces as containing the doctrine of the eternal generation and of the unity of 
the Son with the Father, and we have examined the manner in which he interprets it in 
relation to the "homoousios". We started from those works where the defence of the 
"homoousios" is the primary objective and then we compared their data with those in the 
wider context of Athanasius' dogmatic and anti-Arian output. We think, therefore, that 
before anything else it is necessary to give a brief account of the data which these texts 
provide. 
The first text and the one that marks the beginning of Athanasius' involvement 
with the defence of the "homoousios" is the Epistola de Decretis Nicaenae Synodi (c. 
350). The occasion of the Epistle is explicitly stated at the very beginning, where 
Athanasius says that the Arians intensely objected to the two terms "from the substance" 
and "homoousios", on the grounds of their being non-biblical.'*'' Therefore he attempts to 
establish these terms directly on biblical evidence in a collective and comprehensive 
manner. The core of his argument is that although the terms themselves are not included in 
the Scripture, their meaning is in accordance with it. He claims that although the Nicene 
fathers wanted in the first instance to maintain the biblical vocabulary and profess the 
unqualified divinity of the Son in biblical terms, it was the Arians that construed the 
meaning of the words and led the Nicenes to look for other terms outside the biblical 
vocabulary. The "homoousios" came about as the result of an intensive exegetical 
procedure and designated both the likeness (6|j.oi6tr|g) of the Son with the Father, similar 
to that which human sons acquire from their fathers through the natural process of 
begetting and the indivisible unity of essence (dSialpetOQ xfic; oOotac;) of the Son with 
the Father, who never existed without his Son.'" Throughout the treatise, Athanasius 
D E C R 1:25,416A: "Why did those who gathered at Nicea used unscriptural terms, i.e.. from the 
substance and homoousios?". 
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moves between the two themes, constantly shifting the emphasis from the one to the other 
and backing up his arguments with extensive biblical quotations and exegetical comments. 
In chs. 6-15, he discusses the meaning of the Christological title "Son" and of the 
associated title "Only-begotten" in terms of generation. He discerns two senses of biblical 
sonship: it is "sonship by grace" (Deut. 13:19-14:1 and Jn. 1: :12), which is a gift of God 
on account of virtue and good deeds, and "sonship by nature", which is the result of the 
natural process of begetting. He considers groundless the Arian understanding of the 
sonship of the Son as "by grace" and proves the point by means of the distinction between 
God's acts of creating creatures and begetting a Son. The central verses for the generation 
of the Son are Mat. 3:17 and Jn. 1:18, which he associates with the paradigms of 'light' 
and 'effiilgence' (Heb. 1:3), 'fountain' and 'river of light' (Ps. 35:10''), o f ' l i f e ' (Jer. 2:13) 
and of 'wisdom' (Bar. 3:12). In chs. 13-14, he deals with Prov. 8:22, which was the crucial 
Arian proof text on the creaturehood of the Son. He juxtaposes the biblical teaching of the 
natural generation of the Son, which he draws from Ps. 109:3, Ps. 2:7, Prov. 8:25 and Jn. 
1:18. In chs. 15-18, he gives a comprehensive overview of the biblical teaching of Christ 
as the offspring of God. This is achieved through an exegetical synthesis of the predicates 
"power" (Suvamg, 1 Cor. 1:24), "hand" (xeip, Is. 48:13, 51:16), "word" (Xoyog, Jn. 
1:1-3), "wisdom" (oocpia, 1 Cor. 1:24, Ps. 103:24, Prov. 3:19), "only-begotten son" 
(liovoYEvfiQ uiog, Jn. 1:14, Heb. 1:1-2), and "image" (eiKcbv, Col. 1:15), as bearing 
witness to the "homoousios", each from its own angle. In ch. 19-24 he gives an account of 
the proceedings of the Nicene Council and the exegetical debate that took place over the 
controversial terms. First, he deals with the phrase "from the substance of the Father", 
D E C R 19-20:25,448Df. 
••^  We will follow the numbering of the Septuagint vesion, which was the text in use by Athanasius. 
We used the edition of the L X X text by A. Rahlfs, H TlaXaid AiadriKJ] Kara loix; O', 'AnoatoXiKij 
AiaKOvia zfig 'EKKXrjaiac. tfj(; 'EXXaSoq, "AGfivav 1981, which is an one-volume reprint of the 1935 
edition in Stuttgart by the Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft. 
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which he regards as an illustration of 1 Cor. 8:6 that serves to distinguish the generation of 
the Son from the creation of the world which the Arians confused. In ch. 20 he deals with 
the meaning of the "homoousios" as an expression of the Son's likeness with the Father. 
He regards it as a likeness of generic continuity (Gen 5:3) and of unity of essence (Jn. 
10:30, 14:10 and Heb. 1:3) that refutes the Arian conception of it, claiming to be also 
biblically based, as being a moral unity. In chs. 21-24, he elaborates further on the natural 
generation of the Son, drawing the main guidelines for its correct understanding, apart 
from its connotations of divisions, on the basis of Ps. 44:2, 109:3, Jn. 8:42, 6:46 and Jn. 
10:30, 14:10, 1:18. He illustrates the combination of the two groups of verses with the 
analysis of the paradigm of 'light' and 'effulgence' (Heb. 1:3). In chs. 25-28, he 
establishes the above as being a genuine expression of biblical teaching by virtue of their 
continuity in the tradition as passed down by the accredited "fathers" Theognostus, 
Dionysius of Alexandria, Dionysius of Rome and Origen. 
The second text written about the same period is the Epistola de sententiae 
Dionysii (c. 350). Here he defends the teaching of the Alexandrian bishop against the 
Arian allegations: a) that in his Epistle to Euphanor and Ammonius Dionysius had held 
that the Son was a creature and alien to the Father; and b) that he neither used nor accepted 
the "homoousios". Athanasius' defence is divided into two corresponding parts. In the first 
part (chs. 1-17), Athanasius takes into account all the epistles of the bishop and explains 
that having set out with the particular purpose of sweeping away the Sabellian 
unitarianism, Dionysius stressed the distinction between Father and Son in the strongest 
possible terms. He wanted to leave no doubt that it was the Son who was incarnate, not the 
Father, and that as a man dressed with a created body the Son was alien to the Godhead of 
the Father. The bishop had chosen the biblical image of the vine-dresser and the vine as a 
vehicle to illustrate this fundamental distinction, while at the same time acknowledging 
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biblical witness to the divinity of the Son. The whole argument of Athanasius is based on 
the distinction between those biblical texts which refer to the divine nature of Christ and 
those which refer to his human nature. The first ones describe his glory as God and Creator 
of the world (xa GsiKa T O O ocoxflpoc;), while the second ones describe his weakness as a 
mere man (xa dvOpcoTtiva xoO oroxfipoc;). The "homoousios" gave a compact expression 
to the teaching of the first group which Athanasius considered in the light of three 
presuppositions: a) faith in the idea of God as Creator of the world, b) faith in the oneness 
of God and c) faith in Christ as Lord and Saviour. He asserts that the biblical texts also 
present the Son as being the eternal Creator of all things (Jn. 1:1-3, I Cor. 8:6b), the Father 
as affirming the generation of the Son from himself (Ps. 44:2, Mat. 3:17, 17:5) and Jesus 
Christ as claiming unity with the Father (Jn. 10:30, 14:10). 
In the second part of the treatise (chs. 18-27) Athanasius follows the same pattern 
of argument giving his answer to the second Arian allegation. The important point here for 
us is that he links the whole discussion with the term "homoousios", which he uses both in 
the context of the humanity and of the divinity of the Son. The Son is homoousios with 
human beings on account of his incarnation and the human body he assumed and therefore 
necessarily alien to the Father, but he is also homoousios with the Father as true God and 
therefore necessarily alien to the creatures. Since Athanasius is using the term in its 
generic sense to indicate beings that belong to the same "species", he employs a range of 
alternative terms, like "of the same nature" (6|j.0(puf|(;), "of the same species" (oiioyevric;) 
and "congenial" (ouyYevnc;). He qualifies the generic identification of the Son with the 
Father with the notion of eternal unity and coexistence drawn out of the exegesis of the 
biblical paradigms 'fountain-river', 'light-effiilgence' and 'mind-word'. "Homoousios with 
the Father" is an expression designating the eternal existence of the Son as the natural 
offspring of the latter. 
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The second part of Athanasius' Epistola de Synodis Arimini et Seleuciae (chs 
32-55, circa 359) follows a long exposition of the various Arian teachings and the credal 
statements which they suggested as alternatives to the Nicene (chs 1-31) and includes a 
comprehensive defence of the superiority of the Nicene terminology as the genuine 
expression of biblical teaching against the various Arian decrees holding similar claims. 
The Arians rejected the terms "from the substance" and "homoousios" on the grounds of 
their being "ambiguous" and "not contained in the Scriptures".''^  Athanasius defends them, 
developing his argument around two key verses, Mat. 3:17 and Jn. 10:30. The first is the 
cenfre of chs. 33-42, where he deals with the generation of the Son and expounds on the 
meaning of the three elements involved: the begetter, the act of begetting and the 
offspring. As it concerns the first, he justifies the ascription of the term "essence" (ouoia) 
to the Father on the basis of Ex. 3:14, because it denotes his personal involvement in the 
generation of the Son. As for the second, he explains that the concept of the Son's 
generation should be understood in a "spiritual" sense and apart from any suspicion of 
divisions which occ\ir and belong to bodily beings. This understanding is based on the 
paradigms 'fountain-river' (Ps. 35:10, Jer. 2:13, Bar. 3:12), 'light-effulgence' and the 
Christological titles 'Son' and 'Word', which denote the "unpassible" (ctTtaGec;) and 
"indivisible" (anepiOTOv) nature of this generation. As for the third, he argues that Col. 
1:15 and Jn. 1:16 demand the Son to be the real offspring of the Father and to belong to 
the same ontological category with him. 
After an interpolation in chs. 43-47 referring to the condemnation of the 
"homoousios" at an earlier Council called against Paul of Samosata (Antioch 268), 
Athanasius returns to the meaning of the "homoousios" in relation to the unity of the Son 
with the Father on the basis of Jn. 10:30, 14:9 and Heb. 1:3. By vutue of the generic 
SYNO 37:26,760B; 40:26,764A. 
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identification of the Son with the Father, he argues that according to the biblical evidence 
the Son has all the attributes of the Father's essence except the very name Father on 
account of which the one is distinguished from the other. Jn. 16:15 affirms community of 
attributes, which Athanasius demonstrates through a long list of biblical verses, paying 
particular attention to include those which are uniquely and solely divine. This identity, he 
continues, implies equality which refers to their inner being, because the divine attributes 
cannot be possessed by a being that is "different" or "alien" to the Father's kind of essence 
(etepoouoiov, aXXoxpiouoiov). 
In the following chapters (52-54) Athanasius explains how the meaning of unity in 
essence (evoTrixa Kaxa xf^v ouolav) of the Father and the Son secures the oneness of 
God. On the basis of Gen. 32:31, Jer. 1:11, Ex. 3:16 and Col. 1:17 he argues that the Son 
is "homoousios" with the Father, because "there is only one God, for there is one kmd of 
Godhead", (evav Geov evoc; ovxog 8i6oug Geoxrjxoc;) and that, as Son, he carries the 
"peculiarity and resemblance of the paternal essence" (xfiv i5i6xTixa Kai xfiv eixcpepeia 
xfjc; TTaxpiKfjc; ouoiaQ). In fact, the Son is the very "illuminating and creating, the 
Father's most own" ((pcoxioxiKOV, 5T||J,IOUPYIK6V , iSialxaxov), without whom he 
neither creates nor is known. Therefore, although the Son is acknowledged as a distinct 
divine being, the fact that he is generically identified with the Father and also that both are 
bodiless and immaterial and exist beyond temporal and spatial divisions, does not allow us 
to consider him a second separate God, but contemplate the oneness of God who is 
acknowledged as the Father and the Son. 
In the second Epistle to Serapion (c. 360) Athanasius deals again with the 
"homoousios" of the Son. The major importance of this work lies in the fact that it is an 
abridged version of his main arguments'''' and, as would be expected, he uses those which 
Athanasius clearly says in the beginning of this Epistle that, "Because, as you write, some of the 
brothers wanted them epitomised, so that they would have them handy and in brief in order to be able to 
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he regarded as his most representative or striking. The epistle is brief and its structure 
clear. In chs. 2-5, he develops the theme of the unity of the Son with the Father around the 
key verses Jn. 10:30 and 14:9,10, in the light of Jn. 16:15. He sets forth a clear and simple 
option: the Son would either be homoousios with the Father or homoousios with the 
creatures. Apparently, the sense here is again "generic": the Son will belong either to the 
divine "species" or to the created. He goes through a long list of biblical quotations in 
order to compare the attributes of the Son with those of the Father and the creatures 
respectively and show where the Son belongs. The conclusion that he has all the divine 
attributes that none of the creatures could have is established on the doctrine of the 
generation, which he expounds in the following chapter. Using as his basis Ps. 44:2 he 
makes the distinction between God's begetting a Son and creating creatures. The emphasis 
falls on the contrast of Ps. 44:2 with Ps. 148:5, which shows that the Son is the very Word 
of God, while the creatures are the results of his speaking. In chapters 7-9, he handles the 
two Arian proof texts Prov. 8:22 and Mark 13:32 on the basis of the distinction between 
the biblical verses that refer to the divine nature of the Son and those that refer to his 
human nature. He classes both Arian proof texts in the second category and brings out the 
difference by comparing Prov. 8:22 and Mk.13:32 with a long list of verses which he 
attributes to the first category (Jn. 1:3, Ps. 32:6, 106:20, 103:24, 44:7-8, Prov. 3:19, Is, 
61:1, Mat. 16:16 and Mat. 11:27, Jn. 16:30). 
The Tomus ad Antiochenos (362) was the result of the Alexandrine Council of 362 
under Athanasius and deals with three matters: the two Trinitarian formulae, "one 
hypostasis" and "three hypostases" and a heresy related to the Incarnation. The importance 
of this work stems from the fact that it puts well on the way the distinction between 
"ousia" and "hypostasis", upon which the Cappadocians established the Trinitarian dogma. 
answer to those who ask about our faith and refute the heretics, I did so, knowing that you will complement 
whatever might be missing". 
Introduction 25 
The "homoousios" appears as a technical term that expresses both the unity and the 
distinction of the persons of the Trinity. However, because of the nature of the work no 
biblical texts are included. 
In the Epistola ad Epictetum (362) Athanasius gives a full answer to the heresy 
concerning the Incarnation condeinned at the Council of 362. He interprets Jn. 1:3 as being 
against the conclusions of two opposing tendencies the first one of which held that the 
Word of God changed into body during the Incarnation, while the second held that his 
body was divinised. The important point for us is that Athanasius makes all the 
comparisons among the elements involved in the discussion and describes all those 
changes through the term "homoousios". Thus, we meet the phrases: "the Word is 
homoousios with the Father", "the Word is homoousios with the body that was made of 
soil", "the body is homoousios with the Godhead of the Word", etc. Apparently, the 
"homoousios" in this account denotes two elements that consist of the same "material" and 
therefore they belong to the same kind of being or species.''^  
The final work is the Epistola ad Afros Episcopos (369). Here Athanasius urges the 
Afiican bishops to accept the Nicene formulation as the expression of the Apostolic faith 
because it has been handed down to them through the accredited fathers of an Ecumenical 
Council. This being his purpose, he pays particular attention to underlining the biblical 
character of the two crucial terms "from the substance" and "homoousios". First, as in the 
De Synodis, he justifies the use of the term "ousia" for the Father on the basis of Ex. 3:14, 
Jer. 23:18,22, 9:10 and Heb. 1:3. He gives the well-known definition with which he tries to 
clear the confusion: "for hypostasis and ousia is existence; for it is and exists". For 
Athanasius, the context within which the term is used is defined by the twofold option of 
"being" or "not being", "existence" or "nothing". Both "ousia" and "hypostasis" designate 
See the analysis of this use of the 'homoousios' with reference to Contra Apollinarem I and Ad 
Epictetutm by G.D. Dragas, "The Homoousion in Athanasius' Contra Apollinarem I", Arianism, p. 233-242. 
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the reality of existence and consequently the term "from the essence" denotes that the Son 
does not come "out of nothing", as the Arians alleged, but out of the living existence of the 
Father. As in the De Decretis and De Synodis, so here, he gives an account of the 
proceedings at Nicea, referring first to the generation, which he illustrates through the 
Christological titles 'Only-begotten Son', 'Word', 'Power', 'Wisdom', 'true God' (1 Jn. 
5:20) and the paradigm 'light and effulgence'. The "homoousios" designates the likeness 
of the Son with the Father, because he is begotten from the Father and still one with Him. 
He illusfrates the point through the familiar paradigms fountain-river (Jer. 2:13, Bar. 3:12), 
light-effulgence (Ps. 35:10, Heb. 1:3), chdxSiCiQX-kypostasis (Heb. 1:3), and also Jn. 10:30 
and 14:9. On the basis of Jn. 16:15, he compares the qualities of the Son with those of the 
Father and the creatures respectively, and asserts that the identification of those purely 
divine qualities that emerges from that comparison, can only be understood and accepted 
through a unity of being to which the "homoousios" alone gives full expression. . 
This brief exposition of the Athanasian texts has drawn the guidelines of his 
arguments for the "homoousios" as the expression of the two fundamental biblical 
doctrines of eternal generation and unity of the Son with the Father. Taking for granted the 
clear distinction between the two individual divine persons the Father and the Son, 
Athanasius understands that the 'homoousios' expresses the generic identification of the 
latter with the former, maintaining also the oneness of God in view of the duality of the 
persons. However, it is not the first time that these doctrines featured in his writings. In 
fact, it seems that all the pro-homoousios arguments of those texts are to a certain extent 
abridged versions of a ful l argument deployed in the Three Orations Contra Arianos (c. 
340).''* The striking difference lies in the amount of emphasis put on the actual term 
"^^  The years around 340 is the most commonly accepted date, although many place it at a later stage 
(for a brief discussion on the various opinions on dating these texts see G.D. Dragas, Contra Apollinarem, 
pp. 444-445; also J.N.D. Kelly, Creeds, pp. 260-261). However, there is a general consensus that it is the 
first of the Athanasian writings. We accept the unity of the three texts, following the majority of the 
scholarly opinion. C. Kannengiesser has questioned the authenticity and relativity of the third oration to the 
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"homoousios", which appears only once at the beginning of the first Oration and never 
again. This fact, especially because it concerns a major anti-Arian treatise has greatly 
puzzled scholars, who have propounded various explanations. Many of them inclined to 
think that Athanasius avoided the term because of its greatly problematic and complex 
ambiguity."' 
From our point of view, that they have made too much of a problem which offers a 
rather simple explanation when we consider the chronological order of Athanasius' 
writings. First of all, the fact that the "homoousios" appears in the treatise even once 
suggests that it is indeed included in Athanasius' vocabulary of terms which denote the 
true divinity of the Son. What we have to bear in mind is that the important point for 
Athanasius is his consistent interest in what the terms stand for and not in the terms 
themselves for their own sake, so that in the Contra Arianos he prefers to share the 
emphasis among many similar expressions."* Since the Contra Arianos is commonly 
first two ("Athanasius of Alexandria Three Orations", pp. 986-987), without however berag able to prevail 
on the scholarly opinion yet, since, as R.P.C. Hanson observes, "this position can hardly be described as 
established" (pp. cit, p. 418). 
So J.N.D. Kelly, who observes "a noticeable reluctance" on the part of Athanasius to use the term, 
because, he explains, it was "a strange, novel term, in the company of which no great body of churchmen 
felt entirely at home" (Doctrines, p. 243; C f also Creeds, p. 257-258). The contradicting interpretations the 
'homoousios' suffered from the members of the Council obscured the situation so much that "it is 
impossible to pick one's way with any confidence through the deliberations of the Council" (Doctrines, p. 
253). R.P.C. Hanson considers ambiguity to lie in the loose meaning it initially had at the tie it was used in 
the Creed. In fact, he observes unbalanced use of it in the Athanasian writings which he attributes to 
Athanasius' "incapacity to define effectively what God is as Three in distinction of what he is as One", 
because he was short of appropriate vocabulary which would secure his views fi-om being regarded as 
Sabellian. We do not think that Athanasius was particularly worried not to be accused as Sabellian, as we 
have akeady stated earlier, since he seems to consider the case being closed; he had to deal with the 
Arians. He conveys the distinction among the divine persons with their names themselves, Father, Son and 
Spirit, and at that stage an ontological term, like hypostasis, was not absolutely necessary, as Hanson seems 
to regard it as the only way of defining the distinction of the divine persons. (See his chapter on the 
'homoousion' in The Search, pp.436-445). The defence of the term as it is later undertaken by Athanasius is 
attributed by J.N.D. Kelly to influence fi^om the West after his exile there (J.Kelly, ibid.; it is emphatically 
upheld by J.F. Bethune-Baker, The meaning, pp. l ift), while R.P.C. Hanson, denymg this, rather discerns 
political reasons (ibid.). 
So R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit, p.437; J.N.D. Kelly comments, "It was not that he was personally 
unhappy about it, but that he wanted above all things to promote the doctrine for which it stood. That this 
doctrine was his own all along, and that his thought did not undergo any significant theological evolution, 
is bom out by a careful study of his NOCdAynXsry."(Creeds, p. 260); A. Heron also observes at this point the 
continuity of Athanasius' thought saying "There was no substantial change in his position when he came 
more and more to use homoousios in his writings: it served simply to focus and concentrate the entire 
debate with Arianism", ("Homoousios", p. 67). 
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accepted as the first anti-Arian freatise of Athanasius, we would incline to see his method 
of deploying and of establishing his arguments through a variety of terms as a sign of wise 
strategy rather than hesitancy of using a term that has the approval of an Ecumenical 
Council. The lack of frequent reference to it should not be attributed to Athanasius' 
reservations against it, but to the fact that the controversy was still at its first stages and the 
terminology was not yet fixed. The 'homoousios was not charged with all that significance 
that appears to have later, therefore the variety of terms which Athanasius used in order to 
address larger groups of people and many different schools of thought. The focus on the 
"homoousios" emerges gradually and is mostly the result of the Arian reactions to it, as 
can be deduced from the main defensive treatises of the "homoousios", De Decretis, De 
Sententia and De Synodis. Since Athanasius was primarily interested in the abolition of the 
Arian heresy, it is obvious that he would choose the weapons which would prove most 
effective for his battle.''^ This attitude becomes clearer when we consider his approval of 
the earlier repudiation of the "homoousios" on the ground that it effectively abolished the 
heresy of Sabellius and Paul of Samosata and also when he does not hesitate to challenge 
his opponents to accept the Nicene doctrine regardless of the particular terms even at a 
later stage {De Synodis, 362), when he was already wholeheartedly defending them. 
Therefore, we believe that the Contra Arianos is legitimately entitled to be regarded as a 
pro-homoousios work of Athanasius. As a matter of fact, it a very important one because 
he produces in it his full biblical and theological account of the doctrines of the generation 
and unity and especially through an also extensive refutation of, probably, the majority, or 
at least, of the most important Arian proof texts. In the context of the generation, he deals 
in particular with Prov. 8:22 (CAR2 44-82), Acts 2:36 (CAR2 11-18) and Deut. 32:6,18 
R.P.C. Hanson comments characteristically "[the homoousios] was a word, ...which serious and 
wholehearted Arians could not stomach; Arius in his Thalia had specifically rejected it, and in his letter to 
Eusebius of Nicomedia, had attacked the idea that the Son is a 'consubstantial part' {meros homoousios) of 
tiie Father" {op. cit, p. 167). J.N.D. Kelly also cites St. Ambrose's witness to the insertion of the term in 
the Creed because "it stiaick terror into the adversaries hearts" {Creeds, p. 253). 
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(CAR2 58-59) and in the context of the unity with Jn. 17:11,20-23 (CAR3 17-25). He 
examines all their implications for the biblical exegesis and the Church's faith, and, in fact, 
on the basis of all the biblical data we saw employed in his other works which appear for 
the first time in the Contra Arianos. Thus, the actual term "homoousios" may appear only 
once but its constituent doctrines are central to these texts. 
2. The structure of this thesis 
In this thesis we will attempt to present systematically the biblical material and data 
which the Athanasian texts provide.^" The brief exposition in the foregoing pages has made 
evident to a large extent the structure and contents of this thesis. It is divided into two parts 
according to Athanasius' focus on the two themes of the generation and of the unity of the 
Son with the Father. In each part we examine the biblical grounds upon which Athanasius 
bases these doctrines, dividing the biblical data into three chapters. The first chapter 
contains the main biblical texts which constitute the backbone of his arguments. We 
attempt a comprehensive presentation of their interpretation and theological application. 
The second chapter contains the biblical Christological titles, which derive from larger sets 
of texts from both Testaments. We focus our attention on the manner in which he employs 
these titles in order to develop the two doctrines and we look especially at the features 
which he chooses from them to serve his purpose better. Finally, the third chapter contains 
the interpretation of the biblical paradigms and their Christological application, which 
basically serves as an illustration of the previous sections. We pay special attention to the 
way in which Athanasius takes them up from the natural world and qualifies them in order 
to use them as theological statements on the divine reality. The anti-Arian nature of the 
°^ The limited scope of this thesis did not allow an exhaustive presentation of all the biblical material 
in the Athanasian writings which sums up to approximately 4360 references. We tried to focus our 
attention to the most fi-equentiy recurrent texts and gather around them all the relevant arguments and other 
biblical verses associated with them. 
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Athanasian texts made necessary in most places to compare the Athanasian interpretation 
with that of the Arians in order to make out which of the two approaches does more justice 
to the biblical text. For this reason we also take into account and discuss the data which 
modem theological research on the 'homoousion' and current biblical scholarship 
concerning the texts under consideration provide. At the end we attempt an overall 
assessment of the Athanasian exegesis and a summary of the main points that define the 
biblical ground on which the "homoousios" stands. 
2. THE "HOMOOUSION" AND THE 
GENERATION OF THE SON FROM THE 
FATHER 
The concept of the generic continuity of the Father in the Son'' is present in 
Athanasius' thought f rom his early writings and appears to be central to his understanding 
of the divine sonship of Jesus Christ. It appears for the first time in his early classic treatise 
Contra Gentes: "And being the good offspring of Him that is good, and true Son, he is the 
Father's Power and Wisdom and Word, not being so by participation, nor as i f these 
attributes were imparted to h im from without, as they are to those who participate in him 
and are made wise by h im and receive power and reason in him; but he is the very 
wisdom, very word, and very own power o f the Father, very light, very truth, very 
righteousness, very virtue and in truth his character and effulgence and image. And to sum 
all up, he is the wholly perfect fruit of the Father and he is alone the Son and unvarying 
image o f the Father".'^ This teaching, not yet found in the sophisticated debates which 
were to fol low, is probably echoed in his later Contra Arianos with reference to the 
catechetical practice o f the Church, which marks the initiation into Christian theological 
understanding, "Who hears of a son and does not conceive that which is proper to the 
father's essence? Who heard in his first catechising, that God has a Son and has made all 
things through his own Word, and did not understand it in the sense as we now mean it?... 
For what is sown in every soul from the beginning is that God has a Son, the Word, the 
Wisdom, the Power, that is, his image and effulgence..."." 
'^ A. Robertson characteristically calls it: "the full unbroken continuation of Being of the Father in 
the Son", NPNF, p. xxxii. 
" GENT46:25,93B-C. 
" CAR2 34:26,220A-B; cf. also C A R l 8:26,28B, where he makes similar complaints "For who was 
ever yet a hearer of such a doctrine? From where and from whom did the abettors and hirelings of the 
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The doctrine o f the eternal generation of the Son from the Father became 
fundamental in Athanasius teaching and unfolded its implications to their fu l l extent, when 
he became involved in the Arian controversy. The doctrine of generation was the answer 
which the Church developed against the Arian teaching which alienated the Son from the 
Father in his being and regarded him as a creature and not true God by nature.^'' 
Athanasius, giving a brief outline of this Arian doctrine says: 
"So, they say what others held and dared to maintain before them; 'not 
always Father, not always Son', for the Son was not before he was begotten, 
and as others he was also made out of non-existence. In consequence, God 
was not always Father of the Son, but when the Son came to be and was 
created, then God was called his Father. For the Word is a creature and a 
work, foreign and unlike the Father in essence. The Son is neither by nature 
the Father's true Word, nor his only and true Wisdom, but being a creature 
and one of the works, he is improperly called Word and Wisdom, because 
by the word which is in the Father was he made, as were all things. 
Therefore, the Son is not true God"." 
Taking for granted the absolute distinction of the two individuals Father and Son, 
Athanasius opposes to their ontological alienation by setting two objectives. Firstly, he had 
to prove that the kind o f the Son's essence is not different from that of the Father, in the 
way that the essence of creatures is different in virtue of the fact that it consists of 
'elements' that have been created by the Father. The Son belongs to the same species with 
the Father, because He is begotten from him and therefore carries all the generic or 
essential attributes of the Father and consequntly he is "homoousios" with him. Secondly, 
he had also to show that these two generically identified beings do not constitute two 
heresy gain it? Who thus expounded to them when they were at school?". 
For this reason we believe that the "emergence" of the doctrine of generation in the Church is only 
a matter of emphasis, which aimed at meeting particular demands and therefore we do not share M. Wiles' 
argument that it was a matter of import or development, because it is not emphasized by the Apologists 
{Eternal Generation, p. 291). They had different themes to deal with, as for example the 'logos' of the 
philosophers. The Arians called into question the origins of the Son and his very existence. It is natural 
then for Athanasius to answer to them through the doctrine of the Son's generation. 
" D E C R 6:25,425A-B, also in C A R l 5-6:26,21 Aff; As R.P.C. Hanson {op. cit., p. 10) and R. 
Williams {Arius, p. 99) have suggested this presentation of the Arian teaching is based on Athanasius' free 
reproduction of Arian sources and does not render exact words of Arius. They both hint to possible 
"distortion" or "misinterpretation", for which however no sufficient evidence is produced, since the whole 
of Athanasius' presentation is coherent and also corresponds to the directly Arian poor evidence. 
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separate Gods, so as to conclude in ditheism, but on account of the biblical doctrine of 
their absolute unity, which is based on the immaterial and bodiless nature of God that 
exists beyond space and time which creates divisions, they are the One God who was 
revealed in the Old Testament through the prophets and in the New through the Son. Thus 
he appeals to both Testaments, emphasising mainly the oneness of God as unity of being 
of the Son with the Father in the New, and the oneness of God as unity of act of the Father 
through the Son in the Old. As the Son is united with the Father in the revelation of the 
New Testament, so is he present in the act of the Father in the revelation of the Old. 
The notion o f the Son's generic continuity Son from the Father is clearly presented 
in his first anti-Arian treatises {Contra Arianos), in which he remarks: "For whatever the 
begetter is, i t is necessary that the offspring is the same".'* In the Contra Arianos, as we 
have already pointed out, Athanasius establishes this teaching using a variety of similar 
expressions among which the most prominent and recurrent is the other controversial 
Nicene term "from the essence of the Father" ( E K xfic; ouoiac; xoO IlaTpOQ). When in the 
course of the debate the discussion came to focus on the "homoousion", Athanasius used 
the term "from the essence" to acknowledge the transition to the "homoousion" and to 
move away from using a multiplicity o f terms towards using a single term. His basis was 
the common element o f the generic sense, which both terms conveyed. The beginning of 
this l ink is apparent in the De Decretis, where, in the defence of both terms, he argues that 
both " f rom the essence" and "homoousios" expresses the "likeness" ( O H O I O T T I Q ) of the Son 
wi th the Father which also "human sons acquire from their begetters, according to what is 
written about Adam and Seth, who was begotten from the former ' in his own likeness, 
after his image'"." The same point is more plainly repeated even later in the De Synodis, 
CARl 35:26,221A: "onoloc, yap av f\ o yevvcbv, xoioOxov dvayKn Kal to YevviKxa elvai". 
D E C R 20:25,452B. 
The Generation of the Son form the Father 35 
where he says: "thus, the mind of the offspring and of the homoousios is one and anyone 
who thinks o f the Son as offspring, rightly thinks of h im as homoousios".^^ 
The notion "offspring" is the most appropriate one among the other attributes of the 
Son which oppose the Arian point of view, because it goes back to the 'beginnings' or 
'origins' o f his existence and defines the nature o f his being. The manner o f the Son's 
generation determines the ontological category to which he belongs, and distinguishes it 
from the sonship, which is a gi f t that human beings receive from God. To acknowledge the 
Son from the Father as offspring and not as creature immediately implies that he is 
"homoousios" with the Father. Athanasius asserts that the Scriptures provide all the 
evidence sufficient for this, but, as he remarks, i t takes a great deal of care and 
discernment to ensure that the outcome of such an inquiry into the biblical texts w i l l be 
understood appropriately to God's own self-revelation and God's nature, 
"It belongs to discerning men, as Paul has commanded, to be careful at their 
study and discriminate and dispose of what is written according to the 
nature o f each subject and avoid any confusion of sense, so as neither to 
conceive of the things of God in a human way, nor to ascribe the things of 
man to God". ' ' 
The whole debate, therefore, as Dr G. D. Dragas remarks, was not simply a matter 
o f understanding the meaning of the divine sonship of Jesus Christ, but concerned the 
understanding of the divine nature as a whole.^° Athanasius himself often argues that i f the 
Son was not a real Son, then neither would the Father be a real Father and this would be 
enough to change the conception of God altogether. Thus, his argument on the divine 
sonship aims not only at the clarification of the understanding of Jesus Christ as Son and 
the difference between h im and the creatures, in general, and human beings as sons, in 
particular, but also of the manner of this generation and of the Begetter himself 
Athanasius primarily uses the Bible in order to define and describe the three elements 
" SYNO 42:26,768B-C. 
" D E C R 10:25,433B. 
Athanasiana, p. 58. 
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involved in the doctrine of generation, i.e., the Father, the Son and the act of begetting, 
and to illusfrate their relations to each other. 
The presentation of the material w i l l fol low the pattern which we have set from the 
beginning. First o f all, we w i l l look into the interpretation of those biblical verses with 
which Athanasius defines and clarifies both the understanding of the Father as Begetter 
and the act o f begetting. This w i l l serve as the basis upon which we shall present a 
comprehensive overview of his understanding of the Christological titles "Son" and 
"Word" in the context o f the divine generation. And, finally, we shall look into the manner 
in which he employs the biblical paradigms 'fountain-river', 'light-effiilgence' and 'image' 
to illustrate the above. 
2.1 The Biblical Texts 
2.1.1 The starting point of the debate: 1 Cor. 8:6 and 2 Cor. 5:17-18 
According to Athanasius' account of the proceedings of the Council of Nicea, the 
debate on the generation was initially expressed as an hermeneutical disagreement over the 
two Pauline verses 1 Cor. 8:6a ("Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are 
all things") and 2 Cor. 5:17-18 ("The old has passed away, behold the new has come; all 
this is from God").*' While the Nicenes and the Arians shared common ground when they 
acknowledged God the Father as the ultimate source from which everything originates, 
their views of the origins o f the Son and creation were entirely different. The Arians 
followed a strict monotheism and stressed the distinction between the 'One God' and 'all 
things', differentiating ontologically only the Father from every other being among which 
they included the Son.*^ 
The Arian biblical argument on the generation of the Son, which is contained in the later works of 
Athanasius (from DECR onwards), where he defends the "homoousion", consists only of the verses 1 Cor 
8:6a, 2 Cor 5:17-18 and Prov 8:22 (CAR2 44-57ff, DECR 13-14, DION 10-11, SER2 7-8). But in fact their 
appeal to the Bible was much more extensive, as we can see in the Three Orations Contra Arianos, where 
Athanasius refutes their views step by step in lengthy expositions. We think that there are three reasons for 
this, a) it is the fact that in the CAR Athanasius attempts an overall and detailed refutation of the Arian 
doctrine, therefore he includes all the main points, b) they were used in the Council, whose "minutes" 
Athanasius presents (DECR, AFRO), and c) the Arian insistence on these particular texts, and especially on 
Prov 8:22 which in the course of the debate appeared to be the "cornerstone" of the Arian doctrine. 
Therefore, we regarded as essential to our investigation and in order to give a complete account of the 
Arian biblical argument on the subject, to include all evidence produced in CAR. 
" Their exegetical contention was that "the phrase from God belongs also to us and in this respect 
the Word of God does not differ from us at all" (DECR 19:25,448D). Athanasius, elsewhere, records the 
Arian argument in their own words: "Let us assent. For we are also from God, for there is One God from 
whom are all things and the old has passed away, behold, the new has come; all things are from God"; 
AFRO 5:26,1037B; C f also C A R l 19:26,52C; SYNO 35:26,756A. Arian monotheism has been ftilly 
explained and expounded by almost all scholars with various degrees of emphasis put on it; for more 
details on the ttaditional view of Arius see: H. Gwatkin, Studies in Arianism, pp. 20ff; W. Barnes, "Arius 
and Arianism", pp. 19ff; S. Laeuchli, "The Case", pp. 404ff; Meinhold, "The Ecumenical Council", pp. 
94-97; S. Papadopoulos, St Athanasius, pp. 108-109ff; G. Florovsky, The Fathers of the East, pp. 20-24; 
T.F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, pp. 118ff, 133ff; A. Heron, "Homoousios", pp. 59f, 68f; J.N.D. Kelly, 
Doctrines, pp. 226ff; Creeds, pp. 23Iff; C. Kaimengiesser, Holy Scripture, pp. 5ff; T.E. Pollard, Joh. 
Christology, pp. 141ff, 187ff; G.D. Dragas, Athanasiana, pp. 49ff. A number of recent studies, however, 
fry to create a more "sympathetic" approach of Arius; see: M. Wiles, "In Defense", pp. 339ff; R. Williams, 
"The logic", pp. 56ff; and Arius, pp. 95-117; Gregg-Groh, Arianism. A view, pp. 1-130 and "The 
centtality", pp. 305-31. C f also the collection of the Papers of the 9th Intern. Conf. of Patr. Studies, 
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Athanasius however replies that the alleged identification of the generation of the 
Son with the generation of the creatures is not only without foundation in these two verses, 
but in fact they are a profound manifestation of the divinity of the Son.*^ Turning to the 
context o f 1 Cor. 8:6a, he asserts that the emphasis does not fall on a distinction between 
"God" and "all things", because, as verse 5 suggests, the intention of the Apostle is not to 
explain the relations between the Father and the Son, but between the Christian God and 
the pagan gods. St. Paul is dealing with the particular problem of food offered to idols and 
directs his argument against Hellenistic polytheism, making clear that the ontological 
beginning and origin of all created beings is found in the w i l l and the creative activity of 
the one God the Father and not in "another creator", "chance", "combination of atoms", 
"angels" or "with no cause" according to the various contradicting pagan cosmo-theories of 
his time. 
When one looks at the second half of the verse which the Arians, for obvious 
reasons, omitted, the way the wording parallels the first part puts the Son on a par with the 
Father. Athanasius, laying emphasis on the phrase "and one Lord Jesus Christ through 
whom are all things", argues that rather than putting the Son apart from the creation, it 
acknowledges h im to be the Creator of all in the same way as the Father is. The phrases 
" f rom whom" and "through whom" carry the same theological significance and imply that 
the Father cannot be considered separately from the Son, "for he who dares to call him, 
through whom are all things, one of that all, surely w i l l have similar speculations 
concerning God, from whom are a l l " .^ Since the act of creation is distinctively and 
uniquely divine, Athanasius asserts that the claim that the One who creates is also a 
creature cannot be based on "any religious argument from human reason; for what man. 
Oxford 1983 in R. Gregg, Arianism, Philadelphia 1985. 
We shall follow the exegesis in DECR19:25,449A-B; SYN035:26,765A. Although Athanasius 
seems to have had in mind mostly the first verse, his arguments can be applied to both verses. 
C A R l 19:26,52C. 
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Greek or barbarian, presumes to call one, whom he confesses to be God, a created thing or 
to say that he was not before he was made?".*' Thus, he concludes that although the 
general theological statement "from God" applies both to the Son and to the creatures, the 
fact that according to 1 Cor. 8:6b the creatures have been created "through" the Son 
differentiates both their origins and their nature: the Son is manifested to be co-Creator 
who acted in one indivisible act with the Father. Such a status cannot be possessed by any 
creature, but only by a being which is essentially like God and bears the tmiquely divine 
atfributes o f his being. The fact that the Son appears to possess these attributes which the 
Arians essentially attribute only to the Father, implies that they have been transmitted to 
the Son. Such a fransmission can only take place through the natural process of generation, 
because they are attributes of essence and being. Therefore Athanasius shifts the emphasis 
from the Son as Creator to the Son as offspring saying, 
"For what is called God's work, is all done through the Son and it is not 
possible that the things created should have one origin with their Creator. 
The phrase ' o f God', which occurs in the passage, has a different sense in 
the case o f the works, from what i t bears when used o f the Son; for He is 
offspring and they are creatures and therefore He, the Son, is the proper 
offspring of his essence, but they are the handiwork of his will".** 
The Arians' interpretation of these verses as grounds for identifying the generation 
of the Son with the creation of the world ' f rom God' and for distinguishing the Father from 
any other being, arose from a confusion of the notions 'offspring' and 'creature' and the 
verbs 'to create' and 'to beget'. Arius himself bears witness to that in the famous statement 
of his Letter to Alexander, saying, "[the Son is] perfect creature of God, but not as one of 
the creatures, offspring, but not as one o f the offsprings ... created before the ages ... 
begotten timelessly before everything".*^ The fact that he concentrated his teaching in the 
DION2:25,481B. 
SYNO 35:26,756B; The counter argument of the Arians at this point was the development of a 
"mediator-creator" teaching, which we shall discuss later on. 
" C f his Letter to Alexander, H-G. Opitz, A.W., Urk. 6, 3:1:1, pp. 12-13. Athanasius also bears 
witness to this in many places saying that whenever the Arians hear "offspring and Word and Wisdom, they 
are quick to misconstrue and deny the natural and genuine generation of the Son from the Father; also, 
when they hear words and terms proper to a creature, they straight away regard him to be a creature and 
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phrases "out o f non-existence" (e^ O U K O V T C O V ) and "there was [time] when he was not" 
(fiv 6 T 8 O U K f jv) shows that the regulative concept which defined the meaning of both 
was the notion of creation with the connotations of which he understood the generation of 
the Son. 
What becomes apparent from the above Athanasian text is that the decisive factor 
which defines the distinction between offspring and creature, is the person o f the Father 
and his role in the generation of the Son and the creation of the world. Athanasius discerns 
two elements, "essence" and " w i l l " the first of which relates the Father to the Son and the 
second the Father to the world. His next step was to explain those relations of the Father 
according to biblical evidence and to vindicate the Nicene term "from the essence" ( 8 K 
TfiQ ouoiac;). 
2.1.2 The Father as the 'beginning' of the Son 
Athanasius does not consider meaningless the biblical use of both verbs 'to create' 
and 'to beget', therefore he maintains the distinction between the two concepts, on the 
grounds of the entirely different connotations and implications they carry. The first crucial 
difference he discerns is related to the 'out of non-existence' principle, which implies that 
the outcomes o f creation and generation have their ontological beginning in different 
starting points.*^ On the one hand, generation implies that the beginnmg of the existence of 
its object is located in the subject itself, from which it is produced and whose attributes it 
bears. Athanasius expresses this intimacy of relation with the term "iSiog" ("proper" or 
deny the Word"; and a little later, "you claim that offspring and creature have the same meaning", CAR2 
4:26,153C; C f also CAR2 20:26,189A: "you identified the offspring with the creature, when you wrote 
begotten or made"; also CAR2 58:26,2690. 
The term 'beginning' has double meaning in Athanasius, as we shall see during our discussion: it 
indicates the ontological beginning or origin and the temporal beginning. While the Son has the first in the 
Father, he does not have the second because he is eternal. C f the conclusions of E . Meijering in 
"Athanasius on the Father as the origin of the Son" after an extensive discussion of the relevant Athanasian 
texts. For a well argued exposition of the doctrine of creation see G. Florovsky, "The concept of creation in 
Saint Athanasius", T. u. U., 81 (1962) 36-57. 
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"own"). On the other hand, the verb 'to create' implies that its object has a beginning in 
existence from nothing through the act of God, so that both its beginning and its existence 
are alien to the essence of God. Again Athanasius uses the adverb "outside" (e^coGev) to 
convey this concept.*' To illustrate the difference he uses the parallel of the relationships 
of a father to his son and to his house.™ The latter is the result of the act of creation, 
originates outside and exists apart from their builder, while the beginning of a son is in his 
father, he originates from the essence of his father and therefore he is also "homoousios" 
wi th h im. ' ' In contrast to this and for reasons which we shall see later, Arius' fear of any 
creaturely affection of God made him anxious to preserve the essence of the Father in his 
absolute franscendence and safe from any involvement with the Son or any other being." 
The task for Athanasius was to show that the Father is portrayed in the Bible as 
personally involved in the generation of the Son, whereas he is distanced from the 
creatures, which are the result of his creative act and exist "outside" him. To prove the 
point, he adduced to three verses from the book of Psalms, Ps. 2:7 ("you are my Son, today 
I have begotten you"), Ps. 44:2 ("My heart uttered a good word"), and Ps. 109:3 ("from the 
womb before the morning star I begot you")," which he combined with the names "God" 
"The Son is something proper to God and truly from that blessed and eternal essence; on the 
contrary, what is from his will, comes into consistence from without and is created through his proper 
offspring who is from that [essence]" (CAR2 2:26,152B). Arius, however, refrained from defining the 
creation of the Son as 'out of non-existence'. It is mainly Athanasius that sttesses the point, since there is no 
other reference in the extant Arian documents except for the Letter to Eusebius; C f R.P.C. Hanson, "Who 
taught ouK OVTCOV;", Arianism, p. 125. As for the term "i5io<;" we gave two franslations because we 
think that only the franslation into "proper" does not render the full significance of the Greek. The latter 
also includes the notions of "possessmg the same thing", "similarity", "identity". C f especially the most 
persuasive analysis of the understanding of the term by Arius in R. Williams, The Logic, pp. 58-62. The 
conclusion one can easily draw out of this study is that Arius and Athanasius used it in diametrically 
opposite way: it shows the strict philosophical pressupositions which Arius applied and which seem to be 
totally absent in Athanasius. 
™ SYNO 41:26,768A; CAR2 2:26,152A. 
" In the SER2 6 he characteristically argues "For, as mad one would be, if he said that a house or a 
ship is homoousios with its builder, so appropriate it is for one to say that every son is homoousios with his 
father" (26,617B). 
" C f for this Arius' letter to Constantine as it is reconstructed by R.Hanson, The Search, p. 9. He 
appears in it to claim "No! I do not wish God to be involved with the suffering of insults". 
Because Athanasius uses the L X X text, we will always refer to it both as text and reference. The 
English translations of these verses vary because they follow the Hebrew text, but without great 
differences; the basic meaning which matches the L X X ttanslation is rendered by all of them. For the 
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and "Father", especially in those verses in which the Father is directly related to the Son, 
like Mat. 3:17 (and parallels), Jn. 8:42 and Jn. 6:46. His objective was to just ify the Nicene 
term "essence", which was used in order to show this distinction. 
2.1.2.1 Mat 3:17, 17:5 (andparallels) 
The apocalyptic character of the Baptism and Transfiguration narratives in the 
Synoptic Gospels (Mat. 3:17, 17:5; Mark 1:11, 9:7; Luke 3:22, 9:35) in which the Father 
plainly declares Jesus Christ to be his own Son, constitutes the foundations upon which 
Athanasius bases the Son's generic identification with the Father. The verses have been 
fraditionally interpreted in Trinitarian terms^" and Athanasius maintains this trend by 
taking the Fatherly declaration literally as designation of Jesus Christ's natural sonship. 
There are two elements in this verse that he combines with regard to the generation of the 
Son. Firstly, i t is the initiative of the Father to relate himself personally with Jesus Christ 
in terms o f Father-Son. This is a unique and unprecedented occurrence in the whole Bible 
indicating the different relation of the Son from the relation of other beings with the Father 
which for Athanasius is due to their different status. He argues that i f the generation of the 
Son did not differ essentially from the creation of other beings and he were indeed a 
creature, the Bible would contain statements of comparison between him and the others 
franslation and interpretation of these verses we consulted the following, D. Hay, Glory, pp. 155ff; H-J. 
Kraus, Theology, pp. 107ff; H-J.Kraus, Psalms i-ii; J. Giannakopoulos, Psalms; C. Allen, Psalms 101-150; 
Kirkpatrick, Psalms; Kissane, Psalms; Dahood, Psalms. 
See Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the four Gospels, I (St. Matthew), i, pp. 114-115, ii, pp. 
604-605, in which he presents in the form of catena the interpretations of Augustine, Hilary, Jerome etal. 
The same interpretation also appears in the appropriate passages in the commentaries of Mark and Luke. 
The power of this witness to Jesus and its unprecedented character seems to be acknowledged by 
the majority of biblical scholarship as an indication of the intention of the sacred authors to designate Jesus 
Christ's unique sonship and relation to the Father with reference to kinship of nature and essence, upon 
which his messianic ministry of death and resurrection is founded (Culhnaim, p. 276f, Bonsriven, p. 23f, 
Goppelt, I, p. 199f, Richardson, p. 178f and 181f, Dunn, p. 49). Although all of them underline the 
significance of these texts for this ministry which was to follow, their limitation only to this purpose, that 
is, as a witness to Christ's sonship which is to be recognised in his death, is not adequate to express their 
force and especially when this is asserted on the grounds of denying indication of his pre-existent status 
(J.D.G. Dumi, p. 48, 50ff), since it goes beyond the questions which even the Arians themselves had risen 
and requires special consideration (for the vwtness of the NT to the pre-existence of Christ cf L . Goppelt, 
Theology of the NT, II, pp. 73-79 in conttast to J.D.G. Dunn, op. c/?., pp. 3-9 and passim). 
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and also similar declarations for others as well. He categorically asserts that i t is the only 
case in which God the Father refers to another being in such terms and declares that Jesus 
Christ is his own and only Son.'* I t is the very name 'Son', secondly, that refers the relation 
of the Father with the Son to the generation of the latter from the essence of the former 
and not to creation o f any kind, because, as Athanasius characteristically argues, " i f you 
too have said that the Son is from God, it follows that you have said that he is from the 
'essence' o f the Father. And since the Scriptures precede you which say, that the Lord is 
Son o f the Father, and the Father himself precedes them, who says 'This is my beloved 
Son...' and a son is no other than the offspring from his father, is it not evident that the 
fathers have suitably said that the Son is from the Father's essence?... I f he is a son, he is 
not a creature, and i f a creature then not a son",'' for "no one would ever call his own 
offsprings creatures or his creatures offsprings".'* For Athanasius, this functions as the 
hermeneutical key to the interpretation of other biblical texts and especially Old Testament 
ones, as the link especially to Ps. 2:7 and others indicates," since it appears that the 
explicit divine revelation of the status of the Son illumines all the implicit ones contained 
in other places and especially in the Old Testament. 
CAR2 23:26,196A: "Moreover if, as the heretics hold, the Son were a creature or work, but not as 
one of the creatures, because of his excelling them in glory, it would be natural that Scripture should 
describe and display him by a comparison in his favour with the other works;... But he is not in fact thus 
referred to; but the Father shews him to be his own proper and only Son saying..."; also DECR 11:25,436A: 
"the Father shews only him to be from himself, saying...". 
" SYNO 35-36:26,753Dff; also DECR 11, DION 2, EPI12 and passim. 
DECR 13:25,4450. 
" The link between Mat. 3:17 and Ps. 2:7 is apparent and all scholars make reference to it: it is taken 
as designation of Christ's xmique sonship (Cf Richardson, Bonsriven, Dunn, Goppelt, Culhnann). 
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2.1.2.2 Ps 2:7; 44(45):2; 109{n0):3^° 
In the Epistle to Marcellinus, where Athanasius expounds on the great importance 
of the Psalter for the ecclesiastical and private life, he attributes to these psahns a prophetic 
and messianic character, which constitutes the basis of his interpretation. He specifies their 
Christological significance as having particular reference to the generation of the Son 
saying, 
"When you want to sing in private about the Saviour, you can find 
appropriate [passages] in all psalms; but you have especially 44 and 109 
indicating his genuine generation from the Father and his incarnate 
presence".^' 
His Christological approach to these psahns has been defined by their New 
Testament use, which created a consistent exegetical tradition up to his time.*^ Although 
only his reference to Ps. 2:7 matches the New Testament ones, both Ps. 109 (v. 1) and Ps. 
44 (v. 7) are cited and interpreted in intensely messianic terms by Jesus Christ himself and 
by the Apostles Peter and Paul. Ps. 109:1, in particular, is in the centre of the 
Christological debate between Jesus Christ and the Pharisees recorded in the synoptics 
(Mat. 22:44, Mk . 12:36, Lk. 20:42). There Jesus attacks the Pharisees' simplistic view of 
the Messiah as mere man, which left the verse in an unresolved mystery for the Jewish 
interpreters. He stresses two points: first, that David speaks "in Spirit", a fact that renders 
to the psahn a revelatory character, and second that David addresses the Messiah as "his 
Lord", while no one denied that the Messiah would be one of his descendants. Although 
*° We will examine the three verses together because Athanasius uses them in the same context and 
for the same purpose. 
" MARC 26:27,37B; Cf. also MARC 14-15:27,28Af 
These psalms belong to the category of the 'royal psahns' because they were linked to Jewish 
rituals concerning the concecration of the king. Very soon they acquired messianic significance due to the 
exceeding majesty of the king as he is presented in them. D. Hay has collected all evidence concerning the 
interpretation of Ps. 109 both in Jewish and Christian contexts. In the Christian Church the psahn was 
consistently interpreted up to the time of Nicea in two repsects: "in applying the entire psahn to Jesus, and 
in arguing explicitly for his divinity on the basis of the first and third verses" {Glory, pp. 45-51). Its 
application merely to the Jewish king, employed by several modem scholars who are reluctant to extent its 
significance beyond its particular historical context, is not adequate to render the full meaning of it (see H. 
Kraus who wants to avoid "Christological impose" on the psalm. Theology, p. 114-120). 
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Jesus did not give the answer to his question ( " I f David thus calls him Lord, how is he his 
son?"), the text leaves a clear idea o f his argument which even Masters o f the Law were 
unable to dispute: the Messiah is a descendant of David and yet he is greater than David, 
because being the Son of God himself he has got divine origins. The hermeneutical 
significance o f this point is that the dialogue that follows is not considered to be between 
God and David any longer, but between God and the Messiah, who is his own Son. The 
same exegetical standpoint is taken by both the Apostles Peter and Paul. St. Peter contends 
that the psalm applies to God and his Son, the Messiah, and not to God and David (Acts 
2:34). St. Paul also applies the sitting at the right hand of God (v. 1) to the Son and not to 
David (1 Cor 15:26, Heb. 1:3,13) and on the basis of v. 4 (Heb. 5:6, 7:17) considers the 
high-priesthood of the Son to originate par excellence directly from the Father. Ps. 44:7 is 
used only once, by St. Paul, in Heb. 1:8 to indicate the Father exalting his Son above all 
beings. Finally, Ps. 2:7 is used three times, again by St. Paul, who emphasizes the divine 
sonship of Jesus Christ as the cause of his resurrection (Acts 13:33), his superiority over 
the angels (Heb. 1:5) and his high-priesthood (Heb. 5:5). 
Athanasius, observing this hermeneutical tradition, infroduces these verses into his 
argument either with the claim that i t is the Father speaking, or David "on behalf of the 
Father" ( 8 K TrpoocoTiou T O O 0eoO),*^ that lends to it a distinctive authority. He lays the 
emphasis on the terms 'heart' and 'womb', which in the language of the Bible and 
especially of the Psalms designate the "inner man" and the centre of the human existence.*'' 
As they are naturally linked to the Christological titles 'Son' and 'Word', Athanasius uses 
them to illusfrate the different nature of the Son's generation from the creation of the other 
DION 2; CAR2 23; CAR3 59; DECR 13, 21; MARC 5. 
^ "Heart" in the Old Testament designates "the innermost part of man" and is the seat of mental or 
spiritual powers and capacities, rational functions, rehgious and moral conduct. "Womb" (yaoTTip) is 
always associated with the process of birth-giving; for further details cf E . Kittel, Dictionary, v. 3, pp. 
605-613. 
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beings. The Son is described as coming from the 'womb' of the Father as 'son' and from the 
'heart' o f the Father as 'word', while creatures, as we have said, according to the doctrine of 
creation, have been brought into existence "out of non-existence" through the creative 
Word o f the Father. Therefore Athanasius argues "who ... w i l l dare even to say that the 
Word, who is from the heart of God, is made out of non-existence...?".^^ On this ground, 
he also objects to any other conception of the Son as originating from any source which is 
"other than" (aXX-O0Ev) or "external to" (e^coGev) the Father. To reinforce the 
identification of the Father as the source and establish the distinction between him and 
nothing as the origin o f the Son, he uses the personal pronoun "himself (auTOQ), asserting 
"whence else can one consider the Son...but from the Father himself?" and elsewhere, ". . . i t 
indicates the Father himself'.^^ Based on this principle, he w i l l use the term "essence" to 
render the same meaning, as we shall see later. 
2.1.2.2 Jn. 8:42 and Jn. 6:46 
Although Jn. 8:42 (" I proceeded and came forth from God") and Jn. 6:46 ("Not 
that anyone has seen the Father except him who is from God") are also included in the 
same list o f verses for the generation of the Son,^' their relevance to the subject is not 
obvious at first sight.^ ** In fact they come from a very important and distinctive context in 
the Johannine Gospel, which justifies their selection by Athanasius. The central theme in 
both contexts is the identity of Jesus Christ, which is gradually revealed in the course of a 
theological debate between h im and the Jews. Both verses focus on Christ's divine origins 
from God in his attempt to differentiate himself from all other righteous people of Israel.^' 
DION 2:25,481B; also CAR3 67:26,4640: "If the Word is in the heart, where is the will?". 
D E C R 21:25,4538; 13:25,437D, 
DECR21:25,453B. 
Commentators hardly find any association of the verses with the particular theme of the 
generation. O.K. Barrett discerns a hint by implication to the divine generation of Jesus as intended by 
John, but he does not consider it "the main contention" of 8:42 {The Gospel according to St John, p. 288). 
Only B.F. Westcott, following the patristic ttadition, makes remarkable exegetical comments on 
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Obviously, this matches with Athanasius' intention to differentiate the generation of the 
Son "from God" from the creation of all other beings "from God". The first verse (8:42) 
focuses on the understanding of the Fatherhood of God. Jesus disputes the claim of the 
Jews that they are sons of God on the ground that they do not recognise him who "comes 
from" the Father. Athanasius observes that this evidence of the Son about himself is a 
consistent biblical statement since there is no other indication of his originating from 
anywhere else, but from the Father alone.'" The second verse (6:46) focuses on the 
possibility of the knowledge of God by human beings. Again, Jesus differentiates himself 
from any other being on the grounds of his relation to the Father. Athanasius illustrates the 
point with Ex. 33:20 ("You cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live") and 
argues that since none of the creatures can have knowledge of the Father, but only the Son, 
it follows that he is alone the Father's own and true Son. Such a knowledge is due to his 
fully divine being and can only derive from a natural generation "from the Father", 
because, to put it in Athanasian words, "how would he be the only one to know [the 
Father], i f he were not the only one proper (i5ioc;) to him? How would he be proper, i f he 
were a creature and not a real Son from him?".'' 
Both the verses from the Psalms and the Gospel of John, appear to have been 
interpreted in like manner and for the same theological purpose before Athanasius.This 
is suggested by a specific objection by Arius in his Letter to Alexander, in which he states: 
the theological significance of these statements with reference to their coherent meaning and their relation 
to parallel verses. He considers the designation of the divinity of Jesus the result of his natural generation 
from the Father and the primary objective of these texts. Commenting on 8:42 in parallel examination with 
16:27-28,30, 13:3 and 17:8, he observes: "The words can only be interpreted of the true divinity of the Son, 
of which the Father is the source and fountain. The connection described is internal and essential, and not 
that of presence or external fellowship" {The Gospel according to St. John , p. 136). 
DECR21:25,453B. 
" CAR2 22:26,193B. Cf also B.F. Westcott, "The phrase implies not only mission (xvi 27f, came 
forth from) , but also a present relation of close dependence" (The Gospel according to St. John , p. 105; 
and also 103-104). 
^ They were used by Dionysius of Rome (DECK 26), Dionysius (DION 23) and Alexander of 
Alexandria (Letter to his clerics, Opitz, Urk. 4b, pp. 6-11). 
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" I f the terms 'from him' and 'from the womb' and ' I have come from the Father' are 
considered by some to mean that the Son is homoousion part of him or projection, then the 
Father is composite and divisible and mutable and according to them he is a body, 
suffering all the bodily consequences of these, in spite of him being bodiless"." This text 
suggests that while the "homoousion" was probably a natural term to employ in 
interpreting these verses Arius automatically associated it with divisions in the being of 
God. It appears that his objection mostly refers to the word "part", on account of which he 
also rejects the "homoousion". However, although he attributes this interpretation to 
heretics, he somehow comes himself to accept the heretical view that the 'homoousion' 
indeed implies this division in spite of the contention of his 'orthodox' rivals that this is not 
necessary since it depends on how one understands this process to take place. According to 
Athanasius the problem lies in the fact that both Arius and the other heretics apply the 
same pattern of logic in their approach to Scripture, which uses anthropomorphic models 
to conceptualise the incomprehensible mode of the divine existence.^ " 
It is interesting, though, that on the basis of these verses both Arius and Athanasius 
deny "compositeness" of the divine "ousia", but on account of entirely opposite reasoning: 
Arius argues that i f the Son is "homoousion part" of the Father, then God is composite; 
Athanasius argues that i f the Son is not "homoousios" with the Father, then God is 
composite. The crucial point is that while the "homoousion" answers the question "what" 
the Son is, the "part" answers the question "how" the Son is what he is. As it appears the 
difference was a matter of hermeneutics and theological priorities: Arius was keen to 
answer the second question and modified the answer to the first according to the second, 
whereas Athanasius first answered the question "what" and then qualified the question 
" H. Opitz dates the Letter at 320; see op. cit., p. 12. 
"The Arians, having turned to themselves and understanding nothing else except themselves like 
the Sadducees, they accepted the God-inspired Scripture according to human conceptions; for hearing the 
Son to be wisdom and effulgence and word of the Father, they always ask: how can this exist? As if 
nothing could exist that they cannot imderstand", SER2 1:26,609A. 
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"how" appropriately to the divine nature. Basically, Athanasius denies any answers to the 
question "how", because he believes that the mystery of God can be communicated only 
through faith, neither through logic and most certainly nor through explanations.'^ The 
background and reasons for this difference will become obvious in the examination of his 
understanding of the term "essence" and of the nature of the Son's generation. 
2.1.2.4 Ex. 3:14 and the term "essence " (ovaia) indicating the Father 
With these texts Athanasius defines the boundaries of the context and meaning of 
the term "essence". It is understood as entailing the personal involvement of the Father in 
the generation of the Son and thus distinguishing the divine acts of begetting a Son and 
creating creatures. He pays much attention to the vindication of the Nicene term "from the 
essence of the Father", which constitutes the first step towards the "homoousion". The 
doctrine of creation includes the 'out of non-existence' (e^ O O K OVTCOV) definition, i.e., 
places the existential 'beginning' of the creatures in the 'nothing', which becomes also an 
element of their consistence. Thus, creatures are related to God as far as they are brought 
into existence through the divine act of creation and are sustained by it in order not to 
return to the non-being condition. Athanasius constantly asserts that creatures originate 
from and exist "outside" of (e^coGev) their Creator, while a son is an offspring of the 
essence of its father, as the example of the son of a builder in contrast to his house or 
ship.'^ For his part, Arius was aware of the implications of the doctrine of creation and 
Cf. "Nor must we ask why the word of God is not such as our word, considering God is not such as 
we, as has been said before; nor again is it right to seek how the word is from God or how is he God's 
radiance or how God begets and what is the manner of his begetting...It is all one as if they sought where 
God is and how God is and of what nature the Father is. But to ask such questions is urehgious and argues 
an ignorance of God, so it is not holy to veture such questions concerning the generation of the Son of God, 
not to measure God and his wisdom by our own nature and infirmity" CAR2 36:26,224A. Any of these 
approaches involve also for Athanasius soteriological implications: "For it is better when one is in doubt to 
be silent and believe than to disbelieve on account of doubt; for one who is in doubt may in some way 
obtain mercy, because though one has questioned, one has yet kept quiet; but when one is lead by doubts 
into forming for one's self doctrines which beseem not and utters what is unworthy to God, such daring 
incurs a sentence without mercy", CAR2 36:26,224B; Cf also CARS 1:26,324A, CAR3 18:26,360C, 
DECK 18:25,448B. 
The Generation of the Son form the Father 50 
regarded as more appropriate to relate the Son with the Father only under these terms. 
Therefore, while he equated the notions of 'creature' and 'offspring', he also added that the 
Son was also 'out of non-existence'. Thus, he resulted in lending meaning only to the 
concept of creation and used the terms related to the 'offspring' without any particular 
significance and out of their proper context. 
As we shall see later, according to the extant evidence, Arius tried to justify his 
point biblically, appealing only to certain texts which contained the verb 'to create', but 
there is nothing to show how he supported the 'out of non-existence' teaching. It appears 
then that this emerged as an implication of his view concerning the creation of the Son and 
the impossibility of the eternal existence of two 'ingenerate' beings simultaneously." His 
premise, that is, was rather cosmological and philosophical, but not biblical. On the 
contrary, Athanasius asserts that there is no indication in the Bible that the 'beginning' of 
the Son's existence was in 'nothing', but rather in the Father, who is a concrete being. With 
this argument Athanasius defines the context in which he employs the term: it is the 
fundamental existential distinction between 'being' and 'non being'.'^ 
The fact that Athanasius employs the term 'essence' bearing in mind this distinction 
throughout the debate is made evident by two texts, one at the very beginning and the 
other at the end of his theological career, which draw a consistent line of understanding. It 
fimctions as the underlying regulative principle that determines the various shades of 
meaning the term gradually acquires according to the different contexts in which it appears 
in the Athanasian works. The first text is included in the early GENT, in which Athanasius 
uses the chara!;teristic phrase that "God substantiated the world" (ouaicboac; xi\v K t lo iv ) . 
Cf DECR 13:25,437C; AFRO 6:26,617B. 
" Arius' Letter to Alexander, op. cit ("two ingenerate beginnings"). 
This point seem to be underestimated by many scholars who insist on the lack of distinction 
between 'ousia' and 'hypostasis' by Athanasius. It was not a problem that he addressed and the equal use in 
this context does not imply the confusion which can be created in the context of the unity of the Son with 
the Father. 
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By this he denotes the creative act of God that called beings out of non-existence into 
existence ( T O dvai) , i.e., gave to them "essence" (oOaia) or ordered so that they would 
become "essences", and sustains them so that they will not return to "not being" (]xr\ Eivai) 
again. On the other hand, unlike created beings, God is the one who always exists (wv 
eoTl) . ' ' The second text is included in the late AFRO where the same idea appears as a 
technical formulation: 
"Now, subsistence [uTtooxaoig] is substance [ouaia] and means nothing 
else but the being itself, which Jeremias calls existence saying, and they did 
not hear the voice of existence. For subsistence and substance is existence 
[UTtap^ic;]; for it is and exists".'"" 
The term 'essence' designates for Athanasius merely the isness of a being without 
going into further details, therefore the equivalent biblical text from which he draws this 
definition of the existence of God is Ex. 3:14: "1 am who I am". He associates it with Jer. 
23:18, 23:22,'"' Jer. 9:10, Heb. 1:3 and the divine names "God", "Lord" etc., for which he 
especially quotes Ex. 20:2, Gen. 1:1, Deut. 6:4 and 2 Sam. 7:8 (2 Cor. 6:18). The view of 
Athanasius is that the multiple occurrences of the verb "to be" (eycb eilAl) in all these 
verses, as well as the ontological terms "subsistence" (uTiooxaoic;) and "existence" 
(uTrap^ig) vindicate his intention of putting on a par the term "essence" (oOoia). He 
asserts that, as in the biblical verses, so in the Nicene Creed, all these terms serve to point 
out that it is the Father himself from whom the existence of the Son originates and not the 
"nothing". The relation of the term "ousia" to the notion of "being" implies that Athanasius 
did not identify the terms "ousia" and "hypostasis", as it is usually accepted, according to 
GENT41:25,81C-84A. 
'°° AFRO 4:26,1036B; For the same understanding comp, also DECR 22:25,453Cf: "and that it is of 
what they speak"; and SYNO 34:26,753Af, "you do not believe it to be, but you take it not to be". 
Although the particular term "existence" appears in the late AFRO, it is clear from the above that the 
context and the meaning that he renders to "ousia" is the same. 
R.P.C. Hanson points out the LXX mistranslation of the original Hebrew 'counsel' into 
'hypostasis', which indicates for him "the almost desperate desire of the theologians to base their doctrine 
on Scripture" (op. cit, p. 847). We think that he ovestates the fact, since, at least as Athanasius uses this 
verse, there is no special doctrine to be based on it, but simply an indication of the particular fact of the 
existence of God which in any case was not called into question. Its function in Athanasius is to give more 
emphasis and not to support doctrine. 
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the distinction between the "general" and the "individual", as were later technically 
defined, but rather points to a third notion, i.e., existence, that includes both.'"^ As 
Athanasius had to deal with doubts about the very existence of the Father and the Son his 
argument moves between the notions "to be" and "not to be" and both terms "ousia" and 
"hypostasis" are appropriate and suitable for him to denote existence. This is illustrated by 
means of two distinctions which Athanasius makes. 
Firstly, he distinguishes an "ousia" from a "name" or "words". "Ousia" is what lies 
behind particular words or names and supplies to them their content or their 
correspondence to reality and existence.^"' He renders this idea by using the term "truth" 
(dXT|08ia): 'essence' is the element that determines whether a name is true and real, i.e., 
'possesses' "isness". Therefore the "ousia" does not stand alone but always belongs to a 
name (the essence of the Father or of the Son, etc.).'"'' For Athanasius, then, to consider the 
Son a creature deprives the term 'Son' of its reality: "Holding such ideas you need to 
consider the Word and the title Son not as a substance, but as a name only and in 
consequence hold your own views as far as names only and talk not of what you believe to 
exist [eivai], but of what you think not to exist [|xfi sivai]".'"^ 
Secondly, arguing against the semi-Arians, who refused to apply the term to God, 
under the excuse of avoiding friction, Athanasius argues that i f "ousia" does not point to 
the being of God or God himself, then it must denote "something else" (exepov xi) that 
The identification of the two terms, therefore, as it is supported by most of scholars today should 
not be imderstood in the sense of eliminating the distinction between the two, but as using both to denote 
the same reality. The reality in this context is not God, but the Father in particular. The distinction between 
'ousia' and 'hypostasis' applies when they refer to the being of God which is not 'monosemantic' but 
'dysemantic' (G.D. Dragas, Athanasiana, p. 60) and there they have to be juxtaposed. In fact, Athanasius 
himself, as it is evident from the ANT, felt necessary to qualify only the formula "one hypostasis" as being 
"one ousia", but not the formula "three hypostases". This shows that he was aware of the danger of denying 
the reality of the two persons if he used the two terms without discrimmation in this context of describing 
their unity. Cf. also our discussion in the second part of this thesis on the unity of the Son with the Father. 
CAR2 3:26,152C; Cf his hermeneutical principle concerning the relation between 'words' and 
'realities' in CAR2 3:26,152C. 
Comp. the similar applications of the term 'nature' ((puoiq) in the detailed analysis by G.D. 
Dragas, "Nature and Grace", Athanasiana, p. lOlff 
SYNO 34:26,753B. 
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stands along with God. This suggests the term 'xi' to be equivalent to 'essence' and in 
consequence to define the compositeness of the divine essence as a unity of the Father as 
'xi' with another 'xi' beside the Father that would be conceived of as "accidental" 
(ouiiPePriKOt;), "surrounding" (7i8pi3oX,fi), or "complementing" (ou|a.7tX,ripouv) the 
essence of the Father.'"* 
The designation of the Father as an objective reality through the term "ousia" can 
be seen in the anathema, which were an integral and very important part of the Nicene 
Creed. In them it is stated: "And those who ... declare that the Son of God is from some 
other hypostasis or ousia ... the Catholic Church anathematises". This statement does not 
seem to indicate concern about whether the Son comes from the ousia or the hypostasis of 
the Father or with what happens to it after the generation. Concern is that "from some 
other" objectively denotes a being altogether other than the Father. The parallel use of the 
two terms in this context does not contribute to the confusion related to the 'homoousios', 
as some writers take it,'"^ because they are used in order to indicate existence as 
distinguished from non existence, and in this sense both are appropriate. This difficulty 
appears in the context of the understanding of unity of the Son with the Father in one 
being, although, as we noted, the Sabellian identification of the Son with the Father in one 
hypostasis is not one of the main concerns of Athanasius. 
These explanations make evident the different approaches to the divine essence 
made by Arius and Athanasius, as can be seen from their disagreement about the 
interpretation of its compositeness. Athanasius deals with the divine 'ousia' from a 
DECK 22:25,453D; SYNO 35:26,753C. 
The anathema of the Creed is generally taken as evidence for the identification of the two terms as 
synonymus and therefore interhangeable, see E. Craven, op. cit., pp. 71 Iff; J.N.D. Kelly, Creeds, p. 250; 
R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit., pp. 188-189 and also cf. the account he provides of views of scholars on the 
subject pp. 181-207; C. Stead, realising the possibility of misinterpretation, has pointed out that the 
intention of the anathema was simply to ensure that the Son was not derived from source other than the 
Father and not to establish equality of the Son with the Father (Di'v Sub., pp. 233-242), but he does not 
exclude the equation of the two terms, as it is from our point of view appropriate in this context. 
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distance, views it altogether as a perfect entity complete in itself, seen from the outside, 
rather than the inside and therefore he defines 'compositeness' as a combination of God 
with 'something else'. Arius, on the other hand, attempts to go inside the divine essence, 
view it from within and explain how it lives and acts. He defines compositeness as 
occurring in the very consistency of the essence of God and attributes divisions and 
alterations to it. The tenor of Arius' doctrine is to conceptualise the divine essence and 
make it fully comprehensible to the human mind, while Athanasius maintains the distance 
between God and man on the ground that God is an altogether incomprehensible existence. 
There can be no explanation of how it is, only that it is. The crucial point is that Arius' 
understanding and analysis of terms would be applicable i f the notions of generation, 
offspring etc., were attributed to God by human initiative or were inventions of human 
logic. But i f these notions are associated with God by the Bible itself which contains God's 
self-revelation it is a fatal hermeneutical error to interpret them according to human 
models of being, which, for Athanasius, equals to measure God with human gauge.'"^ This 
principle is clearly defined by Athanasius when he says, "For the saints wishing us thus to 
understand, have given these paradigms and it is unseemly and very impious, when 
Scripture contains such paradigms, to form ideas concerning our Lord from others, which 
are neither in Scripture, nor have any religious bearing".'"' It is for this reason that the 
whole effort of Athanasius focused on demonstratmg the biblical grounds of the doctrine 
of the Son's generation so that it would be established beyond doubt on authoritative 
grounds. He asserts and goes on to prove that the Bible uses only the verb 'to beget' to 
describe the origins of the Son's existence and that it also gives the features of this 
generation. 
108 if-pjjg Arians, being engrossed in themselves, and thinking with the Sadducees that there is nothing 
greater or beyond themselves, have met the inspired Scripture with human argimients. When they hear that 
the Son is the Wisdom, Radiance and Word of the Father, they are accustomed to rejoin, 'How can this 
be?', as though nothing can be unless they understand it" (SER2 1:26,609A). 
DECR 12:25,437A. 
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Al l in all, the question of the generic understanding of the "homoousion" focuses 
on the meaning of generation and the manner in which it is applied to God. First of all, for 
Athanasius, the personal involvement of the Father distinguishes this generation from the 
creation of the creatures and associates it with the concept of "begetting" which excludes 
the Arian alternative verb "creating". While "to beget" is the term which describes the 
origin of a being directly from another one, "create" indicates that the origin of a being 
depends on the act of its creator and exists outside him. While the first is a feature of 
nature that pertains to the essence of the subject, the second is a technical skill that pertains 
to the acts of the subject. The outcomes of these two processes differ ontologically as 
much as the processes themselves. Although Athanasius admits that even this description 
is not adequate to express the fullness of the divine reality, since divine generation is 
different from human generation, it is still the only appropriate one in contrast to the 
notion of creation, which is -by definition- false in that it carries connotations altogether 
inappropriate to the biblical descriptions and the divine nature. On these grounds he goes 
on to explain the witness of the Bible to the generation comparing his exegesis with the 
alternative interpretations proposed by the Arians. He maintains the ontological difference 
between the two verbs on the basis of the group of verses which we look into next. 
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2.1.3 The generation of the Son 
The biblical texts in which Athanasius finds the verb 'to beget' as the description of 
the origins of the being of the Son are the three verses from the Psalms (2:7, 44:2, 109:3), 
to which he adds Prov. 8:25 and Jn. 1:18. As we said his objective is twofold: a) he wants 
to prove that the Bible maintains the difference between the verbs "to create" and "to 
beget", using the first for the production of the creatures and the second for the generation 
of the Son and b) to explain the meaning of the concept of generation and set forth the 
qualifications for its application to the divine nature, because it comes from the created 
dimension and carries connotations which are not appropriate to God. 
2.1.3.1 The verb 'to beget' in Ps. 2:7, 44:2, 109:3, Prov. 8:25 
The argument which Athanasius bases on these verses, and especially on the two 
verbs 'begot' and 'uttered', is that the Bible uses this language for the Son because it wants 
to emphasize that his nature is different from the nature of creatures."" Thus, he constantly 
points out that the Scripture describes the creation of the world with the verb "to create" 
and the generation of the Son with the verb "to beget". The "begot" and "uttered" of the 
three psalmic verses together with the "beget" of Prov. 8:25 are the references for the latter 
and he juxtaposes them to the verses which refer to the creation of the other beings, among 
which the commonest ones are the following: 
Gen. 1:1: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" 
Ps. 73:2: "Remember your congregation, which you have possessed from 
the beginning" 
Ps. 101:26: "In the beginning you laid the foundation of the earth and the 
heavens are the work of your hands" 
Ps. 118:73: "Your hands have made and fashioned me" 
Mat. 19:4: "Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning 
made them male and female" 
To emphasize the point, he often uses the characterisric phrase "the Scripture knows", as m the 
following passage: "Moreover, because the Scripture knows the nature of each [bemg], says through Moses 
about the creatures 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth'. About the Son, however, it 
indicates not anybody else, but the Father himself saying 'from the womb before the morning star I begat 
you' and again 'you are my son, this day I have begotten you'" (DECK 13:25,437D). 
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Comparing these two groups of verses Athanasius points out three differences, which 
distinguish the meaning of one verb from the other. 
The first difference refers to the temporal category, which the "to create" verses 
introduce. Athanasius observes that the verb "to create" designates a beginning in time for 
beings that did not exist and therefore that "the creatures have been created from the very 
beginning and they have the beginning of their existence at intervals" ("SiaoTtiiiaTiKfiv 
dpxfiv ToO d v a i Exei").'" God "began to create" (fjp^axo Tioieiv, Gen. 2:3) beings from 
the very beginning and therefore he also stopped (Kat£7iav)0£v). The biblical verses 
which refer to this event include appropriate definitions, such as "in the beginning" (EV 
ctpxti. Gen. 1:1), "from the beginning" (ciTi' dpxfig, Mat. 19:4), "at the beginning" (Kax' 
dpXdg, Ps. 101:26), which define a starting point. On the other hand, none of the "to 
beget" verses include such definitions because according to Jn. 1:1 ("In the beginning was 
the Word") the 'beginning' of the Son is combined with the verb 'was' and thus it is placed 
in eternity. In particular Athanasius argues: 
"The creatures began to be made, but the Word of God, not having 
beginning of being [dpxTiv xou sivai], obviously did not begin to exist, 
nor begin to come to be [ywsaOai], but was ever. The works have their 
beginning in their making [ev xcp TtoieiaGai] and their beginning precedes 
their coming to be, but the Word, not being of those that come to be [xobv 
Yivoiievcov], rather comes to be himself the creator of those which have a 
beginning. The 'being' [x6 sivai] of those which came to be [yEvrixcbv] is 
measured by their becoming and from some beginning does God begin to 
make them through his word, that it may be known that they were not [x6 
(ifi eivai], before their becoming. The Word has his being in no other 
beginning than the Father, whom they allow to be without begmning, so 
that he too exists without beginning [dvdpxcoc;] in the Father, being his 
offspring and not his creature"."^ 
The second difference is the one which we examined in the previous section and 
which refers to some sort of "spatial" category. The verb "to create" implies that beings, 
which are created, originate from somewhere different than their creator and exist apart 
CAR2 57:26,269A-B. 
ibid. 
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and in distance from him (e^coGev). The verb "to create" shifts the emphasis from the 
being to the act of God, the point of communication between God and created beings since 
they owe their existence to it. The relationship does not incur any involvement with the 
being of God, as the verb 'to beget' does."' Athanasius shows this distinction by 
contrasting Ps. 148:5 ("he spoke and they were made, he commanded and they were 
created") with Ps. 44:2 ("My heart uttered a good word") the outcome of which is 
characteristically clear: the Son is the very Word, the speaking act of God, while the 
creatures are the result of this act. Therefore, the Son cannot be considered both being 
created and begotten, and in consequence a creature and an offspring:"'' " I f he is a son, he 
is not a creature and i f he is a creature, he is not a son, because there is a great difference 
between them. And it is not possible to be both a son and a creature, so that his essence 
wil l not be considered from God and outside of God"."^ 
Closely related to this last idea is a third difference that refers to the insistence of 
the Arians on introducing not the act, but the will of God as the link between the Father 
and the Son."* Athanasius does not discern any difference between the two concepts, 
because the will of God is associated in the Bible with the creation of the world and not 
with the generation of the Son. To prove the point he contrasts Ps. 2:7, 44:2, 109:3 and 
Prov. 8:25 with another group which consists of Ps. 110:2 and 134:6."^ From this contrast 
he draws the conclusion: "Al l everywhere tell us of the being of the Word, but none of his 
"For what man of right understanding does not perceive, that what are created and made are 
external to the maker; but the son, as the foregoing argument had shown, exists not externally but from the 
Father who begat him", DECR 13:25,439C; SER2 6:26,617A; CAR2 58:26,269B; Cf also the 
comprehensive discussion on the relation between begetting and creating by S. Papadopoulos in Athanasius 
of Alexandria, 110-114. 
The diametrically opposite standpoints of Athanasius and Arius are apparent at this point. Cf the 
famous Arian statement: "[the Son is] perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures, offspring, but 
not as one of the offsprings" (Letter to Alexander, op. cit.). 
DECR 13:25,440A. 
Cf. the discussion of Athanasius on the subject in CAR3 59ff:26,448Aff 
Ps. 110:2: "The works of the Lord are great; sought out all of them that have pleasure there in"; 
134:6: "Whatever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven and earth". 
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being by will nor at all for his making", and " i f the Word is in the heart where is the will? 
and i f the Son in the Father where is good pleasure?... Let them leam that the Son is 
begotten not by wil l but by nature and t r u t h " . T h e reason for this is the fact that the 
generation of the Son pertains to the nature of God, which is not defined or determined by 
his wil l , because it is above it. There is no indication that the will of God is in between the 
Father and the Son, for the above texts relate them directly and intimately. 
From these explanations, Athanasius insists that the verb "to create" cannot replace 
the verb "to beget" for the generation of the Son, as the Arians alleged. The Bible never 
does so, he says, because of the sharp ontological differentiation between these words: 
Whereas the verb "to beget" relates the Son intimately and directly with the Father, the 
verb "to create" alienates him from what the Father is in his being. The Arians, however, 
would not agree on that, since, as we have said, they held the two verbs to be 
interchangeable. To support their view they adduced to a number of biblical texts which in 
turn Athanasius was obliged to examine. The comparison of the arguments from both sides 
will make evident the accuracy of interpretation of the biblical texts in question although 
the lack of original Arian documents makes it impossible to reconstruct their full biblical 
argument and the precise interpretation of the biblical texts they employed.'" The 
information available comes, mainly, from Athanasius himself, which, in spite of doubts 
raised against the objectivity of his evidence,'^" we regard as quite reliable. The very fact 
CARS 60:448C; CAR3 67:26,464C-465B; also CARS 59:26,448A. 
For a collection and evaluation of evidence for the Arian documents see G. Bardy, Recherches sur 
saint Lucien, pp. 170ff; C. Kannengiesser, Holy Scripture and Hellenistic hermeneutics, pp. 5-17; R. 
Williams, ^nM5, pp. 95-105; R.P.C. Hanson, The Search, pp. 5-15ff 
R.P.C. Hanson consider Athanasius the "bitterest and most prejudiced enemy" of Arius, who has 
made "virtually impossible to distinguish between the views of Arius and those of his early supporters", 
and also that because Athanasius was "a fierce opponent of Arius certainly would not have stopped short of 
misinterpreting what he said" (The Search, p. 6 and 10). R. Williams, being more moderate, suggests 
"caution" in handling the evidence concerning Arius provided by Athanasius on the grounds of the lack of 
"presenting to us the systematic thought of Arius" which includes some degree of "possible distortion" 
(Arius, p. 95 and 99). We do not share these views, because we believe that since Athanasius was so much 
concerned with the abolition of Arianism as a matter of life or death, he knew that in order to succeed in 
his battle he should be based on the most realistic and objective grounds. He could not have argued against 
a teaching that had never been taught by Arius. What Athanasius, however, adds to the original Arian 
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that he was so mindful to refute the exegesis of the biblical texts which the Arians 
employed, suggests that he had to undertake this task in the most objective manner to 
ensure that his work would be effective. 
2.1.3.2 The verb 'to create'in Heb. 1:4, 3:2, Acts 2:36, Deut. 32:2,18 
According to the Contra Arianos, the Arians alluded to certain biblical passages, 
which, in one way or another, rendered to the Son either created nature, or features of 
created nature.'^' These verses betray an attempt on the part of the Arians to collect those 
verses, which contained verbs like "to create", "to make", "to become" etc., instead of the 
verb "to beget", and to apply them to the generation of the Son.'^ ^ Athanasius 
acknowledges their tendency saying that "they only catch words like he made or he has 
been made"}^^ He deals extensively with these verses of which the most important ones 
were Heb 1 : 4 ("having become [Y8V6|J ,8VO(;] as much greater than the angels as the name 
he has obtained), Heb 3 : 2 ("being faithful to the One who made him [xcp Ttoifioavxi]"), 
Acts 2 : 3 6 ("God has made him [S7tolTio8v] both Lord and Christ"),'^" and Deut. 3 2 : 6 ("is 
not he your father who possessed you and made you and created you?") in parallel with 
Deut. 3 2 : 1 8 ("and you forgot the God who begot you").'" The most prominent place 
among them belongs to Prov. 8 : 2 2 ("The Lord created me the beginning of his ways unto 
his works"), which in the course of the debate turned out to be the "cornerstone" of the 
doctrine are the consequences of this doctrine, which the Arians themselves would not say boldly. 
Prof J.N.D. Kelly points out that "the Arians amassed a formidable array of Scriptural texts in 
support of their thesis" which he divides into four categories: a) those which presented the son as a 
creature; b) those which presented God the Father as the sole veritable God; c) those which implied Christ's 
inferiority to the Father and d) those which ascribe ignorance, weakness, suffering or development to the 
Son of God {Doctrines, pp. 229-230). 
C. Kannengiesser makes this observation saying, "Scriptural texts must certainly be interpreted 
when they speak of divine generation through various analogies, but Arius gives them a changed 
interpretation by construing them as definitions without analogy or metaphor of the origin of the Son" 
{Holy Scripture, p. 7). 
CAR2 11:26,1696; NPNF, p. 354. 
CARl 53:26,121B; CAR2 l-18:26,148Aff 
CAR2 58-60:26,269Cff 
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Arian biblical argument.'^ * Athanasius records a rather triumphant overtone in the Arian 
interpretation: "Behold, here it is! he created and therefore he is a creature".'" Not 
withstanding what we have said so far about Athanasius' understanding of the use and the 
significance of the verbs "to create" and "to beget", we believe that we have to look briefly 
into the main points of his response to these objections and find out how he vindicates his 
interpretation against the Arian one. 
The starting point for such an inquiry is a hermeneutic principle which Athanasius 
establishes clearly still from the very beginning of his exegetical work as the foundation 
upon which he builds his arguments: the person of Jesus Christ and the event of his 
Incarnation, is the basis of all theology and the golden hermeneutical key to all biblical 
texts in question from either Testament. He accuses the Arians of having failed to 
understand this with the result that they misinterpreted the Scripture. It is characteristic 
that he brings forth this principle at the very beginning of his first anti-Arian treatise 
(CAR! 8), immediately after the presentation of the Arian teaching and before the 
beginning of his refutation. In particular, he asserts, 
"How can he [Arius] speak truth concerning the Father, denying the Son 
who reveals him? How can he be orthodox concerning the Spirit, while he 
speaks profanely of the Word who supplies the Spirit? Who will trust him 
concerning the resurrection, denying, as he does, Christ who is for us the 
firstborn from the dead? How shall he not err in respect to his incarnate 
presence, being simply ignorant of the Son's genuine and true generation 
from the Father?"."' 
Athanasius considers the event of the Incarnation as the core of biblical revelation, 
upon which everything stands or falls. He calls the truth of God becoming man, "the scope 
Its great importance is evident from the fact that Athanasius pays much attention and deals with it 
several times and in various periods of the controversy dedicating large parts of his works to the refutation 
of the Arian interpretation; Cf CAR2 44-57ff (mainly), DECR 13-14, DION 10-11, SER2 7-8; also CARl 
53, CAR2 1. 4. 11. 18. 60. 65. 66. 72. 77. 82, CARS 1; DECR 26, ENCY 17, SERl 3, SYNO 26. He also 
points out the great Arian interest in it with the characteristic phrase: "they were putting about [avco Kai 
KCiTCo] in every quarter this passage saying that the Son was one of the creatures and they reckoned him 
with things originated", DECR I3:25,437B and CARl 53:26,1210; Cf also CAR2 1; CARS 1. 
SER2 7:26,620A. 
CARl 8:26,28A; NPNF, p. 310; Cf also G.D. Dragas, Athanasiana, p. 67; T.F. Torrance, The 
Trinitarian, pp. 136-137; J.N.D. Kelly, Creeds, pp. 21 If 234f 
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of the Scripture" (oKOTtoc; xf|c; Fpacpfic;) and "the character of Christianity" (xapaKxfip 
xoO XPiOTtaviaiioO). With reference to biblical exegesis, he argues that it runs through 
the Bible from its first to its last book and divides the biblical statements about Christ into 
two categories: those that refer to his divine nature and those that refer to his human 
nature. Correct identification and categorisation of the texts ensures successful 
interpretation and accordance with truth. He asserts: 
"The character of faith in Christ is this: the Son of God, who is Logos and 
God (for the Word was in the beginning and the Word was God) and 
Wisdom and Power of the Father (for Christ is God's power and God's 
wisdom), he himself at the end of the ages became man for our salvation. 
For John, having said 'In the beginning was the Word', also said a little later 
'and the Word became flesh', which is the same as to say that he became 
man... It is necessary then, when one studies the Scripture, to try and to 
discern when it speaks about the divine and when it speaks about the human 
properties of the Word".'^" 
Starting out from this premise, he applies this principle almost blindfold and argues 
that all the verses which the Arians claim for their support refer to the human nature of 
Christ and not to his eternal generation from the Father."" In these cases the use of the 
verb "to create" and its synonyms is highly appropriate and legitimate, because the Son as 
a human being was indeed created by God. The main factor in each case which makes his 
point evident is the context within which the verses appear. 
Heb. i.-4:'" Athanasius makes two literary observations concerning the participle 
"having been made" (Y8V6|4,8VO(;) and the comparative adjective "superior" (Kp8ixxcov), 
that together formed a phrase on which the Arians based their allegations that although the 
SER2 7:26,620C; CAR3 29:26,385A; DECR The exegetical fiinction of this principle is 
expoimded in detail by T.F. Torrance, The Hermeneutics, EPh 52:1 (1970) 454ff; S. Agouridis, The 
Fathers of the Church as Interpreters, 1st O.H.C., pp. 86ff. The ttanslation, though, of the term "cKonoc;" 
as "scope" is not accurate, because it has a wider meaning indicating the goal in a race-cource and the 
boimds of this course (T.F. Torrance, The Hermeneutics, ibid), and also "the general drift of Scripture 
doctrine" (T.E. PoMaid, Johannanine Christology, p. 186n. 3). 
The argimient of Athanasius is as follows: "whenever they hear offspring and Word and Wisdom, 
they are quick to misconstrue and deny the natural and genume generation of the Son from the Father; 
when they hear words and terms proper to a creature, they sfraight away regard him to be a creature and 
they deny the Word, although it is possible because of him becoming man to refer all these terms to his 
humanity", CAR2 4:26,153C; Cf. also CAR2 20:26,189A; CAR3 35:26,400A; SER2 1:26,609A. 
Cf. CARl 54-64:26,124Bff 
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Son is said to be "begotten", he is still a creature because he is compared with the angels 
and confessed to be "superior". As for the participle, Athanasius points out that it does not 
stand alone (dTtoXXeA-uixevcog), but is combined with the adjective "superior". This 
implies that the comparison does not refer to the being of the Son and the angles, but to his 
ministry ( 6 i a K 0 v t a ) as a human being after his Incarnation, which compared to the 
ministry o f the angels was far greater. Moreover, the participle alone can refer to 
offsprings as for example in Job 1:2 and Gen. 21:5,'^^ but i t does not necessarily imply 
created nature, while a created object can never be called an offspring. As for the 
adjective, Athanasius observes that i t does not imply comparison but distinction of the Son 
f r o m the angels which refers to nature.'" The adjective KpEhxcov compares elements of a 
different nature, like the 'divine' and 'earthly house' in Ps. 83:11, 'wisdom' and 'stones' in 
Prov. 8:10-11 and 'people' and 'name' in Is. 56:4-5. On the contrary, for elements of the 
same nature the Bible uses adjectives like "greater" (neiJ^cov), "more" (|a,aX,X,ov) and "more 
honourable" (Tiiiirotepoc;), as in the case of Rachel and Leah in Gen. 29:17, Joseph and 
his brothers in Gen. 37:3-4, the stars in 1 Cor. 15:41 and the Son and the Father in Jn. 
14:28."" The Arian exegesis is a strange one to attempt in any case, because as Athanasius 
observes the verse emerges f rom a context which greatly exalts the superiority o f the Son 
not only f rom the angels but from any other being. Verses 5-13 clearly vindicate the use of 
KpeiTTCOV as applying to beings of different nature: the Son is the Lord, who is being 
worshipped, while the angels are servants, who are sent for SiaKOvia. Also, verses 1:1-2 
refer the whole text to the Incarnation and the presence of the Son as hiraian being on 
Job 1:2 "They were bom [eyevovTo] to him seven sons and three daughters"; Gen 21:5 "Abraham 
was a hundred years old when his son Isaac was bom [eyevETo] to him". 
"Son that the word superior is not used to compare [ouyKpiTiKox;], but to contrast 
[SiaKpiTiKox;], because of the difference of his nature from them" (CARl 55). 
It is characteristic that Athanasius uses a great variety of terms to express the similarity and 
dissimilarity of nature which are descriptive of generic relations. So, we meet the terms onoyevfi, 
ouYYEvfi, e-cepoouova, e-cepOYevfj. 
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earth, while in 2:1-3 the Apostle explains the reason for the comparison: the ministry of 
the angels, who gave the Law, was incomplete, because death was not yet abolished. It was 
the ministry o f the Son o f God, who became man and suffered death that abolished it. 
Therefore, as a result, the punishment for "neglect" of the gif t of the Son's ministry w i l l be 
greater than the punishment for neglect of the gi f t of the angel's ministry. The Son differs 
f r o m the angels as a Lord (Kupiog) from his servants (5ouX,ou(;). 
Heb. 3:2'}^^ It appears to have been an important verse for the Arians, especially 
the participle "tro Ttoifioavxi" ("the one who made him"), judging by Athanasius' 
characteristic comment that the Arians used it as "a great aid" ("iieya Pofi0r||j,a") to their 
heresy."^ Applying the same hermeneutical method as before he argues that the participle 
alone is not adequate to establish the creaturehood o f the Son. Condemning the Arian 
tendency to treat biblical language as i f it were technical with fixed meanings to its words, 
he points out two principles. First, that priority belongs to the realities which the words 
express and not to the words themselves so that the words do not define realities, but only 
'point to' (oTiiiatveiv) them and, in fact, are defined by them."^ On this principle, the use 
o f the participle alone is not sufficient to establish reality o f created nature for the Son. 
Second, he calls attention to the "peculiarity" or "custom" (i5ico|xa) of Scripture, 
according to which the words used to describe various situations are not restricted by 
technical rules, but are flexible and often influenced by several factors, such as affection or 
condescension. He lists a lot of examples of this inconsistency of language towards the 
corresponding realities, which, he argues, exist without anyone, including the Arians, 
CAR2 2-10:26,149Bff. 
CAR2 4:26,153D; the complete exegesis of the verse is included in CAR2 l-10:26,148Aff. 
"Let them not dispute about the words that the bibhcal writers use of the Word himself, for there 
need be no question about them since they are confessedly used in accordance with his nature. For words 
do not detract from nature; rather does nature draw the words to itself and transform them. For words are 
not prior to essences, but essences are first and words come second", CAR2 3:26,152C; cf T.F. Torrance, 
"The Hermeneutics", EPh 53:1 (1971) 136. 
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confusing them as a result of this."* Therefore, he accuses the Arians of using "double 
measures" (5iao(x OTa0M,d) in their exegesis, because in the case of the Son, they deny 
his sonship and consider h im a creature on account of the particular word "he made" 
(sTioiriaev), while in other cases they do not do so. Anyhow, when Jn. 1:3 and Ps. 103:24 
give the Son the status as the Creator o f the world, Arian insistence on the verb "he made" 
would demand a search for the Word or Wisdom in which he was made, because it would 
be "madness" (|J,avia) to suggest that he created himself 
As for the adjective "faithful" (TTIOTOV) , which the Arians understood in the same 
context and alleged that i t unplied reward of faith for the Son believing in God, Athanasius 
argues that the word has two meanings in Scripture. It is used anthropologically and 
denotes human beings' faith in God (to TTioxeueiv) and it is also used theologically 
denoting the "trustworthiness" o f God (TO d^iOTTiaxov). In this case, i t denotes the 
trustworthiness of Jesus Christ, because of his immutability as the Son of God. Athanasius 
turns again to the context (2:10-3:3) and, as in the previous verse for the angels, so, here, 
he supports his interpretation explaining the Apostle's comparison of the High-priesthood 
of the Son with the High-priesthood of Aaron. Verse 3:2 refers to the Incarnation of the 
Son by virtue o f which he became High priest: he put on human body exactly as Aaron put 
on the appropriate vestments when he became High priest and just as Aaron did not cease 
to be a man after his becoming High priest, so the Son did not cease to be God after his 
becoming man." ' 
Acts 2:36: Athanasius interprets the participle "the one who made him" (xcp 
TCOifjoavTi) by means of the distinction between the titles "Lord" and "Christ" associated 
The verses quoted by Athanasius in this account are Philemon 16 (Paul who calls Onesimus 
"brother", although he is a slave), Gen. 18:12 (Sara who calls Abraham "lord", although he is her husband), 
1 Reg. 1:19 (Bathsheba who calls Solomon "servant", although he is her son), Is. 38:19 ("make children"), 
2 Reg. 20:18 ("your children will come out from you"), Gen. 4:1 ("I possessed a man by God"), Gen. 48:5 
("you sons who were made to you") and Jod 1:2 ("sons were made to him"). 
C f G.D. Dragas, Contra Apollinarem, p. 464. 
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with it and "Son" and "Logos", with which one normally refers to the Son as God. He 
observes that the second pah derives from the relation of the Son with the Father, while 
the first refers to his relation with human beings. The verse does not say that "God made 
h im Son or Logos", but that "God made hun Lord and Christ" which refers to his relation 
to human beings.'"" Athanasius recalls the context (dKoX.ou0ia) and the particular 
circumstances (5 ia x i K a i Ttcbq) of the verse drawing the attention to two points. Firstly, 
he focuses on little phrase that immediately follows, "this Jesus whom you crucified". This 
shows that the Petrine speech refers to the earthly l i fe of Jesus Christ and not to his 
relationship wi th the Father. Secondly, the phrase does not stand alone, but is defined as 
"among you". This specification explicitly relates the titles "Lord and Christ" to human 
beings and designates the Lordship that the Son possesses over them. According to the 
witness o f Acts 2:22,'"' Jn. 10:38"^ and Jn. 5:18,"^ Jesus Christ manifested his Lordship 
with his miracles and, above all, his victory over death through his bodily death and 
resurrection, all of which derive from his unique relation with the Father as Son. This 
Lordship, however, was not acquired during his human life, but belonged to him, as 
Athanasius shows from Ps 109:1,"" Ps 44:7,'"^ Ps. 144:3'"^ and Gen. 19:24,"" to highlight 
the idea of Christ as the Image and the Word of God before his Incarnation. Therefore, the 
verb "he made h im Lord" stands for "he proved'him to be Lord". Athanasius justifies this 
interpretation explaining that the Petrine argument aims at proving the divine Lordship of 
Jesus against the Jewish Christological misconception of Christ as mere man and 
C f CAR2 ll-18:26,169Aff; G.D. Dragas, Contra Apollinarem, pp. 470-471. 
"A man attested by God with mighty works and wonders and signs, which God did through him". 
142 J them, even though you do not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and 
understand that the Father is in me and I am in the Father". 
"They sought all the more to kill him, because he not only broke the Sabbath but also called God 
his Father making himself equal with God". 
"The Lord says to my Lord, Sit at my right hand". 
'"^  "Your divine throne endures for ever and ever; your royal scepter is a scepter of equity". 
""^  "Your kingdom is an everlasting kingdom". 
"And the Lord rained on Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven". 
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descendant o f David, who would not suffer. Concluding his argument, Athanasius brings 
forth the liturgical argument and asserts that the Lord of redemption could only be the 
Lord o f creation, because i f he were a creature his followers would become 
"man-worshippers" ("dv0pco7roX.dTpai"). 
Deut. 32:6 and 32:18-}^^ The Arians wanted to establish the point that when God is 
the subject the Bible uses alternatively the two verbs "to create" and "to beget" without the 
ontological distinction Athanasius claimed. Applying some sort of equation, they argued 
that since the verb in 32:6 is "created" and the verb in 32:18 is "begot",'"' and both have 
the same object, the Jewish people, they should be understood as parallels. According to 
Athanasius reply, "offspring and work you take to mean the same t h i n g " , t h e Arians 
based on them, and extended to the Son, their understanding of the interchangeable 
meaning o f the terms 'offspring' and 'creature'. Athanasius follows the order of appearance 
of the verses and explains that the verb "to create" appears before "to beget", because it 
refers to a different situation. The 'created' refers to the ontological beginiung of human 
beings (here the Jewish people) and chronologically precedes the 'begot', which refers to 
their adoption by God on account of which they are called "sons" (Is. 1:2: "Sons have I 
brought up"). This adoption, which John (1:12) and Paul (Gal. 4:6) also witness, does not 
appoint human beings sons of God "by nature" ((puaei), but "by status" (GeoEi). Their 
creation precedes their adoption, because "from the beginning we were creatures by nature 
and God is our Creator through the Word; but afterwards we were made sons and 
See CAR2 58-60:26,272Aff 
32:6: "is not he your father who possessed you and made you and created you?" and 32:18: "And 
you forgot the God who begot you". 
C A R l 58:26,269Cf; C f Arius' declaration in his Letter to Alexander on 'offspring and creature'. 
Arius did not distinguish ontologically the two terms, therefore we could argue that he would not initially 
reject the biblical verses which Athanasius used for the generation of the Son as offspring. Although Arius 
had organised a doctrinal teahing following strictly logical methods, his attitude towards external 
challenges was highly compromising, even if it concerned diametrically opposite concepts, such as 
'creature' and 'offspring'. He could easily and most efficiently manipulate the ecclesiastical language and 
the arguments of his rivals. C f the illuminating observations concerning the confusion and the debate over 
the language by S. Laeuchli in "The Case", pp. 410-416. 
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thenceforward God the Creator becomes our Father also".''' Turning to the Son and 
drawing attention to Jn. 10:35 Athanasius gives the Christological dimension of his 
exegesis and establishes this adoption on the natural sonship of the Son, who enabled man 
to receive this divine grace through his incarnation. The same order, though, does not 
apply to the Son, but rather the opposite. Contrasting Deut. 32:6,18 with Prov. 8:22,25, 
Athanasius argues that whereas the Son was eternally Son of God by nature and became a 
created human being, human beings first were created and then adopted by God, according 
to the divine plan o f their salvation. 
2.1.3.3 Prov. 8:25 in contrast to Prov. 8:22 
We w i l l also examine separately Prov. 8:25 ("before the mountains he begets me") 
with regard to the generation of the Son, because it acquired a prominent position in the 
overall biblical argumentation of Athanasius on account of its use as the "counter verse" to 
Prov. 8:22 ("The Lord created me the beginning of his ways unto his works"), the 
"cornerstone" o f Arian biblical argument.'" The most important and fierce exegetical 
debate focused on these two texts and their interpretation played a crucial role for the 
outcome of the controversial issue of the Son's generation.'" Both belong to one of the 
rare acknowledged Old Testament passages where the Wisdom of God is personified and 
so both Arius and Athanasius tamed to it for evidence of their views.''" The pattern of 
CAR2 59:26,273B; C f chs 58-60:26,269Cff 
All scholars observe the crucial importance of this verse for the formation or support of the Arian 
teaching; e.g. cf R.P.C. Hanson, op. cit, pp. 8, 434 and passim; R. Williams, Arius, pp. 108. C f also the 
significance of Prov. 8 as the personification of Wisdom for the Old Testament onception of wisdom in 
"Assumptions and problems", pp. 109-112. 
Athanasius discusses in detail the interpretation of Prov 8:22 in CAR2 44ff 26,240Cff, which we 
intend to follow, taking also into account his observations in the other works, which are a brief summary of 
the former. C f also the exposition of G.D. Dragas, Contra Apollinarem, pp. 477ff and P. Sherwood, "St. 
Athanasius concerning the Wisdom of God", pp. 271-276. For a frill investigation of the interpretation of 
the verse from a linguistic and theological point of view with special reference to the Arian controversy see 
C.F. Bumey, "Christ as the A P X H of creation", JTS, pp. 160-177. 
M. Wiles emphasising its importance, asserts that "the original source of the use of the term 
generation in Christian theology lies not so much in the fact of Christ's being known as Son, but rather in 
the language already employed in the wisdom literature about God and his Wisdom. No doubt the 
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argumentation is the same as in the previous verses: while the Arians looked solely on the 
particular verse (22), Athanasius examines 22 and 25 in parallel and compares the manner 
in which they are expressed and their position in the wider context. He acknowledges that 
verse 22 is a diff icul t one, because it is expressed in an obscure way, and, as he remarks, 
"what is said in proverbs is not said plainly, but is put forth latently, as the Lord himself 
has taught us in the Gospel...".'" He marks out the apparent contradiction between the 
Arian rendering o f this verse and the rest of the biblical doctrine, represented mainly by 
Ps. 103:24, with the fol lowing question: "For who, on hearing the Creating Wisdom saying 
'The Lord created me the beginning of his ways', does not at once question the meaning 
and reflect how that creative Wisdom can be created?".'^* In order to safely extract its 
"hidden mind", he applies the hermeneutical principle of the 'scope of faith' through which 
he specifies the factors that define the natural context of the biblical texts as being, firstly, 
the person involved, secondly the occasion, thirdly the time and finally the purpose for 
which they are said. At the end, the interpretation of these verses appears very powerful 
for Athanasius in maintaining his point that the verb "to beget" applies to the etemal 
generation of the Son and carries all the ontological differentiations from the verb "to 
create". From the comparison o f the two verses Athanasius discerns the following 
differences. 
Firstly, he observes that while 8:25 is expressed "loosely" (dTioXeXunevcoQ), that 
is, without any specification, 8:22 combines "he created me" with a "cause" (a ixla) , which 
is "the works". '" This fact makes, for Athanasius, all the difference and clarifies the 
apprehension of God's Wisdom as personified being through the experience of the incamation determined 
the selective emphasis placed on the partiular term generation ..." ("Etemal generation", p. 285). C f also 
the article in Kittel's Theological Dictionary, which follows the Arian interpretation concerning the 
creation of wisdom (pp. 489-492). In confrast H. Jaeger argues for the lack of the concept of created 
wisdom of Prov. 8 in rabbinic exegesis; Wisdom has religious and spiritual value and denotes "the contmu-
ity of God's action in history". However it is not regarded as distinct hypostasis ("The patristic conception 
of Wisdom", pp. 95-97). 
CAR2 44:26,241 A. 
CAR2 77:26,312A. 
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meaning o f the two verses: 8:25 is similar to Jn 1:1 and refers to the true divinity of the 
Son who exists eternally and unconditionally; 8:22 refers to the Incarnation of the Son, 
which indeed took place for a particular purpose."^ According to the principle of "the 
scope of Scripture", the verse applies to the human and not to the divine nature of the Son, 
because all the elements contained m it are appropriate to his becoming man and not to his 
being the Creator. Examining those elements one by one, he observes, "As it concerns the 
occasion, one w i l l find and learn that the Lord, being eternal, at length in fullness of the 
ages became man...; as for the purpose, one w i l l understand that wishing to annul our 
death, he took on himself a body from the Vhgin Mary in order to offer it to the Father a 
sacrifice for all o f us...; as for the person it is the Saviour's ..."."^ 
Secondly, Athanasius renders to the verb "he begets me" the same ontological 
significance with that in Ps. 2:7, 109:3, and contends that i t still maintains it when it 
applies to the Son and that it designates him to be begotten from the being of the Father 
and not created as the other beings by the Father's w i l l and act. The verb "he created" alone 
is not adequate to prove that the Son is a creature, because the verb "to create" and the 
noun "creature" do not always imply one another.'*" The verb does not have the fixed 
meaning, which the Arians wanted, since the biblical language uses it flexibly and on 
various occasions to describe various realities and not simply created beings. In the cases 
where i t designates the ontological beginning of beings, it is followed by an object (Ps 
Prov. 8:25 especially appears in a group of verses concerning the natural generation of the Son in 
D E C K 13:25,437Df and in another group concerning his "divinity or eternity" in CAR2 32:26,216A; E . 
Meijering discusses the subject in "Athanasius on the Father", p. 6f 
He particularly asserts, "Where, however, the cause lies, this cause clarifies the reading properly. 
So here, as it concerns "he created" he places its cause, which is "imto his works"; willing, though, to 
denote loosely the generation from the Father, he added immediately 'before the mountains he begets me' 
without saying 'why' as in 'he created me', but loosely 'he begets me', as in 'In the beginning was the 
Word'...", CAR2 56:26,268A. 
DECR 13-14; CAR2 44, 77. 
160 M-pjjg created alone does not necessarily signify the essence or the generation, but 
indicates something else occurring to the one of whom it speaks, and not simply that one who is said to be 
created is at once in nature and in essence a creature", CAR2 45:26,241C. 
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104:24, Rom 8:22, Rev 8:9, 1 T i m 4:4, Wisd 9:2, Col 1:15-17, and Deut 4:32); but there 
are also cases where it refers to already existing beings and in those it stands alone and 
designates an event in their l i fe , as their renewal by the grace of God (Ps 102:18, Ps 50:12, 
Eph 2:15, Eph 4:24, Jer 31:22). The determinant for the meaning of the verse is its 
particular context, which consists of all the elements involved and not simply of single 
words. He establishes the point on the order in which the verbs emerge, for "he begets" is 
added after "he created" for three reasons. Firstly, the addition of the verb "he begets" 
designates the difference in nature between "offspring" and "creature", which is observed 
in the biblical expression through the use of both verbs. I f "creature" and "offspring" were 
identical (xauxov) the verb "he created" alone would be necessary and sufficient.'^' As a 
consequence, secondly, the fact that the Son is the object o f both verbs entails that he is 
also subject to the same distinction so as to be begotten from the "essence" of the Father 
and not created like all creatures. 
"Thus, the Son is not a creature, because i f he was a creature he would not 
say 'he begets me', because creatures are works of the Creator and external, 
while the offspring is not external like a work, but he is from the Father and 
proper to his substance. Therefore the former are creatures, while the latter 
is only-begotten Son".'^^ 
The third difference between the two verses Athanasius focused on, is the 
adversative preposition "6s", the function of which vindicates his previous arguments. H 
discerns a three-fold purpose in the whole passage 22-25:'^' a) it "secures" the correct 
understanding of the verb "he created", because it introduces the new notion "he begets", 
which reads together; b) as such, i t ensures a coherent meaning between "he created" and 
"he begets", pointing to the reasons for using them; and c) i t necessitates the chronological 
priority o f "he begets" over "he created", which is suggested by the sharp antithesis "he 
"6x1 6e ov) xauxov eoxi KxioHa Kai yevviiixa, bXkh SiecxfiKaai hXXi\%MV t e xfj (puoei K a l 
XT! E K xcbv PlE^ ECov OTinaoia"; CAR2 56:26,268A-B; 60:26,276A; DECR 13:25,440A. 
DECR ibid. 
CAR2 60:ibid 
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created me... before 68 everything he begets me". A l l these arguments demand that 8:25 
should refer to a situation prior to the one indicated in 8:22, which can be nothing other 
than the Son's generation which was followed by his Incarnation. 
2.1.3.4 Jn 1:18 in contrast to Prov. 8:22, Col. 1:15, 18, Rom. 8:29 
Athanasius fu l l y quotes this verse only a few times, but widely uses and expounds 
its main concept "Only-begotten Son". He presents its meaning more vividly by contrast to 
the title "firstborn" (Col. 1:15, 18, Rom. 8:29) which the Arians adduced as a parallel. '" 
He classifies i t among the verses concerning the divinity of the Son on account of then-
common feature of being expressed "unconditionally" (oiTioXeXunevax;) and without the 
combination o f any reasoning. Jn. 1:18 refers to the divinity of Christ, because it plainly 
states that he is, while Col. 1:15, 18, Rom. 8:29 contain the terms "brothers", "dead" and 
"creation", which suggest the reason for his being "firstborn", and therefore it refers to his 
Incarnation. "He is called 'firstborn among many brothers', because of the relationship of 
the flesh; 'firstborn from the dead', because the resurrection of the dead is from him and 
after him; 'firstborn of all creation', because of the Father's love to men, due to which not 
only are all things held together through his word, but also creation... w i l l be delivered 
from the captivity o f corruption".'*' 
Athanasius uses two elements of the verse in support of his understanding of the 
Son's relation to the Father: firstly, the expression "in the bosom of the Father" (like the 
terms "heart" and "womb" in Ps. 44:2 and 109:3), bears special ontological significance, 
because it is an image which points to the inner being of God and relates the Son directly 
wi th it. I t denotes the generation of the Son in terms of begetting: "for what else can 'in the 
bosom' mean, than the true birth of the Son from the Father?".'** Secondly, on this basis. 
For the background of this link see C. Bumey, "Christ as flie APXH", pp. 173-ff 
CAR2 63:26,281B. 
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secondly, he justifies the ontological difference between "creature" and "offspring" and the 
designation o f the Word as "Son": a creature is an external product of God that came into 
existence through his Word, while the Word himself is an offspring because being 
begotten from the essence of the Father he is in his bosom. The two notions cannot be 
mixed or confused, because they are separated by a great ontological gap. The wider 
context o f the Prologue of John's gospel provides sufficient evidence for the ontological 
distinction of the Son from the creatures: "as for creatures John says 'everything was made 
through him' [Jn 1:3], but, evangelising the Lord, he speaks 'the only-begotten son, who is 
in the bosom of the Father'; i f , then, he is son, he is not creature and i f he is creature, he is 
not son; for there is great difference between them".'*^ 
With these arguments Athanasius has sufficiently shown that the intimate relation 
which the biblical Father-Son language attributes to God and Jesus Christ is maintained 
and expressed also through the verb 'to beget' and the derivatives. By these means the 
Bible denotes the ontological distinction of Christ, who in this way is generically identified 
wi th God as his true offspring 'proper' ( i6iov) to his essence, from the creatures, which are 
products o f the creative act of God. He has also shown that the biblical footings with 
which the Arians tried to support their teaching are not simply inadequate, but absolutely 
inappropriate because they do not refer to the being of the Son, but to the ministry he 
assumed as a human being. On the one hand, Athanasius clearly discerns and distinguishes 
the pre-existent from the Incarnate Christ, whom in the first instance finds to be described 
as begotten while in the second as created by the Father. The Arians, on the other hand, 
using some sort of awkward equation of abstractiy selected biblical texts defined the 
pre-existent (whom they appear to accept) on the merits of the Incarnate Christ, for the 
fear o f attributing ontological division to God through the application o f the concept o f 
DECR21:25,453C. 
D E C R 13:25,440A. 
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generation. The crucial point for Athanasius which skips o f f this alleged danger is that the 
association of generation with God is made by the Bible itself. This being the authoritative 
starting point, the understanding of the divine generation ought to be especially qualified 
in order to be distinguished from human generation. 
Therefore the next step in Athanasius' argument is to explain the manner in which 
the concept of generation applies to the divine nature and to set forth the necessary 
qualifications for this understanding. He focuses on those pomts which the Arians used to 
object to the generation of the Son as inappropriate for God and demonstrates the biblical 
basis upon which both the generation and its appropriate understanding are founded. 
2.1.4 The differences between human and divine generation 
Athanasius acknowledges that the doctrine of the generation of the Son had to be 
explained because, on the one hand, i t was an image taken from the natural world and 
subsequently applied to God, and that i t therefore carried implications that were not 
appropriate to the divinity. The use of such images is a biblical custom by which Scripture 
condescends to the inability of human mind to perceive and comprehend the divine 
realities without omitting to provide the necessary data for their correct understandmg 
which have to be synthetically and systematically interpreted.'*^ On the other hand, he had 
to deal wi th the Arians, who exploited the weak points of the notion of generation in 
support o f their views, namely that the two verbs "to create" and "to beget" can be used 
alternatively in relation to God, on the grounds that both distinguish h im from any other 
being, including the Son. The reservations against the generation were m effect applicable 
also to the "homoousion", since according to Athanasius the problem was that the term 
Athanasius repeates in many places this fimdamental principle of his theology. In CAR2 32 he 
asserts, "For such illusfrations and such images has Scripture proposed, that considering the inability of 
human nature to comprehend God, we might form ideas even from these however poorly and dimly, and as 
far as it is attainable" (26,216B); also CAR 372. 
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could be understood for God as for human beings: "Is there any cause of fear, because the 
offsprings from human beings are coessential that the Son, by being called coessential, 
might be himself considered as a human offspring too?".'*' 
Athanasius was trying to overcome two difficulties. The first one refers to the 
chronological secondariness of the Son with respect to the Father. The Arians alleged that 
since God is by definition without beginning, the Son as well as the other beings, either 
begotten or created, which have a beginning, is therefore essentially differentiated from 
Him. They regarded the "ingenerate" existence (dyevvnxoc;, or dyevrixoc;)'™ as the 
primary definition o f the essence of God and therefore the Son, who has a "begotten" 
existence (yevvrixoc; and yevrixoc;), should be essentially differentiated from the Father. In 
the Letter to Eusehius ofNicomedia Arius declares: 
"God existed before the Son being ingenerate [dvdpxcog]...the Son is not 
Ingenerate, nor in any way a part of the ingenerate, nor derived from some 
substratum, but that he exists by w i l l and counsel before times and before 
the ages, frill <of grace and truth>, God, Only-begotten, unaltering. And 
before he was created or determined or established he did not exist, because 
he was not ingenerate. We are persecuted, because we said that the Son has 
a beginning, while God is without beginning".'" 
SYNO 41:26,756C. These reservations are expressed especially by Eusebius of Caesarea, who in 
the begiiming was reluctant to sign the Nicene decision. C f his Letter to his diocese, DECR 34. J.N.D. 
Kelly especially underlines them with regard to the meaning of the 'homoousion' (Creeds, pp. 21 Iff). 
At this point he found considerable support from the greek language in which the only difference 
between "begotten" (YEVViixoq, yzvvxwia) and "created" (YEVTIT6<;, yiv^]ia) is the spelling of one more 
"n" for the first (Cf A. Heron, Homoousios, p. 60-61). This little detail helped very much for the further 
confusion of the two verbs. Athanasius many times discusses the term "ingenerate", which he regards as 
suspicious. In DECR 29 he makes a characteristic comment, "They do and say everything, not to honour 
God, but to dishonour the Son, being ignorant that he who dishonours the Son, dishonours the Father" 
(25,469D); Cf. also C A R l 30:26,73A. For the meaning and significance of the term see ; E. Meijering, 
"Athanasius on the Father", p. 9f; L . Prestige, "and cognate words m Athanasius", JTS, 34 (1933) 258-265; 
P. Chrestou, Uncreated and created, Unbegotten and Begotten in the theology of St. Athanasius, (reprint) 
Thessaloniki 1974. 
Letter of Arius to Eusebius ofNicomedia in H.-G. Opitz, Urkunde, 3:1:1, pp. 2-3 (the translation is 
by R.P.C. Hanson, The Search, p. 6). We find similar statements also in his Letter of Arius and his 
companions to Alexander of Alexandria (H.-G. Opitz, A. W., Urk. (J, 3:1:1, pp. 12-13) as for example "God, 
who is the cause of everything, is the only One [sup.novcbxatoc;] Ingenerate; then is the Son who is 
begotten from the Father timelessly..." (ibid, pp. 12-13). Athanasius also records the Arian question "Did 
you have a son before bearing? Now as you did not, so neither was the Son of God before his generation" 
(CARl 22:26,57C). 
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The second diff icul ty refers to some sort of 'spatial' dimension, which implies 
division o f the being of the begetter into two separate beings. Athanasius points out this 
implication saying: "for bodies which are like each other may be separated and become at 
distances from each other, as are human sons relatively to their parents...".'^^ The division 
of the essence of God in this account was the main reservation against the "homoousion" 
and the generation, and according to the information o f Eusebius o f Caesarea, probably 
caused the greatest debate at the Council of Nicea.'^^ As we have said in the Introduction, 
Arius was firmly holding the view that generation of the Son from the essence of the 
Father, so as to be homoousios with him, was already condemned by the Church as 
heretical, because the Son was understood to exist as a "part" of the Father'^" and since the 
"ingenerate" was the main characteristic of God, the Son as homoousios would be 
considered a second "ingenerate beginning" beside the Father."' Thus it appears that the 
problem about generation primarily lied in the understanding of the manner in which the 
divine persons are understood to be individuated and secondly in the selection of the terms 
which ought to express both their distinction and their unity."* 
DECR 20:25,452B. 
C f his Letter to his diocese, DECR 34. See C. Stead. Div. Sub., p. 25 8f 
C f the terms "part of God" (nepo<; 9eoO), "part of the mgenerate" (iiepoq ayevvnTou), 
"co-ingenerate" (ouvayevvTiTOi;), "projection" (TtpoPoXfi) and (epuyfi) in Arius' Letter to Eusebius of 
Nicomedia (H.-G. Opitz, Urkunde (J, 3:1:1, pp. 2-3) and the names of Philogonus, Hellanikus and Macarius. 
Similar is the famous statement in his Letter to Alexander (H-G. Opitz, A.W., Urk. 6, 3:1:1, pp. 12-13) 
where he lists all the available and condemned meanings of the notion "offspring": "We say... an offspring, 
but not as one of the offsprings; neither as Valentine decreed the offspring to be the projection of the 
Father, nor as Manichaeus suggested the offspring to be consubstantial part of the Father; neither as 
Sabellius called it [the Monad] Son-Father, dividing the Monad, nor as lerakas lamp from lamp or like a 
torch in two...", because "... according to them the Father is composite and divisible and mutable and body 
and in addition to these, the bodiless God suffers all the passions of a body". M. Wiles particularly 
emphasizes the relation of the Arian biblical exegesis to the antimonarchian literature of the 2nd and 3 rd 
centuries (Spiritual Gospel, pp. 121f; also R. Williams, The logic, pp. 57-58). Athanasius presents these 
allegations as follows "They deny that the Son is the proper offspring of the Father's essence, on the 
ground that this must imply parts and divisions; what is this but to deny that he is very Son and only in 
name to call him Son at all?" (CARl 15:26,44A); "How can the Son be from the Father's essence and yet 
not a part? Since what is said to be of another, is a part of it and what is partitioned, is not a whole" (CAR2 
32:26,216C; C f also CAR2 34:26,220A; DECR 13:25,463A). 
In the same Letter to Alexander Arius condemns those who hold that the Son exist together with 
the Father, because they "introduce two ingenerate beginnings" {ibid.). Athanasius also records this view 
with their question "Is the Ingenerate one or two?" (CARl 22:26,57C). 
Apparently, Arius operated with anthropomorphic models of the divine being and therefore he 
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A third diff icul ty referred to the role of the w i l l of the Father in the generation of 
the Son. Arius emphatically insisted on the view that the Son was the result of the wi l l of 
God and this is evident in his Letter to Alexander where he says that "[the Father] brought 
[the Son] into being by his own w i l l , unmutable and unchangeable, perfect creature of 
God" and also that "he [the Son] was created before time and before the ages by the w i l l of 
God and he received l i fe and being from the Father and the glories".'" 
To clarify areas of misunderstanding and give their proper meaning, Athanasius 
discerns two elements in the image of the generation: the first is the nature o f the beings 
involved and to which it points and the second is the manner in which i t takes place."* As 
the arguments are set out both by Athanasius and the Arians it becomes evident that the 
Arians put the emphasis on the second element on account of which they deny the first, 
while Athanasius pays attention to the first, refusing to get involved in the second with 
details which are not provided by the biblical evidence. Athanasius complains that the 
Arians were interested in "how God begets and what is the manner of his birth-giving". 
emphasized the niunerical part of the confession "One God". He understood the Father as a particular 
individual, distinctively identifiable from any one else. In this respect, he called God "Monad" (MOVOK;) 
and as such he logically secured him from any other "second" or "third" individual. The Father was "sole" 
([iovoq and also the superlative liovcbxaxoq) ehgible to bear all the essentially divine attributes. This 
fimdamental principle is the opening statement of Arius' credal Letter to Alexander, "We acknowledge one 
God, sole ingenerate, sole etemal, sole without beginning, sole tme, sole possessing immortality, sole wise, 
sole good, sole master, judge of everything, adminisfrator, steward, immutable and unchangeable, just and 
good, god of the law, the prophets and the new testament". On the other hand, R. Williams asserts that it 
was also one of Arius' main concerns to defend the Son's independent existence, which he regards as being 
against Alexander's teaching about the "propemess" of the Son to the Father. Arius understood this as a 
degeneration to the status of an impersonal power, since as R. Williams explains, "To iSiov cannot be a 
substance; and if the Son is said to be iSioc; xfjc; xoO ITaxpOf; ouoia<;, this is tantamount to a denial of the 
independent existence of the Son... 'Father' and 'Son' are shorthand designations of individuals...: the 
individuals designated 'Father' and 'Son' are unique and particular subsistents, identifiably distinct because 
possessed of distinct substantial properties. Any language suggesting that the Son is proper to the Father is 
incomprehensible in this context" (The Logic, pp. 57-58,61; C f especially his detailed analysis of the 
notion "proper" in the Arian understanding pp. 58-62). 
Letter to Alexander, op. cit. In his Letter to Eusebius ofNicomedia (H.-G. Opitz, Urkunde, 3:1:1, 
pp. 2-3) he argues: "he came into being ...full <of grace and truth>" (0EA,fmaxi Kai PouXji UTieoxri... 
7tA,fipTi<; xapvxoc; Kai a^riGEiai;). 
™ This important text in which he clearly sets the conditions under which this image should be 
imderstood is in C A R l 26:26,65Af See especially the main point: "if they assume from human images that 
generation implies time, why not from the same infer that it implies the natural and proper of the sons to 
their parents?". 
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which he considers as completely unacceptable, because God is beyond human 
conception."' This is, in turn, the hermeneutical key, which he uses to solve the problem 
making the distinction between 'words' and 'realities' of which he gives priority to the 
latter.'^" Scripture, he holds, is concerned to describe the nature of the relations between 
the Father and the Son, but it does not explain how they exist. According to Paul's advice 
(1 T i m . 4:13) therefore one should be careful and discerning so that one might not mix the 
meanings of the words and understand what applies to God according to the human pattern 
or ascribe to God what applies to men.'^' The same degree of discernment is also 
demanded so that one might not abuse the words either, construing their meaning 
according to one's prior understanding. The relations between the Father and the Son are 
described with the verb "to beget", because it conveys simple, equal, intimate and direct 
relations without the intervention o f any intermediary concept. The verb "to create" instead 
introduces the concept o f "nothing" and relates the one to the other with the act and the 
w i l l of God, and excludes the personal and ontological involvement that the biblical 
verses demand. 
So, all the relevant notions, i.e., father, son, offspring, birth-giving, although 
understood literally, do not bear any "bodily" sense, because they apply "appropriately" 
(apuoJ^ovTOx;) to God, who as a bodiless and pure Spirit begets differently from human 
beings. To render the point more comprehensibly, Athanasius explains the concepts 
'creating' and 'being' when they apply to human beings and when they apply to God. God 
creates out of non-existence and "calls into existence things that do not exist" (Rom. 4:17), 
™ The qualifications for approaching the reality of God is reverence and faith in the mystery of God, 
which excludes the unsafe speculations of logical explanations. In a characteristic text he argues, "For it is 
better in perplexity to be silent and believe than to disbelieve on account of the perplexity; for he who is 
perplexed may in some way obtain mercy, because though he has questioned, he has yet kept quiet; but 
when a man is lead by his perplexity into forming for himself doctrines which beseem not, and utters what 
is imworthy of God, such daring incurs a sentence without mercy", CAR2 36:26,224B; C f also DECR 18: 
25,448B; CAR3 1:26,324A; 18:26,360C; T.F. Torrance, "The Hermeneutics", EPh 52:1 (1970) 466f 
CAR2 36:26,224B. 
D E C R 10:25,433B; SYNC 41:26,765C and 42:26,768A-B. 
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while human beings create from pre-existing materials and they are able to do so because 
they have learnt this art from God whom they imitate. Their being is also different because 
God is self-existing and is not contained by anything, but on the contrary, contains and 
governs everything through his Word, while his being is outside and alien to everything. 
Human beings are enclosed in space and cannot exist on their own, but are sustained by the 
Word of God.'' ' 
On this basis, Athanasius argues that the manner of the divine generation is also 
different. It is an act that pertains to nature, and therefore it is not the act itself that defines 
nature, but nature defines the manner in which this event takes place.''' As generation 
designates the identity of nature of sons with their fathers so on this basis it can also be 
validly applied to God, but in view of the purely spiritual nature of God. Athanasius 
explains this as follows, 
"Let every corporeal inference be banished on this subject; and transcending 
every imagination of sense, let us with pure understanding and with mind 
alone, apprehend the genuine relation of son to father and the Word's proper 
relation towards God, and the unvarying likeness of the radiance towards 
the light: for as the words 'offspring' and 'Son' bear and are meant to bear no 
human sense, but that is suitable to God, in like manner when we hear the 
term 'homoousios' let us not fall upon human senses and imagine partitions 
and divisions of the Godhead, but as having our thoughts directed to things 
immaterial, let us preserve undivided the oneness of nature and the identity 
of light; for this is proper to a son as regards a father, and in this is shewn 
that God is truly Father of the Word"."' 
Starting out from this premise, Athanasius provides the biblical data, which direct the 
effort of the human mind to conceive the differences of divine from human generation and 
determine the boundaries of its meaning. 
First of all Athanasius clears the confusion over the chronological divisions in the 
act of birth-giving in terms of priority and posteriority. He explains that they are due to the 
fact that human beings live and operate within a temporal framework and they become 
DECR 11:25,433C. 
C A R l 26:26,65C and 27:26,68A; also CAR2 3:26,152b etc. 
DECR 24:25,457B. 
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fathers of sons in time, because they themselves became sons of their fathers at an earHer 
chronological point. The weakness of human nature demands a process of preparation in 
order to be able to beget. However, he argues that apart from the temporal categories, one 
can think of an offspring as always existing with its father, i f one directs one's mind to the 
generic continuity of the human species and thinks that human beings are always potential 
begetters, and that every offspring exists already "in the loins" of its ancestors. 
Birth-giving is an attribute of nature and in the last analysis it is not affected by temporal 
divisions as far as the identity of species is concerned. God is eternal and exists beyond 
time, therefore there is nothing to prevent him from being eternal Father of an eternal 
offspring. For this reason biblical evidence not only does not imply any temporal 
categories, when it speaks about the relations of the Son with the Father, but also many 
times contains definitions which point out the eternity of the Son. Athanasius proves the 
point mainly with the following texts: 
Jn 1:1 ("In the beginning was the Word") manifests the Son as existing always and 
not having a chronological starting point of existence. This excludes any intervening 
period of time in the process of his generation: "John, theologising about the Son and 
acknowledging the difference of the words, did not say 'In the beginning has become' or 
'been made', but 'In the beginning was the Word', so that 'offspring' is proclaimed together 
with 'was' and one might not regard it with intervals, but believe in the Son existing 
eternally''.^'' 
Although they are inadequate to describe fully the divine reality, the paradigms 
light-effulgence' (Heb. 1:3: "He is the effulgence of his glory") and fountain-river' (Bar. 
3:12 "You have abandoned the fountain of wisdom"), in their theological application, do 
CAR2 58:26,269C. 
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carry sufficient connotation to suggests that as the he can never exist without the other, the 
Father will never be regarded as existing without his Son.'^ * 
Prov. 8:25 ("Before everything he begets me") contains the specification that the 
Son is begotten ''before everything"This does not denote priority in time from other 
creatures according to the Arian interpretation of 8:22. As Athanasius argues, the Arians 
have failed to understand even the manner of God's creating, because he did not bring 
creatures into existence one after the other, but all "at once" through the one and the same 
order according to their species. The fact that the Son is before everything signifies that he 
is different from everything, because he is generated differently, that is by birth and not by 
creation. The verb "he created" in 8:22 therefore is specified with "the beginning of his 
ways", while "he begets" in 8:25 with "before everything". The purport is that the Son who 
is "before everything" cannot be in the same sense "the beginning" of others, but he is 
acknowledged to be "other" (aXXog) than the others since everything that exists was 
created by God in one instance: "For the one who is before everything, is not the beginning 
of everything, but other than everything; and i f he is other than everything, which also 
denotes the beginning of everything, then it is clear that he [the Son] is other than 
creatures; it is also clearly proclaimed that the Word being other than everything and 
before everything, is afterwards created 'beginning of ways unto works' on account of the 
Incarnation, so that, as the Apostle said, the one who is the beginning, the firstborn of the 
dead, might be pre-eminent in everything". 
The critical presupposition in this issue for both Athanasius and Arius is the 
understanding of the concept of time and its implications.^*^ As we can see from the above. 
C A R l 26, 27:26,68A-C; CAR2 32:26,216B; 58:26,269; DECR 12:25,436C-D etc. 
CAR2 80:26,317A. 
A well argued presentation of the matter has been produced by E. Meijering in his essay "HN 
n O T E OTE OYK H N O YIOE. A Discussion on time and eternity", God, Being, History, pp. 81-88, to 
which we refer for ore details. We do not share, though, his parallelism of the Arius-Athanasius case with 
Atticus-' orthodox' Platonists: the same patterns of logic and argument apply almost to all subject-matters 
of intellectual debates on abstract concepts. But the case between Arius and Athanasius was not merely 
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Athanasius denies any other temporal category except the one that has its beginning at the 
creation of the world according to Heb 1:2 ("through whom he created the ages"). In other 
words, as in the case of ontology, so here, he draws a line between eternity, where God 
belongs, and time, where creatures belong. For Athanasius, all biblical passages place the 
Son before that point, in effect in eternity.''^ Arius on the other hand somehow introduces 
a third "kind" of time, which lies in between the previous two and is specified as the period 
from the creation of the Son to the creation of the world. He appears to hold that all the 
biblical chronological specifications {before, when etc.) which apply to the Son specify 
that different kind of time to which they belong. However, although he held that "there 
was [time] when the Son was not", he refused to define this 'time' by using the notion of 
eternity and placing the generation of the Son somewhere in there. Using the adverb 
"dxpovcoQ" ("timelessly") he believed that he could avoid defining specific tune, which he 
obviously understood as being lacking in the Bible.''" Athanasius obviously rejects any 
such conceptions as groundless on biblical evidence, and especially in respect of Jn. 1:3 
and Heb. 1:2: 
"Why do you imagine times before the Son? or why do you blaspheme the 
Word to be after times, by whom even the ages were made? For how did 
time or age at all subsist when the Word, as you say, had not appeared, 
'through' whom 'all things have been made and without whom 'not one thing 
was made'? or why, when you mean time, you do not say plainly 'a time 
was, when the Word was not'? But while you drop the word 'time' to 
deceive the simple... you could not escape discovery"."' 
The second task for Athanasius was to clear up the already mentioned suspicions of 
division of the essence of God on account of the generation. He argues that ontological 
divisions exist in human birth-giving, because human nature itself is composite and 
that, nor betrays any direct influences of similar debates in philosophical contexts. Cf. G.D. Dragas critique 
of contemporary Dogmengeschichte in op. cit., pp. 63-64. 
Cf. especially CAR2 32:26,216A, where in combination with Mat 3:17, Heb 1:3, 1 Cor 1:24, Bar 
3:12, Ps 1093:24, Jer 2:1, Jn 1:1 and Lk 1:1, he declares: "All these signify the eternity of the Son and that 
he is not alien but proper of his substance". 
"° Cf. his Letter to Alexander, op. cit: "created before the ages...begotten tunelessly before 
everything". 
C A R l 13:26,40B. 
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divided in space. Human offsprings are parts of their parents, because their nature "flows 
out" (dTtoppeouoi) of the nature of the latter, which is complemented again by food 
"flowing into" (eTtippeouoi) them. Human nature is partial and is characterized by 
constant movement and combination of different parts, therefore birth-giving also has to 
operate with these parts and perpetuate their divisions. God, on the other hand, is "without 
parts" (d|J.8pfig) and "impassible" (dTtaOfiQ). He does not change, neither is he influenced 
by "influx" (e7tippof|) or "efflux" (dTtoppofj). He is simple and eternal in nature and 
therefore birth-giving does not divide him. His offspring does not exist as a part of him, 
nor diminishes his essence exactly as human offsprings do not diminish either the essence 
or the humanity of their parents, nor do they posses only a part of it.' '^ 
The point of interest in the question concerning the Son's generation is the kind of 
his nature, not definitions of the manner in which he exists. On this point, Athanasius 
recalls the following biblical texts: 
In Mat. 3:17 ("This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased") God is 
witnessed as the Father of the One and Only Son. The reason for this is the fact that 
essence of God is "simple" (ocTtXii) and "unchangeable" (axpeTtxoc;): "Being incomposite 
in nature. He is Father of the one and only Son. This is why he is only-begotten and alone 
on the Father's bosom and alone is acknowledged by the Father to be from him saying, 
This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased".''^ 
Jn. 1:18 ("The Only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father") introduces a 
new aspect into the concept of generation. Although generation emphasizes for Athanasius 
the distinction between the two persons of the Trinity as concrete individuals, the phrase 
"in the bosom of the Father" signifies the different kind of the divine from the human 
generation, because it indicates unity of the Father with his offspring and not separation 
For the full argument of Athanasius see C A R l 28:26,69Af. 
D E C R 11:25,436A. 
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and division: the Son is begotten and yet not separated from the bosom of the Father. The 
verb "to beget" in the divine dimension only secures the direct and intimate ontological 
relations between the Father and the Son, and does not trail divisions according to 
categories that do not apply to the divine mode of existence. 
The Christological title 'Word' and the paradigms 'light-effulgence', 'fountain-river' 
and 'image', primarily convey the idea of unity of nature between the Son and the Father, 
because they shift the emphasis on generation from bodily to spiritual understanding: 
"As we have said above, so now we repeat, that the divine generation must 
not be compared to the nature of men, nor the Son considered to be part of 
God, nor the generation to imply any passion whatsoever. God is not a man. 
For men beget passibly, having a transitive nature which waits for periods 
by reason of its weakness. But with God this cannot be; for he is not 
composed of parts, but being impassible and simple, he is impassibly and 
indivisibly Father of the Son. This again is strongly evidenced and proved 
by divine Scripture. For the Word of God is his Son and the Son is the 
Father's Word and Wisdom; and Word and Wisdom is neither creature nor 
part of him whose Word he is, nor an offspring passibly begotten. Uniting 
then the two titles, Scripture speaks of the 'Son' in order to herald the 
natural and true offspring of his essence".''" 
Finally, Athanasius also denies the Arian allegations that the Son came into 
existence by the will of God. He deploys the following arguments.''^ a) On the basis of Ps. 
113:11 ("Our God in the heavens and on the earth created everything he pleased"), Fs. 
110:2 ("Great are the works of the Lord, everything is according to his will") and Ps. 
134:6 ("Whatever God pleases he does, in heavens and on earth"), which he compares with 
Mat. 3:17, Ps. 44:2, Jn. 1:1, Ps. 35:10, Heb. 1:3 and Col. 1:15, he asserts that the notion of 
"wil l" is attached to the verb "to create", not to the verb "to beget" and its related terms. 
The wil l of God precedes creatures and relates them to God,- while the biblical verses 
which talk about the generation of the Son relate him to the Father intimately and directly 
without any intermediary linkage or allusion to the latter's will , b) As a consequence, the 
concept of generation is conceived of as pertaining to the nature of God and not to his will . 
C A R l 28:26,69A. 
See CAR3 59ff:26,448Aff. 
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Nature is above will ; it is neither preceded, nor defined by it. A son is an offspring of the 
essence of his father which has the attribute of begetting by nature and is not determined 
by the father's will . Thus, Athanasius reverses the Arian argument saying: " I want to ask 
the irreligious men ... to ask now not the childbearing women, whom they used to ask 'Did 
you have a son before bearing?', but the fathers and say to them, 'Do you become fathers 
by your wil l , or by nature together with your will?', or, 'Are your children like your nature 
and essence?' ... For they will reply to them 'What we beget, is like not our will , but like 
ourselves; nor become we parents by previous counsel, but to beget is proper to our nature, 
since we too are images of our fathers".'^* c) The allegation that the Son exists by the will 
of God, also affects the conception of the Father, because he is no longer regarded as the 
Father eternally, but as Father through will. Since Athanasius considers God's fatherhood 
an essential attribute of his being the idea of the Son's generation by will presents God as 
defining his own existence by his will , as i f his will preceded his being, Athanasius regards 
the idea as "shamelessness" (7tp07t£T£ia) and "exceeding madness" (uTteppdXXouoa 
^lavia). d) James 1:18 ("Of his own will he brought us forth"), 1 Thes. 5:18 ("for this is 
the will of God in Jesus Christ for you") suggest that since the will of God is in Christ, 
then one must seek in God for another will or word in which Christ was made, because it 
is not possible that he creates his own existence. Scripture, however, does not provide such 
evidence, e) Finally, taking as his basis an exegetical synthesis of Prov. 3:19 ("The Lord 
by wisdom founded the earth, by understanding he established the heavens"), Ps. 32:6 
("By the Word of the Lord the heavens were made"), Ps. 113:11 ("Our God in the heavens 
and on the earth created everything he pleased"), James 1:18 and 1 Thes. 5:18 and having 
as regulative principle God's creation of the world, he argues that one must not think of 
God according to the human model: since the world was created through the "will" 
CAR3 67:26,465B. 
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(PouXfi, 98>.Tioig), "understanding" ((ppovrjoiq), "wisdom" (oocpia), "word" (Xoyog) and 
all these are in Christ, then God has no other will than Christ who is the Son. The 
following text is characteristic and representative of Athanasius' understanding of the Son 
in relation to all the associated titles: 
"The Son of God then, he is the 'Word' and the 'Wisdom', he is the 
'understanding' and the living 'counsel' and in him is the good pleasure of 
the Father; he is truth, light and power of the Father. But i f the will of God 
is wisdom and understanding and the Son is wisdom, he who says that the 
son is by wil l , says virtually that wisdom has come into being in wisdom 
and the son is made in a son and the word created through the word. This is 
incompatible with God and is opposed to his Scriptures. For the Apostle 
proclaims the Son to be the very radiance and character, not of the Father's 
wil l , but of his essence itself saying, 'who being the radiance of his glory 
and the character of his subsistence' [hypostasis]. But if, as we have said 
before, the Father's essence and subsistence is not by will , neither, as is very 
plain, is the proper one to the Father's subsistence from will. For such as 
and so as that blessed subsistence is, the same must also be the proper 
offspring from it. And accordingly the Father himself did not say 'this is my 
son originated at my will ' nor 'the son whom I have by my favour', but 
simply 'my son' and more than that 'in whom I am well pleased', meaning 
by this, This is the Son by nature and in him is lodged my will about what 
pleases me".'" 
The arguments presented so far, constitute the background of Athanasius' 
understanding of the Christological title "Son". It gives a new dimension to the other 
Christological title "Word", already used in the ecclesiastical literature of the previous 
centuries. There is a constant interplay in Athanasius' writings between the notions "son" 
and "word" on the one hand and "generation" on the other: the two former titles bear 
witness to the natural generation as their presupposition, and at the same time the concept 
of 'generation' invests them with new meaning and response to reality. The main 
arguments having already been expounded, we will try in the following section to give a 
comprehensive overview of the applications of the title Son and the associated title 
"only-begotten" (Movoyevfig) as constituent concepts of the 'homoousion'. 
CAR3 65:26,461A-B. 
2.2 The Christological Titles 
2.2.1 The Only-begotten Son of God (MovoYevfic; Yioc;) 
The confession that Jesus Christ is 'the Son of God' is acknowledged today by the 
majority of specialists as central to the New Testament texts."* It was the first compact 
declaration by the early Christians of what Christianity was all about and very quickly 
came to be the affirmation of both the true divinity and the true humanity of Jesus Christ. 
As Dr. I . H. Marshall remarks, "the roots of the New Testament designation of Jesus as the 
Son of God lie in his own consciousness of being uniquely related to the Father, a 
consciousness which he expressed both by speaking of God as 'my father' and by referring 
to himself as the Son".'^ ^ From this premise, the early Christians advanced Jesus' divine 
sonship as the foundation of their own distinctive identity against their Jewish background 
and the Hellenistic paganism dominating the culture and philosophy of the time.^°° 
However, as Dr. G. D. Dragas points out "this faith, before it was allowed to unfold its 
implications for the knowledge of God and man in Christian theology, met with two 
opposing tendencies, which soon arose against it. The ebionitic or psilanthropic one, which 
sfressed the human side of Christ and made the divine side of the Son of God accidental 
and the docetic which relativised the reality of his humanity".^"' 
For example O. Culhnann points out: "According to the whole Gospel tradition, the 'Son of God' 
title as applied to Jesus express the historical and qualitative uniquness of his relation to his Father" (p. 
275). For the biblical point of view of the theme we consulted the following: O. Culhnann, The Christology 
of NT, A. Richardson, Introduction to the theology of the NT, J. Bonsriven, Theology of the NT, J.D.G. 
Dunn, Christology, L . Goppelt, Theology of NT, I. Marshall, "The divine sonship of Jesus Christ", Interpre-
tation, 21 (1967) 88-103, C. Turner, "O Y I O E MOY O AFAnHTOI", 7^", 27 (1926) 113-129. 
"The Divine sonship", p. 103. 
Prof J.D.G. Dunn remarks: "Some movements have no dominant figure in the begmning; but 
Christianity began with Jesus. And it was the meaning of Jesus, of what he had said and done, together 
with what the first Christians understood him to be and to have been, to be doing and to have done, which 
was the most significant factor in the new sect's own developing self-understanding and developmg sense 
of distictiveness over against the other religions, sects and philosophies of the time" {Christology, p. ix). 
Athanasiana, p. 39; see also the presentation of the questions which those tendencies raised for the 
sonship of Jesus in the struggle for its acceptance and exact exposition. 
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As Athanasius also informs us, anyone who wanted to become a member of the 
Church from any cultural or religious background, faced the kerugma of the divine sonship 
of Jesus as the most challenging article of Christian catechesis.'"' Although it is difficult to 
frace the complex and mysterious ways which human logic follows to form its ideas, it 
appears that Arius' doctrine was one more attempt to compromise the confession of Jesus 
Christ as Son of God with the traditionally accepted monotheistic faith.'"' His 
understanding of the sonship of Jesus was "the most subtle development" compared to 
similar earlier Hellenistic or Jewish attempts. This was because, as Dr. G.D. Dragas 
explains, 
"Between these two parties, the theists and the immanentists, others of 
Jewish Platonic ideology move into the middle position which accept to a 
certain relative measure a divinity of the Son and even his unique divine 
Sonship, which they make the hegemonic principle of his humanity but 
subordinate it to a transcendent and absolute Father who alone can be fully 
and properly God. This is in fact the most subtle of these developments 
because it moves in between opposite views, the transcendentalist and the 
immanentist, and therefore can manipulate more easily the language and 
"Who hears of a son and does not conceive that which is proper to the father's essence? Who 
heard in his first catechising, that God has a Son and has made all things through his own Word, and did 
not imderstand it in the sense as we now mean it?... For what is sown in every soul from the begmning is 
that God has a Son, the Word, the Wisdom, the Power, that is, his image and effulgence..." CAR2 34:26, 
220A-B; Cf. also C A R l 8:26,28B, where he makes similar complaints "For who was ever yet a hearer of 
such a doctrine? From where and from whom did the abettors and hirelings of the heresy gain it? Who thus 
expounded to them when they were at school?". 
This is the main problem which R.P.C. Hanson also identifies {The Search, p. xx), but we would 
disagree with him that the "crisis" over this problem "was not created by either Arius or Athanasius", but 
arised ttom a vague "earliest Christian tradition". This, of course, is in accordance with Prof. Hanson's 
tendency to handle all the pesons involved in the controversy in equal terms as a concerted effort through 
thesis and antithesis to find the Christian doctrine of God, but we think that this is not the case. Taking as a 
criterion the fact of the later vindication of Athanasius and his acknowledgement as the spokesman of 
orthodoxy at his time, he cannot be treated in equal terms with Arius. Arius' views can be comprehended 
and explained, but they were not less heretical in 325 than they were in 381. The "earliest Christian 
tradition" did not consist of confusion over the divinity of Jesus Christ or the Trinity, but it was a living 
experience of the Church, which was intellectually challenged by particular people at particular time. It 
was not at the time of Athanasius that the Christian haith had to be defined or determined, but sunply 
expressed in the appropriate language and demands of the time. Jesus Christ was believed to be the true 
Son of God by the apostolic Fathers as well as by Athanasius. The difference is that whereas the title 'Son' 
was enough for the former to express their faith in him (as well as the other biblical terms), it was 
insufficient for Athanasius to express the same faith because of Arius' twist of meanings (Cf the initial 
intention of the Nicenes to maintain the biblical vocabulary and the Arian attitude as described by 
Athanasius in DECR 19-20). We think that B. Lonergan's definition of the so called 'dogmatic 
development' as "movement from one kind of clarity to another" renders more accurately the situation {The 
Way, p. 13; He makes a 'dramatic' description of the procedure of receiving and expressing the Christian 
truth in pp. 5ff; C f also note 23 in ow Introduction). 
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fraditions of the Church ... The Arian crisis was the last and most decisive 
of the early attacks on the Church's confession of the Son of God".^ ** 
Athanasius maintained the traditional ecclesiastical understanding of Jesus Christ's 
sonship and established it on the strongest possible ontological terms, which would 
distinguish it from the Arian version that construed both its meaning and significance. The 
fight took place on biblical grounds and biblical data were used as the starting point of two 
radically different approaches. On the one hand, priority in Athanasius' argument is given 
to Jesus Christ as the Son who reveals the Father (Heb. 1:1, Jn. 14:9) and this becomes the 
regulative principle for his understanding of God. On the other hand, Arius, while dealing 
with Jesus as the Son of God, turns away, as it were, to an abstract definition of God and 
of his attributes, and sets it as the regulative principle for his definition of the sonship of 
Jesus.^ "' He then turns again to the Bible trying to find footing and support for his 
understanding. As a consequence, these two different exegetical methods resulted in two 
confradicting conclusions: Athanasius maintains the significance of the ontological 
difference between 'son' and 'creature' and fortifies it with referenc to the language of 
'begetting', explaining its implications and the distinctions at which it aims. Arius 
eliminates any ontological distinction, equating the concepts 'son' and 'creature' and thus 
ruling out a considerable part of the most deep and valuable biblical teaching. Prof T.F. 
Torrance remarks that "Arianism was the most dangerous heresy for it struck at the very 
roots of the Church's faith by calling into question the reality of Christ's revelation and 
saving activity... The oneness between Jesus Christ and God in being, word and act had to 
do essentially with the integrity of the Gospel message".^ "* 
As we have seen, the arguments of Athanasius were as much literal as theological 
also. The best and most comprehensive account of his understanding of sonship is 
204 Athanasiana, pp. 47-48. 
Therefore, Dr. G.D. Dragas rightly observes that "the pomt of divergence between St. Athanasius 
and Arius is not merely the conception of divine sonship, but the understanding of the divme nature", 
op.cit.,^.S%. 
T.F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith,^^. 119, 132. 206 
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deployed in the DECR. In the beginning of his exposition, as in any modem biblical 
textbook, he discerns two meanings of the term 'son' in Scripture.'"^ The first designates 
any offspring that comes into existence from its father through the natural process of 
begetting. Its significance lies in that the offspring shares the same natural characteristics 
as those possessed by its begetter, and belongs to the same species or kind of existence as 
its father, with whom it is in effect "homoousios" with its father. "It is necessary", 
Athanasius remarks, that "whatever the begetter is, the offspring is the same" and also that 
"as it is madness to call the ship or the house homoousios with its builder, so it is 
appropriate to call every son homoousios with his father"."" The second meaning 
designates the status which human beings acquire as sons through divine adoption. This 
relationship is again described with the terms 'son', 'father' and 'to beget', and refers to 
God, who is said to have begotten human beings as sons, according to Deut. 13:19-14:1 
("If you obey the voice of the Lord your God, keeping all his commandments which I 
command you this day, and doing what is right in the sight of the Lord your God, You are 
sons of the Lord your God"), Is. 1:2 ("Sons have I reared and brought up, but they have 
rebelled against me") and Jn. 1:12 ("To all who received him, he gave power to become 
children of God"). Athanasius calls the former "sonship by nature" ((puoei) and the latter 
"sonship by status" (Geoei) or "by grace" (xapixi), because it is a gift granted by God to 
Scholars discern four main uses of the term 'Son of God' in Israel and the Old Testament: a) for 
physical descendants, b) for the people of Israel as a whole, c) for the king and d) for persons with special 
commission from God (See article "YIOL" in Kittel's, Theological Dictionary, IV, pp. 340-353; so also 
-with slight variations of emphasis- O. Culhnann, p. 272-275; Richardson, pp. 148-149; Bonsriven, pp. 
19-23; the overview of usage by Goppelt, II, pp. 71-72; and especially the most comprehensive summary of 
the results of modem investigation in Dunn, pp. 14-16). Although great plurality appears in the use of the 
term, from the point of view of physical relationship all these fall into the two categories that Athanasius 
sets, especially when it refers to the 'son of God': that of physical or generic relation (cpucsei) and that of 
conventional or formal relationship, which shorthand Athanasius calls 'by adoption' or 'by appointment' 
(Oeoei). 
C A R l 35:26,221A: "OTtovoq yap av f) 6 yevvcbv, TOioOtov avdyKTi Kai T O yevvTina eivai"; 
C f also CAR3 65:26,461B. SER2 6:26,617B; C f also DECR 13:25,437-440A and 10:25,433A: "for what 
is naturally begotten from any one and does not accrue to him from without, nature acknowledges as son 
and this is what the name implies". 
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those who are virtuous and faithful to him.^°' On these grounds he sets the question clearly 
and plainly: "Now in which of these two senses do they understand the Son of God?". 
Although it is not clear what answer Arius would give to the question according to 
this pattern of meaning, from hints we can gather from both him and Athanasius, he seems 
to accept the second meaning of sonship, as it is set by Athanasius, by which he held that 
the Son was first created by God alone and then was adopted as Son receiving the gifts of 
the divine glory. First of all, Athanasius refutes the Arian interpretation that the Son is 
called "Only-begotten on the grounds that he alone was created by God while all the rest 
were created through him.^'" Secondly, in the Letter to Alexander Arius sounds particularly 
worried not to be misunderstood by his bishop as considering the Son an ordinary human 
"son" adopted by God in the same way: he explains that he does not believe that the Son 
"who was before, was afterwards generated or new created into a Son", but that "at the will 
of God created before times and before ages and gaining life and being from the Father, 
who gave subsistence to the glories together with him. For, the Father, granting the 
inheritance of everything to him, did not deprive himself of what he has ingenerately 
(dYEVvfiTCOc;) in himself'.^" From our point of view this suggests an attempt to draw the 
Son's creation and adoption by God as close as possible to each other by eliminating the 
period of "time" which he recognised as having been introduced between them. It appears, 
that is, that according to Arius the origin of the Son from the Father, which is generation 
for Athanasius but creation for him, and the Son's adoption by God, (i.e., generation) took 
place simultaneously. To avoid the specification of that chronological point, he introduced 
™^  O. CuUmann especially emphasizes the importance of strict obedience to the command of God as 
necessary qualification for the designation as 'son of God' (p. 275). Fo the significance of the term in 
relation to God see Kittel's, Dictionary, op. c!?., pp.347-353. 
DECR 7:25,428Bf 
^" "...according to what yourself, blessed Pope, have forbidden those who introduced these in the 
middle of the Church and the Council", op. cil In his Letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia (H.-G. Opitz, 
Urkunde, 3:1:1, pp. 2-3) he argues: "he came into being...full <of grace and truth>" (ymiaiyy...nXixQ^c, 
xdpiTOt; Ktti aXriGeiaq). 
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the vague notion of "dxpovcoc;" (timelessly). He believed that the likeness with God, 
which human beings acquire by imitation and virtue according to Athanasius, was an 
internal acquisition of the Son from the very first moment of his existence granted to him 
on account of God's prior knowledge of his goodness.'" Therefore he is always called Son, 
he is the Son par excellence compared to human sons, and in effect he is the unique 
"God-like" creature. The only attribute that he did not inherit, was the "ingenerate" mode 
of existence and therefore he could never be regarded as God generically identical with the 
Father.'" In this respect and since it did not make any difference to say that the Son was 
created or begotten and because the common ecclesiastical language accepted the verb "to 
beget", Arius had no reason to go against it, no matter i f he inferred an entirely different 
situation.'"* 
This understanding has virtually also set the context and the main guidelines with 
which Athanasius employs the Christological title 'Son'. He understands the sonship of 
C f also Athanasius' allusion to the Arian view alleging that "because his [the Son's] qualifications 
were foreknown, as they say, he therefore received grace from the first, the name, and the glory of the 
name, from his very first begmning ..." (DECR 6:25,425C). 
'^^  In his Letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia says "dYevvtiroq ydp O U K fiv". Arius had drawn the 
followmg conclusion, which lies at the foundations of his doctiine, "So, there are three subsistencies; God, 
who is the cause of everything, is the only One [sup.ixovcbTaTOc;] Ingenerate; then is the Son who is 
begotten from the Father timelessly and is created and founded before the ages, he is alone origmated from 
the Father. He is not eternal or coetemal or Ingenerate with the Father, neither has he got his bemg together 
with the Father, as some assert t a 7tpo<; i i , suggesting two Ingenerate principles, but as monad and source 
of everything, so is God before everything". Letter to Alexander, op. cit. and the similar statements in the 
above quotation; C f also Athanasius' quotations from Thalia in C A R l 5-6:26,21Af "he [the Son] as others 
had an origin of creation [dp%T|v T O O KTiCeoGai eoxs] -- and whereas all beings are foreign and different 
from God in essence, so too is the Word alien and unlike in all things to the Father's essence and 
property..." and "As all beings are foreign and unlike to God in essence, so too is the Word alien 
(aXX-OTpioq) and unlike (avoHOioq) m all things to the Father's essence and propriety... The essences of 
the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are separate (nenepionevai) in nature and estranged 
(dne^evconevai) and disconnected (a7cecJX0lVlo^eval) and alien and without participation ( O ^ E T O X O I ) to 
each other ... utterly unlike from each other in essence and glory for ever. Thus as to likeness of glory and 
essence he says that the Word is entirely diverse from both the Father and the Holy Spirit" (CARl 
6:26,24A-B). Prof R. Williams particularly emphasizes the pomt saying, "Arius and his party never 
wavered in their commitment to the doctiine of the 'three hypostases', each of which subsists KaG'auTO. 
Each is, in its own right, a logical subjectt, a substance, ireducible to being part of the definition of another 
subject. The Son therefore has his own properties, his own essential characteristics, which for Arius must 
logically be other than the essential characteristics of the (essentially eternal) Father" {The Logic, p. 61). 
S. Laeuchli, especially discusses the problem of the conunon language with the different 
coimotations as one of the three main points of the conttoversy, C f The case, p. 410; C f also the 
discussion by T.F. Torrance, Trinitarian, pp. 111-114. 
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Jesus Christ according to its first meaning and puts it in opposition to the creature concept 
as well as to the adoptionist form of sonship. Although the 'Father-Son' language is very 
common in the biblical texts, he pays particular attention to certam verses which made 
clearer the distinction. The arguments we have presented so far, have made clear his 
attitude against the designation of the Son as creature. In the following section we will 
present an overview of these arguments and their applications together with some 
additional observations concerning the significance of the associated Christological title 
"Only-begotten" as bearing witness to the doctrine of the natural generation. We will also 
look into the way in which he differentiates the designation of human beings as sons of 
God and establishes the distinction between sonship by nature and sonship by grace. 
2.2.1.1 The natural sonship of the Son 
Athanasius considers the designation of Jesus Christ as the Son of God 
emphatically expressed particularly in two texts which he employs with equal emphasis. 
They are Mat. 3:17 "This is my beloved Son with whom I am well pleased" and Ps. 2:7 
"You are my Son, this day I have begotten you". He appears to have a special preference 
for these texts, obviously because, being explicit and plain declarations of God the Father 
towards his Son, they are clothed with a distinctive authority. They refer to Jesus Christ as 
the Son in a unique and unprecedented manner which Athanasius underlines with emphatic 
statements, like "The Father revealed his own Word from heaven declaring. This is my 
beloved Son" and also "Him the Father pointed out both in Jordan and on the Moimt, 
saying 'This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased'. Him the Arians denied, but 
we worship".^" On this basis Athanasius handles the verses in the following way. 
CAR3 59:26,448B; EPI 12:26,1069A; C f also similar statements in DECR 11, DION 2, SYNO 
35, CAR2 23, CAR3 65. 
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First of all, he asserts that the names 'father' and 'son' have to be natiu-al and with 
correspondence to reality; they are not metaphors or imaginative, as the Arians believe. 
The starting point for the correct understanding of these terms is the fact that they are 
names with which the Father and the Son addressed each other, so they are used by the 
divine persons themselves rather than being terms which human beings ascribe to them. 
Therefore, it is an error of hermeneutics to deny their proper meaning on the grounds that 
they imply division, because this very exegesis implies the imposition of an 
anthropological model of understanding on the biblical revelation concerning the nature of 
God. As the nature of God is far superior to the human it is impossible for the human mind 
to comprehend the mode of its existence or the manner in which it lives.^'* This is a 
fundamental hermeneutical principle which Athanasius expresses as follows, 
"But i f on the other hand, while they acknowledge with us the name 'son' 
from an unwillingness to be publicly and generally condemned, they deny 
that the Son is proper offspring of the Father's essence, on the ground that 
this must imply parts and divisions; what is it but to deny that he is very son 
and only in name to call him son at all? And is it not a grievous error, to 
have material thoughts about what is immaterial and because of the 
weakness of their proper nature to deny what is natural and proper to the 
Father? It does but remain now, that they should deny him also, because 
they understand not how God is and what the Father is and they, foolish 
men, measure by themselves the offspring of the Father".^" 
Apparently, the crucial theme which underlies this argument is the authority of the 
biblical text as such, both in its 'literal' and 'metaphorical' meaning. The criterion for the 
distinction between the two and the principle for the approach to the biblical text by the 
interpreter, are clearly set by Athanasius in the following texts: 
This is the ground upon which Athanasius shows so much persistence on the distinction between 
words and realities, as we have akeady referred to earher. He had many times the opportimity to appeal to 
the same principle, since the Arian exegesis of the biblical texts was consistent insofar as it persistently 
inverted the meaning of particular words to the same direction, which obviously falls within the exegetical 
boundaries which Athanasius has set for this matter. C. Kannengiesser remarks that "The biblical problem, 
common to Arius and to his recent protectors, is that of the exact theological description of the Son through 
the images and the letter of Scripture... Scriptural texts must certainly be interpreted when they speak of 
divine generation through various analogies, but Arius gives them a changed interpretation by construing 
them as definitions, without analogy or metaphor, of the origin of the Son" {Holy Scripture, p. 7). 
C A R l 15:26,44A; C f also DECR 10-11 
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"But since, 'No one knows the Father but the Son and he to whomsoever 
the Son will reveal Him', therefore the sacred writers to whom the Son has 
revealed him have given us a certain image from things visible ...[Heb. 1:3, 
Ps. 35:10, Bar. 3:12, Jer. 2:13]. For the sacred writers wishing us thus to 
understand, have given these illustrations; and it is unseemly and most 
irreligious, when Scripture contains such images, to form ideas concerning 
our Lord from others which are neither in Scripture, nor have any religious 
bearing",^'* and also 
"Let every corporeal inference be banished on this subject; and transcending 
every imagination of sense, let us with pure understanding and with mind 
alone, apprehend the genuine relation of son to father and the Word's proper 
relation towards God, and the unvarying likeness of the radiance towards 
the light: for as the Words 'offspring' and 'Son' bear and are meant to bear 
no human sense, but one suitable to God, in like manner when we hear the 
term 'homoousios' let us not fall upon human senses and imagine partitions 
and divisions of the Godhead, but as having our thoughts directed to things 
immaterial, let us preserve undivided the oneness of nature and the identity 
of light; for this is proper to a son as regards a father, and in this is shewn 
that God is truly Father of the Word".^'^ 
With the first text Athanasius defines what we called the 'literal' meaning of the 
biblical text and with the second the 'metaphorical'. On the one hand, the literal meaning 
refers to the selection of particular terms by Scripture for transmitting the divine revelation 
which constitutes the only source for developing theological concepts. As he explains, for 
example, it is the image of the light and the effulgence that has been used to describe the 
reality of the Son's unity with the Father and not the image of light and fire.^^° Athanasius 
retains and defends the literal meaning of the biblical vocabulary when alternative terms or 
notions construe or threaten to abolish it. On the other hand, the understanding of biblical 
language as metaphor is based on the fact that it refers to realities that transcend the 
created world and therefore the definition of the terms should follow suit. 'Metaphor' 
though does not imply twisting of the literal sense of the terms used, but, understanding of 
the reasons which necessitated their use with reference to the realities which lie behind 
them. Thus, we see Athanasius objecting to the rendering of 'begetting' as 'creating', to the 
equation of 'offspring' and 'creature', and to the interpretation of the 'Word' and 'Wisdom of 
D E C K 12:25,436Cf. 
DECR24:25,457B-C. 
D E C K 23:25,456D. 
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God' as mere names and not as a real attributes of the Father. Although he defends the 
literal meaning of these biblical terms, he refers them to the transcendent divine reality and 
reads in them the identity of being of the Son with the Father upon which he establishes 
the 'homoousion'. This task, though, demands a deep assimilation of the inner logic which 
penetrates the biblical statements and a tight grip of the thread which unites the one text 
with the other unto a coherent whole.^^' He calls this hermeneutical method the "collection 
of the mind of the Scriptures" and it consists of placing the particular biblical texts or 
terms in the narrower and wider context in which they appear and their harmoiusation in 
order to determine their meaning and function in each occurrence.^ ^^ 
On this basis, Athanasius asserts that the 'Father-Son' language in the Bible does 
not impose human patterns of existence on God, but indicates the nature of their relations. 
Bearing also in mind the arguments on the 'to beget' language, the description which 
Athanasius gives for those relations, could be summarized as follows. 
a) The Son is regarded as the natural offspring of the Father and not as one of his 
creatures. As such, their relations are intimate and pertain to their inner being, because the 
Son is generated from the essence of the Father and he is not a product of his creative 
activity on account of which he would exist 'outside' of the Father and would have no 
connection to what the Father is in his being. Athanasius' statement is simple and plain: " I f 
then he is Son, he is not a creature; i f creature, not son, for great is the difference between 
them, and son and creature cannot be the same, unless his essence is considered at once 
from God and external to God".^ ^^ 
T.F. Torrance, TTie Hermeneutics, EPh, 53 (1971) 148. 
This method provides the interpreter with the flexibility to reinterpret and apply the biblical texts 
on the particular demands of the time using terminology, which might be outside the biblical vocabulary, 
but conveys themind of the Scripture. This is highly justifiable by Athanasius, since it is his main argument 
for the vindication of the insertion of the "homoousios" in the Nicene Creed. See DECR 
19-20:25,488D-452B; AFRO 6:26,1040A-C. 
D E C R 13:25,440A; C f also SER2 7, DI0N2 etc. 
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b) The designation of the Son as natural offspring from the essence of the Father 
does not imply "division" or "partition" of his essence, but only acknowledges the nature 
of the Son's genuine divinity. Since the Father is pure spirit and exists beyond partitions or 
divisions which occur to bodily beings, the outcome of the divine generation will also have 
the same attributes: "But God, being without parts, is Father of the Son without partition or 
passion, for there is neither effluence of the immaterial, not influx from without as among 
men. And being uncompounded in nature, he is Father of the Only Son".^ "^ Begetting does 
not necessarily imply division of the essence of the begetter, because it does not diminish 
it, neither does the offspring share a nature lesser than its father's, but both terms simply 
indicate that the offspring has the same attributes with its begetter: "And since to be 
participated no one of us would ever call passion or division of God's essence (for it has 
been shewn and acknowledged that God is participated and to be participated is the same 
thing as to beget), therefore that which is begotten is neither passion nor division of that 
blessed essence. Hence it is not incredible that God could have a Son, the offspring of his 
own essence, nor do we imply passion or division of God's essence, when we speak of 
'Son' and 'Offspring', but rather we acknowledge the genuine and true and Only-begotten 
of God and so we b e l i e v e " " f o r such as [OTtola f i] and so as [SCOQ av fi] that blessed 
subsistence [hypostasis] is, the proper offspring from it must be the same".^ *^ 
c) Addressing the divine persons as 'Father' and 'Son' also denotes their direct and 
immediate relations. I f the Son is not generated naturally from the Father, then he must be 
Son by participation (SK laexouoiac;). This, in turn, implies that there is a mediator 
between the Father and the Son, which unites them. The only possible candidate for this 
D E C R 11:25,436A. 
"5 C A R l 16:26,45B. 
CAR3 65:26,461B. Obviously, this is the point up to which the Athanasian exegesis goes. The 
incomprehensibihty of the divine nature, as we have said repeatedly, does not allow many explanations and 
definitions of the manner in which it exists. 
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service would be the Spirit, who according to Jn 16:14-15 "takes" from the Son. Moreover, 
the Son would be called 'son' of whatever that mediator would be. The directness of the 
'Father-Son' language as it is expressed in the biblical texts excludes any mediator: "When 
the Father says 'This is my beloved son' and when the Son says that God is his own Father, 
it follows that what is participated is not external, but from the essence of the Father. And 
as to this again, i f what participates in the Father is other than the essence of the Son, an 
equal impropriety wil l meet us, because it will lie in between the Father and the essence of 
the Son, whatever that might be".^" 
A l l in all, to acknowledge the Son as natural offspring or Son of the Father in the 
real ontological sense, at once includes, for Athanasius, the concept of the "homoousion" 
without any special reference to it being needed: "Isaac does not make, but begets Jacob 
naturally and is homoousios with him, and so does Jacob for Jude and his brothers. For as 
mad as one would be to claim that a house or a ship is homoousios with its builder, so it is 
proper for one to say that every son is homoousios with his father. I f then, they are Father 
and Son, it is necessary that the Son is truly and naturally a Son. This is the meaning of the 
Son being homoousios with the Father". 
The second element which Athanasius takes up is the unqualified use of the verb 
"to be" ( E O T I V ) , not only in Mat. 3:17 but also in all texts which talk about the Son. The 
verb's particular significance is that it points to the eternity of the Son. Athanasius bases 
this assertion on two arguments: 
a) A l l the biblical statements which define the status of the Son, talk about his 
existence using the verb mainly in the simple present tense and unqualified by any limiting 
chronological definitions or other reasoning. In contrast, the verses which refer to creatures 
are always combined with chronological definitions that indicate the starting point of their 
C A R l 15:26,44C. 
SER2 6:26,617B. 
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existence. So, adverbs like 'when', 'before' etc. clearly define the creature's chronological 
origin in Gen. 2:5, Deut. 32:8, Jn. 14:28-29, Prov. 8:23-25, Jn. 8:58, Jer. 1:5, Ps. 90:2, 
Sus. 42, while in contrast 'ever' is applied to the being of the Son to indicate his 
timelessness: "Thus, it appears that the phrases 'once was not' and 'before it came to be' and 
'when' and the like belong to things originate and creatures which come out of 
non-existence, and are alien to the Word. But i f such terms are used in Scripture of things 
originate, but 'ever' for the Word, it follows, 0 you enemies of God, that the Son did not 
come out of non-existence".^^' 
b) The verb "to be", for the Son, points to and is the result of the perfection of the 
divine nature. The essence of God has never been imperfect so that it would be liable to 
change with the generation of the Son. Therefore, because God is perfect and exists 
beyond time, he also begets perfectly and his offspring is eternal. He does not consist of 
that same essence which is possessed by human beings and which is imperfect, subject to 
temporal changes and, on account of which, they beget offsprings inferior to their parents 
and separated in time and space: " I f he is called the eternal offspring of the Father, he is 
rightly so called. For the essence of the Father was never imperfect, so that what is proper 
to it should be added afterwards; nor as man from man has the Son been begotten, so as to 
be later than his Father's existence, but he is God's offspring and as being proper Son of 
God, who is ever, exists eternally. For whereas it is proper to men to beget in time on 
account of the imperfection of their nature, God's offspring is eternal, for his nature is ever 
perfect"."" 
C A R l 13:26,40B; CAR3 59. 
C A R l 14:26,41B. For Athanasius, then, the argument of Arius that because the Son is begotten in 
contrast to God who is "unbegotten" or "ingenerate" implies temporal secondariness is groundless. In fact, 
Athanasius asserts that because he is said to be begotten, it excludes any suspicion of time or chronological 
starting point, because God exists before time and the concept of generation is proper to the nature of God 
acquiring its characteristics from it. Unlike with the verb "to create", such impUcations would be positively 
plausible. Therefore, he insists so much on the distinction between "to create" and "to beget" and especially 
on the point that the existence of the Son is never said to have been created, but that is proper to God's 
essence: "All everywhere tell us about the being [TO eivai] of the Son, and never of him being created or 
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Although Athanasius does not make any specific exegetical comments on the 
adjective "beloved" (dyaTiriTog) it is clear from the contexts in which Mat. 3:17 appears 
that it emphasizes the uniqueness of the Son as the one and only offspring of the Father.^" 
The argument is characteristic: "For being uncompounded in nature, he is Father of one 
only Son. This is why he is Only-begotten and alone in the Father's bosom, and alone is 
acknowledged by the Father to be from him, saying 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I 
am well pleased'".^ ^^ Athanasius is very much based on the fact that such a statement about 
the Son is unprecedented and absolutely unique in the Bible without one single occurence 
where it might be applied to another being. This acutely differentiates the Son's natural 
sonship from the adoptionist form of sonship which applies to himian beings and is 
acquired as a gift of the divine grace. 
2.2.1.2 The meaning of sonship "by participation " (EK fiErouoiaq) 
The unique sense of Jesus Christ's sonship becomes the criterion by means of 
which Athanasius distinguishes it from the sonship which Scripture ascribes to human 
beings when it calls them sons of God. As we noted earlier, the texts which Athanasius 
uses as the source for this kind of sonship are Is 1:2, Deut 13:19-14:1 and Jn 1:12. The 
differences which he discerns in these texts fron those which refer to the Son are the 
following. 
Firstly, Athanasius observes that these verses state clearly and plainly the reason 
for which human beings become sons of God: the necessary presupposition is faithfulness 
bywill"(CAR3 60:448C). 
Scholars identify the meaning of 'beloved' and 'only-begotten' both of which are used to designate 
Jesus' unique relation to the Father. A. Richardson explains briefly: "The peculiarly Johannine expression 6 
\iovoyEvr\c, moq is used of Christ in the NT only at John... and is a synonym for the Synoptic dyanr\ioq, 
as both novoYevfn; and ayanx\T:oc, are used in L X X to translate the same Hebrew word meaning 'only'" 
(The Christology, p. 152; so also O. Culhnann, p. 298). See also the special essay by C. Turner which 
expounds in detail the meanmg of the term, "O Y I O E MOY O ATKYimOY.",JTS, 27 (1926) 113-129. 
DECK 11:25,436A. 
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to God and obedience to his commandments, which exercises their imitation of his 
attributes and improves them in virtue and grace (Jn. 1:12, "To all who received him, he 
gave power to become children of God"). In contrast, as we have seen, the verses which 
refer to the Son are unqualified and without any reasoning for him being a Son. He is 
alone the natural offspring belonging to (tSiov) the essence of the Father etemally. 
Athanasius establishes the second difference on the Christological dimension of 
human sonship according to Mat. 11:27 ("No one knows the Father except the Son and any 
one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him") and Jn. 10:35 ("If he called them sons to 
whom the Word of God came"): the sonship which hiiman beings acquire is due to the 
natural sonship which only the Son possesses. The Incarnation of the Word is the 
hermeneutical key to the sonship of human beings, because the latter finds its ultimate 
reason, justification and fiilfilment in the assumption of human nature by the Word and in 
its unification with God: "For because of our relationship to his body, we too have become 
God's temple and in consequence are made God's sons, so that even in us the Lord is now 
worshipped and beholders report, as the apostle says, that God is in them of a truth".^" He 
also argues "For there could not be adoption apart from the real Son who says 'No one 
knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son will reveal' ... and all that 
are called sons and gods, whether in earth or in heaven, were adopted and deified through 
the Word and the Son himself is the Word. It is plain that through him are they all, and he 
himself before all, or rather he himself only is very Son and he alone is very God from 
very God ... for he is offspring of the Father's essence".^ '^' 
Finally, Athanasius argues that i f the Son did not possess his sonship by nature he 
would not be able to communicate it to human beings. The reason is that he could not give 
what belongs not to him but to the Giver, and also that since all created beings are in need 
C A R l 43:26,100D. 
C A R l 39:26,93A. 
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of salvation they receive only an amount sufficient for themselves and not for others. 
Moreover, because the sonship of human beings is not an essential attribute of them but an 
acquisition from God, it follows that it cannot be permanent but only temporary. Human 
beings who received the grace of adopion on account of their virtue, were deprived of it 
when they fell and they received it back when they repented. This kind of sonship is a 
movable gift; it can be given and taken away. The sonship of the Son is permanent, 
because it is natural and he possesses it essentially, therefore he is able to communicate 
it .^" 
With these arguments Athanasius maintains the uniqueness of the Son as the Son of 
God by nature, while all others are called 'sons' of God in the Scriptures because they 
participate in his sonship. This uniqueness is further emphasized by means of the 
associated Christological title "Only-begotten" (MovoyEvfic;). 
2.2.1.3 The Son as Only-begotten 
Jn. 1:14: "We have beheld this glory, glory as of the Only-begotten Son 
from the Father" 
Jn. 1:18: "The Only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has 
made him known" 
The designation of the Son as "Only-begotten" '^*' appears most prominently and 
explicitly in the Johannine Gospel, but as is clear from what we have said previously, 
Athanasius studies its presence in the wider biblical context. The Son of God, whose status 
is at stake, is clearly one and only and this uniqueness in biblical expression also 
SYNO 51:26,784B; C A R l 37:26,89A. 
D E C R 11:25,436A-B. New Teastament scholars are divided between two different readings in the 
verse as "only-begotten son" and "only-begotten god" (D. Fennema, "John 1:18: 'God the only Son'", NTS 
31 (1985) 124-135, in which the main scholarly discussion is reproduced; the same also in B.A. Mastin, "A 
neglected feature of the Chistology of the Fourth Gospel", A^^, pp. 37ff who produces evidence from all 
textual authorities). Athanasius uses the former reading in both his quotations and general usage of 
"only-begotten", in the context of generation and sonship. He uses the form "only-begotten god" (GENT 
41), but independently from the Johannine text and as a consequence of the former, as he uses also the 
forms "only-begotten Word or Wisdom". Although the term "only-begotten god" appears more frequently 
in Arian documents (SYNO 15, 18, 23) than the Athanasian writings, "only-begotten son" is generally 
maintained. 
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constitutes the basis for his absolute ontological differentiation from all others, who are 
adopted 'sons' of God. This uniqueness, however, was also interpreted differently by the 
Arians. 
Arius differentiated the Son from both the Father and human beings and regarded 
his uniqueness as being due to his position somewhere in between them. The Son as 
'begotten' is inferior to the Father, who is 'ingenerate', and as 'only-begotten' is greater than 
human beings, because he is uniquely related to the Father. According to Athanasius' 
evidence, there were two Arian versions of this unique relationship: first, that the Son is 
called 'Only-begotten' because he was alone created by God through God's Wisdom and 
Logos as their perfect image, while all other creatures were created through his acting as 
mediator.^" Second, that because God foreknew his goodness adopted him as the Son par 
excellence and granted to him all the divine glory and attributes; therefore he alone 
participates directly in the Father, while all human beings participate in him.^ ^^ Obviously, 
this was a highly compromising attempt to keep the Son as close as possible to the Father 
and it was going along with the idea of some sort of 'demigod', as has been successfully 
characterized.^" Because of the ambiguity of his teaching, Arius could easily manipulate 
DECR 7-8:25,428Bff; C A R l 5:26,21 A-B; C f R. Williams' analysis of this kind of relation of the 
Son to God accordmg to Arius. In particular he explains: "The divine Xoyoq and oocpia create in the Son 
their closest possible finite image, and the Son may be said to 'share' in these divine powers in so far as he 
is directly their product. He demonstrates the immediate and unimpeded effect of Xoyoc, and aotpta, and so 
in some significant measure reflects what they are like" {The Logic, p. 74). 
D E C R 9-10:25,432Bff; C A R l 5:op. cit. We could probably detect here an attempt to insert also 
the Christological criterion in their teaching. It is indicative, however, of the astute manner in which they 
olayed with ideas: the Son was a creature, but not as one of all; he was created in time, but not the time that 
all know; he is called Wisdom and Logos, but not the real one, which is in God; he possesses all the divine 
properties, but not essentially because he received them from the Father. This sort of argument always 
derives from desperate attempts to compromise incompatible qualities and it confuses things so much, that 
an exceptionally high degree of serious discussion is demanded. 
A. Heron, op. cit., p. 70; Gregg-Groh considers this notion "not a demotion of the Son, but a 
promotion of believers", "The centtality", p. 314; J.L. Neve, A history, p. 115. It probably belongs to this 
category of understandmg the interpretation by bibhcal scholars of the term 'novoyevfiq' as 'one of its kind' 
which takes the second component of the adjective as deriving from 'yevoQ' and not from 'yevvav' (so J. 
Robinson, Twelve more NT studies, p. 173. J. Robinson tries to prove that patristic theology abused the 
Johannine texts by taking them out of context and imposing on them the doctrine of the Trinity that John 
never intended). This interpretation is of course erroneous not only from the etymological point of view, 
but especially from the biblical point of view, which does not provide any groimds for supporting it. This 
has been adequately proved by J. Dahms in his well argued essay "The Johannine use of monogenes 
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the ecclesiastical language through the "yes...but" pattern, as in his famous statement, "a 
creature of God, but not as one of the creatures, an offspring, but not as one of the 
offsprings".''" 
Athanasius responds to the first Arian version of the "Only-begotten", with three 
arguments. Firstly, he contests the allegation that only the Son was created by God, and the 
other creatures through the Son, appealing to the biblical texts where God comes in direct 
relationships with the creation, in fact where the existence of creation and creatures 
depends on him. Obviously, Athanasius would have numerous references for this point, 
but according to his familiar method he chooses the characteristic ones. So, he recalls the 
examples of God's interference in the Jacob story in Egypt, in the story of Abraham and 
Abimeleh, of Moses on the Mount Sinai and in the battle with the Amalekites. He also 
quotes Is. 40:28, Jer. 1:5, Ps. 99:3 and Is. 66:2, where God acts through his Word and his 
Hand, and he complements them with 1 Cor. 8:6, where God acts through Jesus Christ. 
Using these texts, he denies the Arian view of the mediating role of the Son in the creation 
saying: "He is the One who through his own Word has created all things small and great 
and it is not possible to divide the creation and say this is the Father's and this is the Son's, 
but they are of One God who uses his own Word as a Hand, and in him does all things. 
This God himself has shewn us, when he says 'My hand has made all these'".'"" 
reconsidered" {NTS, 29 (1983) 222-232) in which he shows that "the majority view of modem scholarship 
has very httle to support" this interpretation and that '"only begotten' is the most accurate translation of all". 
Cf. also T.C. De Kruijf, "The glory of the only son" in Studies in John, pp. 111-123, who lends to the term 
more soteriological than Christological nature. 
Letter to Alexander, op. cit.; Cf. also CAR2 19:26,183C. M. Wiles stresses special emphasis on 
this point of the Arian doctrine, which he calls the "model qualifier" method. He claims that Arius was 
especially interested in qualifying the terms he used and equally determined to speak about the Son not 
only as "one of the creatures", but also as "not as one of the creatures" {In Defense, pp. 344f). His intention 
is to "lighten" the weight of the Arian error asserting that Arius moderated his statements on account of a 
method which is "common in theology". However, M. Wiles misses the point that what condemned 
ecclesiastically Arius was not his method, but the result of his method. However, it was this method that 
provided Arius all the power of creating the so difficult to clear confusion of terms and language. 
DECR7:25,428C. 
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Secondly, Athanasius proves the logical inconsistency of the Arian interpretation 
with two observations: a) i f the "absolute hand of the ingenerate" (aKpaxoc; xeip xoO 
dyevnTOu) could not create, because of God's absolute transcendence and immateriality, 
then it could not create the Son either, who is also "ysvnxoc;", and b) I f all things were 
created through a mediator, then the Son would also need a mediator before him. I f this is 
not so and God could himself make a creature, then the creation of the Son as mediator 
was pointless. 
Finally, Athanasius argues that the Son is not the only one witnessed in the 
Scripture as created by God alone. He alludes to the example of Adam, who among human 
beings is the only one created by God alone, but he does not belong to a different 
ontological category from the human beings. He also alludes to Jer. 1:5, Is. 44:2, Ps. 
118:73, Is. 49:5 and Ps. 32:9, which witness the continuing creative act of God in the birth 
of every human being. 
With these arguments Athanasius contends that the first Arian version of the 
"Only-begotten" does not lend to the Son a distinctive attribute, which human beings do 
not appear to have. The implications of the second interpretation of the term, relating to 
the concept of participation, are similar. Athanasius argues that the source of every kind of 
sonship is the Father, not the Son. According to Is. 1:2, which witnesses the beginnings of 
the sonship of human beings, it is evident that they participate in the Father and not in the 
Son, therefore they are called 'sons of God' and not 'sons of the Son' or sons of the one in 
whom they participate.^''^ The fact, however, that both the Son and human beings 
participate in the Father, does not equate their sonship, because the Son would not differ 
from them ontologically as the Only-begotten demands, since there would be other beings 
of the same nature. Therefore, Athanasius insists that from whatever aspect one examines 
"^^  C f the discussion on the link between "begetting" and "participatmg" by Athanasius in CARl 
14-16:26,41Aff. R. WilUams expounds on it in detail from the Arian point of view in The Logic, pp. 66ff 
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the term, it demands such a radical distinction between the Son and human beings and a 
relation of the Son to the Father. It is compelling, then, that the terms 'Father' and 'Son' 
should be understood in their real ontological sense, since, according to the data of nature, 
"what is naturally begotten from any one and does not accrue to him from without, nature 
acknowledges him as son, and this is what the name implies".'"' 
The understanding of the term 'Only-begotten' as applying to the relation between 
Father and Son and not between human beings and the Son, is even more fully explained 
when Athanasius advances it against the Arian rendering of the phrase "the beginning of 
his ways unto his works" in Prov. 8:22 and the title "first-bom" in Col 1:15, 18 and Rom. 
8:29. When Athanasius interprets Prov. 8:22, he faces the same problem with the first 
version of the 'Only-begotten', which obviously relates the two texts and lends coherence 
to the Arian exegesis.''''' Thus, it appears that the Arians put on a par the words "ways" and 
"unto his works" and held that the "ways" of the Lord were the creation of the universe, 
which began with the creation of the Son. He was alone created by God and therefore he is 
called 'only-begotten', while he mediated to the creation of beings that followed. They 
supported the point with the adjective "firstborn", which St. Paul uses in Col. 1:15 ("the 
firstborn of all creation"), Col. 1:18 ("the firstborn from the dead") and Rom. 8:29 ("the 
firstborn among many children"), as indicative of the relation of the Son to the creation of 
which he is considered to be the 'first'.'"*^ Since God was "alone" before the creation,'''* 
DECR 10:25,433A. 
R.P.C. Hanson observes that Prov. 8:22 "always lurks in the background" every time the Arian 
teaching of the creaturehood of the Son comes up {The Search, p. 8). 
"^^  C f Athanasius' quotations of the Arian arguments: "he is equated with the creatures and he 
precedes them in terms of time"; and "if he is first-bom of all creation, it is clear that he is indeed one of 
that creation"; (CAR2 62-63:26,277Cf). 
"^^  Although it is not stated explicitiy, we believe that this is an underlying idea of the Arian doctrine. 
We have come to this view following the sequence: since Arius held that God is alone without beginning 
and everything that exists has a beginning, it entails that there was time, somewhere m eternity, when God 
was all alone. We are accustomed to such "kinds" of time introduced by Arius, especially in relation to the 
Son's generation (flv oxe O U K fiv). Thus, God had nothing else, as it were, to deal with apart from himself, 
since nothing existed. God's first work was the creation of the universe and he started with the Son. For 
God's utter loneliness as basic concept in the Arian teaching see G.D. Dragas, op. cit., p. 49f and passim 
(theomonism); A. Heron, op. cit., p. 68 (remote franscedence); T.E. Pollard, Johannine Christology, pp. 
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there were no "ways" in front of him to undertake; they all began with the creation, when 
he commenced calling beings into existence, starting with the Son. Thus, the biblical 
expressions "beginning of his ways", "firstborn" and "Only-begotten" are understood as 
jointly bearing the meaning of the 'first work of God's creation' or 'first creature'. The 
Arians also found the reason for this distinctive position of the Son in the phrase "Unto his 
works", upon which they developed the concept of the "mediator-creator". '^'^  This is 
evident in Athanasius' quotation from the Thalia: "God, willing to create us, created 
somebody, whom he called Wisdom and Logos and Son, in order to create us through 
him".^"^ This interpretation is exegetically very important, because it appears to be the 
regulative principle for the further interpretation by the Arians of all those biblical 
passages, which describe God as creating through his Word, as we shall see later. 
Athanasius develops two arguments against the Arian interpretation of 
'first-creature' concept:^"' a) "first-creature" opposes "only-begotten", because it implies 
that the creation of the Son was followed by the creation of other creatures similar in 
nature, from which he differs in virtually nothing. He might have acquired priority in time 
and superiority in being, according to the Arians, but not the absolute uniqueness that 
"only-begotten" demands: 'only' does not logically follow 'first'; b) priority in time does 
not apply to creatures, because none of them was created individually and before the 
others, but they were all created at once and according to their species; therefore, i f the 
Son was a creature, he should have been created with the rest and not before them. Thus, 
both statements "only-begotten" and "before the ages", can be properly understood only i f 
the Son is considered "other than creatures" ("aXXog xcbv KTia^idxcov"), that is, different 
189-192; E . Meijering, "Athanasius on the Father", p. l l f 
CAR2 71:26,297A; C f also the similar statement in C A R l 26:26,65A 
C A R l 5: op. cit 
CAR2 48-49:26,249Af 
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in nature and essence from the other creatures. In effect, the Son bears the "resemblance" 
("onolcooiQ") and "image" ("elKOva") of God, who is also One and Only. 
Using the same contrast, Athanasius also examines the meaning of the adjective 
"firstborn" (Col 1:15, 18; Rom. 8:29). First, he argues that it is also incompatible with the 
"Only-begotten", because it refers to an opposite situation: one is called "only-begotten", 
because one has no brothers at all, while one is called "firstborn", because one has 
brothers.'^" Thus, in the case of the Son, if, on the one hand, the priority is given to the 
latter and is applied to his creation by the Father, the former cannot be explained at all, 
because many other similar creatures followed. On the other hand, i f the priority is given 
to the former as the only Wisdom and Word of God, the latter can be explained on account 
of his incarnation and the assumption by him of created human nature. 
On this ground, Athanasius argues that the "ways" of the Lord cannot be the 
creation of the world, but the re-creation, the redemptive work of Christ, which aimed to 
the restoration of the possibility of salvation. Christ is the beginning of these "ways", 
because through the assumption and the succeeding deification of human body he is the 
first who became himself "the way" (Jn 14:6) towards immortality and paradise. The first 
"way", which failed because of Adam, could be restored only by God himself and not by 
another creature. Therefore, the phrase "unto his works" ("etc; epya ai)ToO") does not 
mean "to create the works", but designates the purpose of the Son's incarnation which is 
"the salvation of the works". 
Athanasius establishes the last point on three further clarifications: a) he illustrates 
the phrase "unto his works" with Jn 5:36 ("for the works that the Father has granted me to 
accomplish...bear me witness") and Jn 17:4 ("I glorified you on earth, having 
accomplished the work which you have given me to do"). He observes that the "works" of 
"° Athanasius says: "So, if he is first-bom, let him not be only-begotten; but if he is only-begotten, as 
he is indeed, let first-bom be explained" CAR2 62:26,280A. 
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8:22 are the works which the Father gave to Christ and obviously predate his "creation". 
This entails that the verb "he created me" in 8:22 cannot refer to his ontological beginning, 
but to his incarnation. The three verses are consequently parallel and the phrase "the Father 
gave me his works" carries the same purport as the phrase "the Lord created me unto his 
works"; b) the verb "he created" cannot refer to the ontological beginning of the Son, 
because its purpose is specified as "unto his works". The verb "to create" means that God 
calls beings "into existence" ("eic; T O ^X\V") out of non-existence and not "unto" other 
beings ("eic; epya"). The Logos of God in turn is never said to come into being, but only 
that "he was" (Jn 1:3); c) the fact that 8:22 contains the reason for the verb "he created" 
("unto his works") denotes that it does not refer to his ontological beginning as divine 
being, but to his Incarnation. The Bible expresses the statements about the divinity of the 
Son clearly and plainly without the combination of any reasoning or purpose.^ '^ Thus, 
Athanasius summing up his interpretation of Prov. 8:22 says, 
"So, i f it said in the Proverbs 'he created' we must not conceive that the 
whole Word is in nature a creature, but that he put on the created body and 
that God created him for our sake, preparing for him the created body, as it 
is written, for us, that in him we might be capable of being renewed and 
deified"."' 
Refuting thus the most powerful Arian argument, Athanasius makes clear that there 
is no biblical evidence of relating the Son with the notion of creation in any sense. The 
only language which is used for him in order to describe his relation to the Father is the 
language of generation and this again in a unique and unprecedented manner. This 
exclusiveness entails the Son's generic alienation from creatures and identification with the 
Father, being considered the genuine (yvnoiov) and true (dX-riGcbQ) proper to his essence 
(i5iov Tfjc; ouoiac;) offspring, for what is begotten from a human being is also a human 
CAR2 51-52:26,253Cf 
CAR2 47:26,248B. 
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being and what is begotten from God is also God."' In this account he is fittingly 
considered 'homoousios' with the Father: 
"Just as we could not call our fathers makers, but begetters, and as no one 
would call us their creatures, but sons by nature and one in essence 
[homoousios] with them: so, i f God be Father, he must be Father of one 
who is by nature a Son and one in essence with him. Abraham did not 
create Isaac, he begat him. Bezabel and Eliab did not beget but made all the 
works of the Tabernacle. The shipwright and the housebuilder do not beget 
the things they make; they work, the one on the ship, the other on the 
house. Isaac does not make Jacob; he begets him by nature , a son. And 
likewise Jacob, Judah and his brethren. Just as one would be mad to say that 
the house is one in essence with the builder and the ship with the 
shipwright, so it is correct to say that every son is one in essence with his 
own father. I f then there is Father and Son, the Son must be Son by nature 
and in truth. But this is to be one in essence with the Father as we have 
shown from many instances".'^ '' 
2.2.2 Word (Aoyoc;) and Wisdom (Eocpia) 
Athanasius also speaks about the Word or Wisdom of God in terms of being 
begotten or generated from the Father.'" The concept of generation and the intimate and 
direct relationships between Begetter and offspring are the common ground upon which 
Athanasius joins the two titles "Son" and "Word" and shifts the emphasis from the one to 
the other. This transition is clearly evident in the following text: "But i f he is Son, as the 
Father says and the Scriptures proclaim, then 'Son' is nothing else but what is generated 
from the Father, and what is generated from the Father is his Word and Wisdom and 
Radiance".'^ * The combination of the two concepts in Athanasius' thought derives from the 
"For he is God, being the Son of God" (CARl 49:26,113C); "For if he is the Word of the Father 
and tiiie Son of his, he is God of God" (CARl 10:26,32B). 
SER2 6:26,617A; for the translation see C.R.B. Shapland, The Letters of St. Athanasius, pp. 
160-161. 
In the very comprehensive article in Kittel's Theological Dictionary (IV, pp. 69ff), it has been 
presented the multiplicity of meanings and applications of the term 'word' both m the Hellenistic and 
Jewish contexts. Although the use of the term varies in Scripture it is clear from the arguments that we 
shall look at in this section the meaning which prevails is that of the speaking act of God for Athanasius 
and initially for Arius, before developing the mediator teaching. T.E. Pollard argues for the Origenistic 
cosmological approach to the Word of God by Arius and the soteriological by Athanasius ("Logos and Son 
in Origen, Arius and Athanasius", pp. 282-287). C f also the analysis of the 'Logos' doctrine by G.C. 
Zaphiris, "The Word of God as fountain of life", pp. 425ff. 
C A R l 14:26,41C. 
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Johannine Christology expressed in f u l l in the Prologue o f the Gospel.^" The 
Christological titles "Son", "Offspring", "Only begotten" and "Word" are the dominant 
elements of this text and are used alternatively for the specification of the identity of Jesus 
Christ. Therefore, Athanasius' appeal to this text is constant and frequently instant, as it is 
easily observed throughout his works."* 
The use o f the Christological titles 'Word' and 'Wisdom' is a very important 
element in Athanasius' argumentation about the eternal generation, because it reinforces 
both the understanding o f the Father as "generative nature" (Y£Vvr|TiKii (puoig)^^* and of 
the different nature of the generation of the Son from human generation. Athanasius 
mainly develops three points around the concept of the "Word": firstly, he sets it in 
opposition to the Arian doctrine about the mediator-creator and secondly to the subsequent 
allegations about the created nature of the Son, because it intensifies the distinction 
between "offspring" and "creature". Finally, he explains the manner in which God is 
conceived o f as begetting his Word, stressing the significance o f the term for the correct 
understanding o f the divine generation. 
2.2.2.1 The Word of God as mediator to the creation 
The different understanding of the Word of God by Athanasius and Arius is based 
on two fundamentaly different approaches to the being of God and to the exegesis of 
biblical data. According to Athanasius' presentation of the teaching of the Thalia, Arius 
held that "there are two wisdoms; first the attribute coexistent with God and next the Son 
See G.C. Zaphiris, op. cit., pp. 444ff. 
"For where at all have they found in divine Scripture or from whom have they heard that there is 
another Word and another Wisdom besides this Son, that they should frame to themselves such a doctrine? 
... but as being the only Word of God was he preached by John 'The word was made flesh' and 'all things 
were made by him'. Wherefore of him alone our Lord Jesus Christ and of his oneness with the Father are 
written and set forth the testimonies, both of the Father signifying that the Son is one and of the saints 
aware of this and saying that the word is one and that he is Only-begotten" (CAR2 39:26,229B). 
CAR2 2:26,149B-C. 
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who was originated in this wisdom and was only named Wisdom and Word as 
participating in i t . 'For wisdom, said he, by the w i l l of the wise God, has its existence in 
Wisdom'. In like manner, he says that there is another Word in God besides the Son and 
that the Son again, as participating in it, is named Word and Son according to grace".^^" 
Based on an anthropological approach to the mystery of God, Arius applies human 
patterns and models of existence and regards the "Word" as an impersonal power or 
attribute o f the being of God, which cannot be ontologically identified with Jesus Christ as 
the "Word" o f God and Creator of the world, because the latter is a concrete individual 
being.^^' The Son is called "Word" only "KaxaxpTlOTiKobc;"^^^ because he acted as 
mediator to creation on behalf of the Father, having received f rom God the art of 
creating.^^^ This view implies that in his exegesis of the biblical texts concerning the 
creation o f the world, Arius would identify the New Testament texts, which attribute the 
creation o f the world to Christ, with the Old Testament ones, which attribute the creation 
of the world to God's Word and Wisdom, but he would not lend to them the same 
ontological significance. This interpretation is discriminating rather than synthesising, 
because it obviously has its starting point in cosmological speculation and is primarily 
CARl 5:26,21B. 
It can be seen that Christ is in a sense regiilative for the final fonnulation of his view, since he 
could not relate him as a concrete being with the term "Word", which designated a different ontological 
reality. T.E. Pollard observes that the Arians drew "a rigid distinction between the Logos and the Son" 
("Logos and Son", p. 284), which R. Williams explains thus: "The point is straightforward: divine 
properties are eternal and impersonal. Of course God 'has' oocpia and Xoyoc,, but they are qualities 
belonging to his substance. Thus to say that the Son is l5ioq to God is to reduce the son to being an 
impersonal quality... This is indeed 'Sabellianism' in Arian eyes (and is almost certainly the view of Paul of 
Samosata - the divine Logos is 'internal' to the father's substance and does not subsist in any other way; 
between Jesus of Nazareth and the impersonal divine quality of rationality there is no intermediary 
subsistent, no heavenly Son or hypostatic Word). But for Arius, traditional orthodoxy makes it quite clear 
that there is a pre-existent heavenly Son, existing K a 0 ' OnooTaoiv; the Son is himself an ouoia, a proper 
subject of predication" (The Logic, pp. 59-60 and cf the whole of his discussion on the point in pp. 58-62). 
M. Wiles argues that the term renders the meaning of "in a lesser sense" as distinct fi-om "strict 
sense" (In defence, pp. 342-343). R. Williams puts more emphasis on the negative connotations of the term 
and renders it as "speaking in metaphors". He explains the meaning of metaphor according to the 
Porphyrian theory, which distinguishes between 'metaphor' and 'properly" (Kupiox;), 'i5iov 6vo\ia' and 
'6v6^.aTl' or 'Kar" enivoiav' (op. cit.,p. 76). R.P.C. Hanson translates as 'loosely' (The Search, p. 16). 
"^^^  CAR2 28:26,2050: "But they say, 'though he is a creature and of things originate, yet as from a 
master and artificer has he learned to frame and thus ministerd to God who taught him". 
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determined by ontological definition of the biblical terms according to human logic and 
experience of reality. This is also evident from the argument which Arius advanced against 
the literal understanding of the Word as the speaking act of God: i f this was so, he argued, 
i t would be impossible to identify which one o f the many words that God utters is the One 
and Only Word, which Athanasius and his party supported.^^ Holding this end of the 
string, he developed the rest of his doctrine consistently, ending up with the absolute 
ontological alienation o f the Son from the Father. 
The biblical texts which constitute the source for the Word doctrine are witnessed 
only by Athanasius when he develops his own arguments on the subject. Although there is 
silence on the Arian side, we could probably take them as standard texts for which the 
Arians would have no objection. These are the following: 
Gen. 1:3,26: "And God said: 'Let there be light'", "And God said: 'Let us 
make man" 
Ps. 32:4: "For the Word of the Lord is upright and his work is done in 
faithfiilness" 
Ps. 32:6: "By the word of God the heavens were made" 
Ps. 32:9 (148:5): "For he spoke and they were made, he commanded and 
they were created" 
Ps. 103:24: "In wisdom you have made them all" 
Jn. 1:1-3: "In the beginnuig was the Word.. .All things were made through 
him" 
1 Cor. 8:6b: "And one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things" 
Col. 1:17: "In h im all things consist" 
On the basis of these texts Athanasius develops his arguments agamst the above 
mentioned Arian understanding of the Word. He primarily finds the origins of the 'Word' 
doctrine in the description of creation in the first chapter of Genesis on which he 
comments: 
"For the Word of God is Framer and Maker and he is the Father's w i l l . 
Hence i t is that the divine Scripture says, not that one heard and answered, 
DECR 16:25,444A. C. Stead has argued that Athanasius misunderstood the Arian claim, because it 
is not "a radically reductionist view of the Logos" that considers him a mere creature, but one that intends 
to exalt him above all creatures: "Conttasted to God the Father he must inevitably be seen as belonging to 
the created order; but if we consider his place within that order, he appears as first-bom and unique. If my 
argument is sound, there is no need for us to accept Athanasius' claim that Arius regarded the Logos as 
merely one of the creatures" ("Arius on Gods many words", p. 157). This was exactly the problem: the Son 
does not belong to the created order in any way however exalted he is.(!) 
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as to the manner or nature o f the things which he wished made; but God 
only said 'Let i t become' and he adds, 'And it became'; for what he thought 
good and counselled, that immediately the Word began to do and finish...So 
that the word 'he said' is a token of the w i l l for our sake and 'it was so' 
denotes the work which is done through the Word and the Wisdom in which 
Wisdom is also the w i l l o f the Father. For 'God said' is explained in the 
'Word". ' ' ' 
There are two fundamental points that can be observed in this text: a) Athanasius 
finds the ultimate fulf i lment and justification of the concept 'Word of God' in the creation 
of the world, which God brought into existence out of non-existence through oral 
commands, b) He understands the term 'word' literally as denoting the speaking act of 
God, and with this he contests the metaphorical sense which the Arians supported. He tries 
to prove that no concept of 'mediator', i.e., another being, is suggested or implied in the 
biblical narrative, but that it is the very Word of the Father acting. The main arguments 
which he deploys are the following. 
a) The biblical description of creation does not imply any mediator who would act 
as a minister or servant of God, obeying his command to create the world. Such an idea 
would demand a sort o f dialogue between God and his 'minister' as happens in the cases 
when God entrusts special missions to his servants (Gen. 15:8, Ex. 4:13, Zach. 1:3,12). 
There is no such dialogue or any other indication o f anybody else acting with God in the 
creation o f the world, but rather that all creatures were the immediate result of his Word. 
Athanasius observes that 'God said' is followed by 'it became', because "when God 
commands others, whether he speaks to angels, or converses with Moses, or commands 
Abraham, then the hearer answers; ...But when that Word himself works and creates, then 
there is no questioning and answer, for the Father is in the Word and the Word is in the 
Father. I t suffices to w i l l and the work is done".''* 
CAR2 31:26,213B; Cf also CAR2 20, 22; DECR9; The discussion of Athanasius on the 
'mediator' of the Arians is quite extensive and recurrent. Here we will present only the major arguments, 
which are especially connected with biblical verses. 
CAR2 31:26,213A. 
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b) The ministers of God are employed by him in order to communicate his 
messages and commandments to men, but they are never witnessed to be sent to create. In 
the creation o f beings i t is only the Word o f God that is present and it is only through the 
Word that God created and sustains everything. Therefore the ministers of God are many 
in number, but the Word is One and Only. This contrast of uniqueness with multiplicity 
holds when one considers the Father-Son and God-creatures relationship: " I f then the Son 
were a creature and one of beings originate, there must have been many such sons that God 
might have many such ministers, just as there is a multitude o f those others. But i f this is 
not to be seen, since while the creatures are many, the Word is one, any one w i l l collect 
from this that the Son differs from all and is not on a level with the creatures but belongs 
to the Father. Hence there are not many words, but one only Word of the one Father, and 
one image o f the one God".^^' 
c) I t has never been possible to distinguish between beings created by God and 
beings created by the Word, because God creates through his Word and the one can never 
be considered separately from the other. He illustrates this indivisible unity of action 
through the 'light-effulgence' image and Jn. 5:19 ("For whatever the Father does, the Son 
does likewise"): "Since he is God's Word and own Wisdom and, being his radiance, is ever 
wi th the Father, therefore i t is impossible, i f the Father bestows the grace, that he should 
not give i t in the Son, for the Son is in the father as the radiance in the light. For not as in 
need, but as a Father in his own Wisdom has God founded the earth... Where the Father is 
or is named, there plainly is the Son also".^ ** 
d) Creativity in its absolute sense belongs only to God and it is not an 'art' that can 
be taught and learned. As he explains the differene lies in the way in which God and 
human beings are said to create. When creating refers to the latter it denotes the skill to 
CAR2 27:26,2040. 
CAR2 41:26,236A. 
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reconstruct pre-existing material into new forms (M.ETappu9M.i^ ei), but when it refers to 
God i t carries absolute ontological significance because it denotes creation of beings out of 
non-existence, according to the Pauline statement (Rom. 4:17). He argues that i f the 
Word-mediator was himself also out of non-existence, he could not be the "creative cause" 
(TioiriTiKOV aiTiov) o f others, since none has ever been possible to be so. Created beings 
can only reconstruct materials as "artificers" (xexvlxai) and are unable to order 'Let it be' 
as creators (Ttoitixai). I f this were possible for the created 'Word', then on the one hand all 
created beings would be naturally capable of creating, and on the other God would also be 
regarded as artificer, since he would not have anything more than creatures have. Finally, 
since all things were created by God through his Word (Gen. 1) and Jesus Christ claims to 
work the works o f the Father (Jn. 5:17), one should look for another Word, which created 
the mediating creature, because this one could not be Creator and creature at the same 
time. The Arian teaching about two Words of God is fixndamentally erroneous because 
there is no such evidence in biblical revelation: " I f so, who was it by whom God gave 
command for the Son's creation? for a Word there must be by whom God gave command, 
and in whom the works are created; but you have no other to shew than the Word you 
deny, unless indeed you should devise again some new notion".'*' Moreover, this inquiry 
is liable to be extented to an infinite number o f creating divine w o r d s . A H these 
implications, says Athanasius, "neither are written, nor are possible". The fact that God is 
the only one to be acknowledged as the Creator of every existence is acknowledged not 
only in the Bible, but also by any "human reason", as he characteristically asserts in a 
comprehensive summary o f the impUcations of Jn. 1:1, Ps. 44:2, Jn. 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6b, Col. 
DECR 9:25,432B. 
"° "For if the Son is a creature, by what word and by what wisdom was he made himself? for all the 
works were made through the word and wisdom as it is written 'In wisdom have you made them all' and 
'All things were made by him and without him was not anything made'. But if it is he who is the word and 
wisdom by which all things come to be, it follows that he is not in the number of works, nor m short of 
things originate, but the offspring of the Father" (CAR2 5:26,157A). 
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1:16, which appears in the opening paragraphs of his De Sententiae Dionysii: "Nor is there 
any religious argument from human reason left them in their defence. For what man, 
Greek or barbarian, presumes to call one, whom he confesses to be God, a created thing or 
to say that he was not before he was made?".^^' 
e) Finally, the distinction of the 'Word' from all created beings is found by 
Athanasius in the characteristic hymn of the "three martyrs in Babylon" in Dan. 3:57 ("Al l 
the works o f the Lord, bless the Lord") which contains a list that specifies by name all 
created beings. He argues that i f the name 'word' was taken in the metaphorical sense, 
which the Arians supported, and belonged to a created being, then according to the hymn it 
should also be included in the list of the 'works' of the Lord, which are invited to 'bless the 
Lord'. However, i t is neither included here, nor anywhere else in the Bible where the term 
'Word of God' occurs is he addressed as a created being: " A l l other things are both praising 
and are works, but the Word is not a work, nor of those that praise, but is praised with the 
Father and worshipped and confessed as God, being his Word and Wisdom and the Framer 
of the works"." ' 
Athanasius insistently maintains that the Christological title 'Word' belongs to the 
divine nature o f the Son and occiirs always in the context of the creation of the world 
alone. The biblical data do not provide any grounds for the Arian views therefore he 
consistently demands biblical references.'" The silence from the Arian side on this matter, 
which indirectly emerges from the Athanasian texts, suggests that they had no such 
backing to appeal to, since their teaching was in effect only partially grounded on the 
Bible. Nevertheless, i t is certain that Athanasius would be very keen to respond to those 
DION 2:26,481B; also CAR2 21-22:192Aff, CAR2 27. 
CAR2 71:26,300A; SER2 
"From what Scripture do they say this?" CAR3 59:26,448B and passim. 
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texts i f they were to appear, as he did in other cases (e.g. the verbs 'to create' and 'to 
beget'). 
2.2.2.2 The Word of God as the offspring of the Father 
Athanasius argues that, as the title "Son", so the "Word" implies that the Son is 
intimately and immanently related to the Father as bearing a unique and special 
"peculiarity" (iSioxrit;) to the being of the Father."" Such a relation can only be expressed 
through the 'to beget' language, because the word is generated fi-om its subject and is not 
created by i t . Therefore, according to the Christological application of Ps 44:2, he asserts 
that the Word o f God springs from the heart of God and as such it can never be alleged as 
being created or chronologically secondary to the Father: "For what man, when he has 
heard H i m whom he confesses to be God alone say 'This is my beloved Son'; and 'My 
heart uttered a good word' w i l l venture to say that the Word out of the heart of God has 
come into being out of non-existence?".'^' In this account Athanasius understands the 
Arian teaching as attributing to God a time that he was "speechless", depriving H i m even 
of his creativity, since the Scriptures witness him to created only through this very Word 
of his, as he demonstrated above.''* This approach of Athanasius to the Word of God 
"It has been shewn above and must be believed as true that the Word is from the Father and the 
Only offspring proper to him and natural. For whence may one conceive the Son to be, who is the Wisdom 
and the Word, in whom all things came to be, but from God himself?", DECR 21:25,453B; 24:25,457D. 
DION 2:25,481B; also "If he is an offspring, how do you call him a creature? For no one says that 
he begets those which he creates, nor one calls creatures his own offsprings" (CAR2 48:26,2480). A little 
earlier (CAR2 22:26,193B) he explicitly condemns the famous Arian statement "an offspring, but not as 
one of the offsprings; a creature, but not as one of the creatures" as "impious" (aoePec;), "blasphemous" 
(PX,ao(pTmov) and "senseless" (dvoTirov). 
276 i i j f QQ(J -g jy[aj,gj ajjj Creator and creates his works through the Son and we caimot regard things 
which come to be except as being through the Word, is it not blasphemous, God being the Maker to say 
that his framing Word and Wisdom once was not? It is the same as saying that God is not Maker, if he had 
not his own framing word which is from him, but that by which he frames accrues to him from without and 
is alien from him and imlike in essence" (CARl 17:26,47C-48A); also "Whereas God is, he [the Son] was 
eternally; since then the Father is ever, his radiance ever is, which is his Word. And again God who is has 
from himself his Word who also is; and neiher has the Word been added, whereas he was not before, nor 
was the Father once without Word. For this assault upon the Son makes the blasphemy recoil upon the 
Father as if he devised himself a Wisdom and a Word and Son from without, for which ever all these titles 
you use, you denote the offspring from the Father as he has said (CARl 25:26,64B; also SER2 2:26,609B). 
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exhibits a dynamic view of God, which includes life, production and movement, but 
without change or division. He is not a static being lost in its absolute transcendence, but a 
being that lives and acts having his being-in-act and his act-in-being.'" Therefore, 
Athanasius maintains that God is of "generative nature" and includes the generation of the 
Son in the very constitution o f His nature or o f his " f h i i t f i i l essence" (KapTtoyovoc; 
oOoia). The fol lowing text fu l ly illustrates the point and provides a comprehensive 
account o f his understanding: 
I f then he is not a Son, let h im be called a creature and let all that is said of 
works be said o f him, nor let him and him alone be called son, nor word, 
nor wisdom; neither let God be called Father, but only Framer and Creator 
o f things, which by h im come to be; and let the creature be image and 
expression of his framing w i l l and let h im as they would have it , be without 
generative nature, so that there be neither word, nor wisdom, nor image of 
his own essence. For i f he is not Son, neither is he image. But i f there is not 
a son, how then say you that God is a Creator? Since all things that come to 
be are through the Word and in Wisdom and without this nothing can be, 
whereas you say he had not that in and through which he makes all things. 
For i f the divine nature is not ftiiitful itself, but barren, as they hold, as a 
light that does not lighten and a dry fountain, are they not ashamed to speak 
of his possessing framing energy? Do they not blush to place before it what 
is by will? But i f he frames things that are external to h im and before were 
not, by wi l l ing them to be and becomes their Maker, much more w i l l he 
first be Father of an offspring from his own essence"."* 
The crucial point in this interpretation of the biblical data is that Athanasius 
appears not to be concerned at all for the definition of the ontological reality designated by 
the biblical Christological titles and images either initially or later, even when he seems so 
insistent on the use o f the term "essence" and "homoousios". He regards them not as the 
objective, but as the means of sorting out the confusion caused by the Arians in the right 
representation o f the biblical faith. He considers it defined by the person of Jesus Christ, 
who is a concrete being and independent individual. Therefore he interprets the 
Christological titles only relationally, i.e., as revealing a special feature of Jesus Christ's 
Cf the illuminating comments of G.D. Dragas, Athanasiana, p. 58 and the analysis of T.F. 
Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, pp. 130-132. 
CAR2 2:26,149B-C. 
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intimate relation with God the Father. Athanasius applies a synthesising interpretation 
which is primarily based on the Prologue of St. John's Gospel which identifies the Word 
through whom God created the world with Jesus Christ as the Only-begotten Son o f God. 
Athanasius, fol lowing the same principle of exegesis, extents further this identification to 
the titles 'Wisdom', 'Hand' and 'Power' with reference to Is. 48:13, 51:16, Ps. 103:24, Prov. 
3:19, Jn. 1:1-3, Heb. 1:1-2, 1 Cor. 8:6b and Col. 1:12-17. He explains as follows: 
"For God's offspring is one and these titles are token of the generation from 
the Father. For i f you say the Son, you have declared what is from the 
Father by nature; and i f you think of the Word, you are thinking again of 
what is from H i m and of what is inseparable; and speaking of Wisdom, 
again you mean just as much, what is not from without, but from him and 
in him; and i f you name the power and the hand again you speak of what is 
proper to essence; and speaking of the image, you signify the Son; for what 
else is like God, but the offspring from him. Doubtless the things, which 
came to be through the Word, these are 'founded in Wisdom' and what are 
'founded in Wisdom', these are all made by the Hand and came to be 
through the Son. And we have proof of this not from external sources, but 
from the Scriptures...".''' 
The debate on the matter according to these arguments has two very important 
implications for biblical hermeneutics. The first one refers to the occurrences of the term 
"Word of God" in the Bible: Athanasius interprets all of them only Christologically, since 
God has no other Word than the one who is also his Son. Thus, verses, especially from the 
Old Testament, like Ps. 32:4,6, 44:2, 106:20, acquire particular Christological significance. 
The second implication refers to the understanding o f Christ as the key to the Scriptures. I t 
is obvious that both Athanasius and the Arians acknowledged Christ as Creator of the 
world, but wi th a major difference. On the one hand, the Arians failed to understand the 
Old Testament description o f God creating through his Word, because they applied to it 
ontological definitions which were appropriate to the created nature of beings and not to 
the spiritual nature o f God: consequently the designation o f Christ as the Word o f God 
could only in their terms be metaphorical, because the former is a concrete being while the 
DECR 17:25,4440; Cf also OARl 16. 
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latter is an impersonal energy. On the other hand, Athanasius ontologically defines the Old 
Testament description o f God creating through his Word (Gen. 1) through the New 
Testament confession of Christ to be the Word of God (Jn. 1:3, 1 Cor. 8:6b). The unifying 
element o f the two texts is the conception of God creating, and the identification of the 
Word o f God with Jesus Christ infers the ontological definition of the divine Word. This 
interpretation denies the models of 'being', 'individual' and 'energy' as they are 
comprehensible to the human mind according to their definition within the created 
dimension. As we have already noted, Athanasius understands the Christological titles in 
terms o f relationship. Human language when applied to God carries for him the character 
o f imagery that suggests relations rather than defining ontological or existential categories 
of the divine reality. So, the literal understanding of the Word of God does not imply that 
the divine Word is also without concerete existence, but because it is also identified as Son 
and has been experienced by men as the Christ, i t should be acknowledged as "living 
Word" {Ifbv Xoyoq) and "substantive Wisdom" (evouoioc; oocpla). The Athanasian 
synthesis o f biblical hermeneutics and ontological definitions, so that the one would 
illusfrate the other, is, we believe, characteristically expressed in the following text: 
"For the Son is the Father's Word and Wisdom; whence we learn the 
impassibility and the indivisibility of such a generation from the Father. For 
not even man's word is part of him, nor proceeds from him according to 
passion; much less God's Word, whom the Father has declared to be his 
own Son. I f we merely heard of 'Word', we should suppose Him, such as is 
the word of man, impersonal; but that, hearing that he is Son, we may 
acknowledge h im to be l iving Word and substantive Wisdom".'*" 
Thus, applied to the doctrine of the divine generation, unlike the concept of the 
generation o f a Son, the generation of the Word is an image that departs from the natural 
and bodily implications and is conceived only in a spiritual sense. The designation of 
God's offspring only as 'Son' in Scripture would be insufficient, because no clues would be 
provided for conceiving the notion of generation apart from division, with which it is 
SYN0 41:26,768A. 
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associated in the human dimension. The spiritual character of the word's begetting points 
to the spiritual reality o f God and gives a hint of the attributes of that generation, which 
involves spiritual beings. Generation of word does not unply any division or partition 
neither in the human nor in the divine reality, because of its immaterial nature. Therefore it 
denotes the "impassibility" (ciTtaGeg) and "indivisibility" (d|iEpioxov) of the Son's 
generation from the Father. Consequently, the understanding of the "homoousion" follows 
suit, since i t gives expression to this spiritual relation that fits to God's spiritual nature. The 
problems that remains to apprehend is the manner in which the divine persons are 
individuated. Athanasius firmly maintains that since the divine nature is an 
incomprehensible reality for the human mind no one could tell how God exists, but only 
that he exists. One confesses the three persons of the Trinity, because this is how they 
appear in biblical revelation, but one cannot explain how they exist. Accordingly, neither 
should the Christological titles which describe divine attributes be understood in human 
terms. The Son of God is not individuated as a human son, neither is the Word of God an 
impersonal energy like the human word. To understand them according to human models 
is to "measwe" God with the human imperfection, as he accuses the Arians of doing.'^' 
These points are fundamental to Athanasius' argumentation from his early anti-Arian 
works and throughout his writings as the following text from his De Synodis shows: 
"And is there any cause of fear, lest because the offspring from men are 
coessential, the Son by being called coessential, is himself considered as a 
human offspring too? Perish the thought! Not so! But the explanation is 
easy. For the Son is the Father's Word and Wisdom, whence we learn the 
impassibility and indivisibility of such a generation from the Father. For not 
even man's word is a part of him, nor proceeds from him according to 
This very important text is as follows: "Nor must we ask why the word of God is not such as our 
word, considering God is not such as we, as has been said before; nor again is it right to seek how the word 
is from God or how is he God's radiance or how God begets and what is the manner of his begetting. For a 
man must be beside himself to venture on such points; smce a thing ineffable and proper to God's nature 
and known to him alone and to the Son, this he demands to be explained in words. It is all one as if they 
sought where God is and how God is and of what nature the Father is. But to ask such questions is 
irreligious and argues an ignorance of God, so it is not holy to veture such questions concerning the 
generation of the Son of God, not to measure God and his wisdom by our own nature and infirmity" 0AR2 
36:26,224A. 
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passion, much less God's word; whom the Father has declared to be his own 
Son, on the other hand i f we merely heard of 'Word' we should suppose 
him, such as is the word o f man, impersonal. But hearing that he is Son we 
may acknowledge h im to be l iving Word and substantive Wisdom. 
Accordingly, as in saying 'offspring' we have no human thoughts and 
though we know God to be a Father, we entertain no material ideas 
concerning him, but while we listen to these illusfrations and terms, we 
think suitably of God, for he is not as man, so in like manner, when we hear 
'coessential', we ought to franscend all sense and according to the Proverb 
'spiritually understand what is set before us' ... Else, why should we 
understand 'offspring' and 'son' in no corporeal way, while we conceive of 
'coessential' as after the manner of bodies? Especially since these terms are 
not here used about different subjects, but of whom 'offspring' is predicated, 
o f h im is 'coessential' also ... So the sense of 'offspring ' and 'coessential' is 
one and whoever considers the Son an offspring, rightly considers him also 
'coessential'".'*' 
SYNO 41-42:26,765C-768C. The same understanding is exhibited in all his works, of which we 
selectively give special reference to DECR 11:25,430B (where ahnost the same words are used) and CARl 
28:26,69Cf; (also DECR3; 20; 23; 24; 30; SERl 26; SER2 5; SYNO 51; AFRO 8). 
2.3 The Biblical Paradigms 
2.3.1 The biblical paradigms in Athanasius' exegesis 
We have already made some hints about the use o f certain biblical images or 
paradigms in Athanasius' argumenation on the generation of the Son. In fact, their role is 
much more important than we have so far conveyed and his emphasis on them much 
stronger. The use of natural images for the illustration of the relation between the Father 
and the Son can be fraced back to the New Testament and was a common practice among 
the ecclesiastical authors during the previous centuries. The "generation", the "father-son" 
and the "logos-wisdom" concepts are regarded as images, but from a literary point of view 
they should be characterized more as analogies from the human world than as 
paradigms.'^' By the term 'paradigm' we denote those images, which are taken from the 
natural world to express theological truths. The most prominent one, obviously because o f 
its direct Apostolic origins, is the image of the light and its effulgence ((pcbQ-dTtauyaaixa) 
theologically introduced and applied to the Son-Father relation in the Epistle to the 
Hebrews (1:3). Together with this, in the same verse goes the second one of the 'character' 
(XCtpaKTTip, often franslated as 'impression' or 'stamp') and the 'subsistence' (uTtootaoic;), 
which, however, does not appear very often in the Athanasian texts. From previous 
ecclesiastical authors, there were also in use other paradigms, which Athanasius appears to 
employ very selectively. He takes up and uses quite extensively and exhaustively in 
parallel wi th the light-effulgence one, the image of the fountain and river. He introduces 
Cf R.P.C. Hanson, The transformation, p. 97. For the function of paradigms in theology and their 
imderstanding see A. Heron, "Logos, Image, Son: Some models and paradigms in Early Christology", pp. 
43-47. In particular, he identifies three main functions: a) they are used to crystalise and focus a particular 
insight; b) to refine, clarify or modify the comprehensibility of a notion; and c) to represent as a sort of 
map or shorthand description the result of investigation. Cf also E. Meijering, "HN HOTE OTE OYK 
HN O YIOi:", pp. 81ff 
The Generation of the Son form the Father 125 
this one mostly as implication o f his theological views, since its application is not directly 
theological, but he freshly reinterprets i t through his deep hermeneutical insight. In Ps. 
35:10 God is described as 'source of life ' , in Jer. 2:13 as 'source of living waters' and in 
Bar. 3:12 as 'source o f wisdom'. Athanasius interprets these texts Christologically in the 
light o f Jn. 14:6 ( " I am the life") and 1 Cor. 1:24 ("Christ the power of God and the 
Wisdom of God"). There is also the image of 'vapour' (dx|j,ig) and power taken from Sap. 
Salom. 7:25 ("he is the vapour of the power of God"), which Athanasius witnesses as 
being used by Dionysius of Alexandria.'^'' He does not use it himself probably because of 
his view of the non canonicity of the book of Sapientia}^^ He relates the image of the 
branch coming from the trunk, which Dionysius also used, to the humanity of Christ and to 
his relationships with human beings.'** The image of fire l i t from fire used by Justin, 
TertuUian and others'" and also elsewhere in a heretical context, as Arius' Letter to 
Alexander records, is not used by Athanasius at all. The criterion of Athanasius' selection 
o f paradigms is based on their Scriptural origin, as he explicitly states. Without the 
backing o f biblical authority they could easily become open to suspicion.'** 
Before, however, presenting the arguments which Athanasius draws from these 
paradigms to support his view on the generation of the Son, we first have to explain some 
principles o f his interpretation and understanding of them. First of all, it has to be pointed 
out that Athanasius ascribes a metaphorical character to human language as a whole, when 
used in theology. Models of created nature have been used by God as means to 
communicate the divine messages to human beings in the sacred writings of the Bible. 
Athanasius discerns a particular procedure in this revelation, which starts from God, passes 
DION 15:25,504A. 
See his 39th Festal Letter. 26,143 6- 1437A. 
DION 10:26,493Bf 
See R.P.C. Hanson, ibid., p. 98. 
DECR 12:25,436C-437A. 
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through his saints, who experienced the direct revelation of God and always appear in the 
Athanasian texts to have f u l l knowledge of the truth beyond the particular images, and 
ends at human beings. Therefore the biblical paradigms are the only authoritative source 
for theology that provide sufficient data for any knowledge of God.'^' To draw from other 
sources is, for Athanasius, "incongruous" and "impious".'^" 
However, although these paradigms have such origins, they still manage to create 
only a faint idea o f the reality of God, because his essence is ultimately incomprehensible 
and unknowable.'^^ Because of this inadequacy, they have to be understood and interpreted 
under certain qualifications as metaphors.'^' Since, examined individually, they are 
inadequte for a f u l l description of the divine reality they have to be interpreted 
synthetically. The logic that lies behind this is simple. A l l paradigms refer to the same 
reality, i.e., the Father-Son relation, but the models which they introduce contradict one 
another i f they are taken literally. The same reality of being cannot be described in human 
terms as word, son and effulgence simultaneously. Therefore, the reader faces the choice: 
either he has to reject their ascription to the same reality as erroneous, or accept only one 
of them as viable or regard them as descriptions of the same reality from different points 
of view. Athanasius goes for the last option and observes that the objective reality which 
these paradigms designate can be traced by their common feature. This is the intimate and 
ever-existing relation between the two elements involved in each paradigm. This common 
feature can also be safely identified, when the biblical paradigms are combmed with the 
"accuracy o f the oracles" (tcbv pr|Tcbv f) ctKpipeia).''^ In this way they w i l l not be pushed 
too far, neither w i l l they be understood as transferring created features to the uncreated 
SERl 19:26,573B. 
DECR 12:25,437A. 
DECR 12:25,436D; CAR2 32:26,216B; CAR3 23:26,372B. 
CAR3 21-22:26,368-369A. 
CAR2 33:26,217B; also CARl 26:26,650, CAR2 74:26,3040, CAR3 15:26,3520; DECR12 & 24. 
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God. The ultimate criterion, which defines the boundaries of interpretation, is the fact that 
they refer to spiritual beings and therefore have to be understood accordingly.^'" 
This hermeneutical standpoint of Athanasius is illustrated by the following three 
examples, a) He argues that the fact that the image of the light and the effulgence conveys 
the theological truth that the Son is "proper offspring of the Father's substance" (xfig loO 
Ttaxpog ouoiaQ i5 iov yevvnua) and he is "indivisible and united with the Father" (TO 
dSiaipSTOV K a i xfiv Ttpoc; TOV Tiaxepa evoxtixa) is obvious when one considers that it 
is the effulgence o f the light that has been selected to express this relation and not the fire 
kindled fi-om the heat o f the sun: the effulgence always exists together with the light, while 
the f ire is accidental to the sun, which can exist without kindling fire.^'^ 
b) The necessity of the combination of the paradigms for their correct 
understanding is apparent in the interpretation of the father-son and mind-word paradigm, 
as we have already seen. Both paradigms refer to the Son, but contradict each other i f they 
are taken in human terms. The mind-word paradigm lacks the 'hypostasis', the definition of 
an individual being (dvuTtooxaxoc;), but designates an undivided unity of spiritual nature 
between the two elements. On the other hand, the father-son image provides the definition 
of the 'hypostasis', but lacks the element of unity, since i t intensely implies distinction 
through division in space and time. The combination of the two paradigms provides a 
holistic understanding o f the Son as "living Word" {Ifbv Xoyoc;) and "substantive 
Wisdom, energy" (evouoiog oocpla, evepyeia).^'* 
c) Finally, the combination of the paradigms with the accuracy of the biblical 
statements can be seen in the application of the fountain-river unage. The Old Testament 
texts, Jer. 2:13, Bar. 3:12 and Ps. 35:10, acquire their fu l l theological and dogmatic 
'^^  SYN0 41:26,765C. 
DECR23:25,456D. 
CAR2 2:26,152A; SYNO 41:26,768A. 
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meaning through their illustration by the New Testament statements Jn. 14:6 and 1 Cor. 
1:24. They contain predicates (life, wisdom) uniquely ascribed to the Son, which, being 
understood under the light of the Old Testament paradigms, designate him as the living 
offspring of the productive and generative fountain, i.e., the Father.^'' 
2.3.2 'Light-effulgence', 'Fountain-river', 'Hypostasis-character' 
Having established this exegetical framework, Athanasius employs the paradigms 
of the light-effalgence, the fountain-river and the character-hypostasis for supporting the 
doctrine o f the eternal generation of the Son. The particular subjects which he illustrates 
through these paradigms are already known f rom our earlier discussion. First o f all, he 
argues that the biblical characterization of the Son as the effulgence of light and the river 
from the fountain excludes all possibilities of regarding him as a created being, because no 
such notion is connected to or in any way related to these images. The important feature, 
which these descriptions refer to God, is the idea of the continuously generating existence, 
which is always considered together with its offspring. The effiilgence or river is an 
attribute o f the very nature or existence of the light or fountain, and the former 
continuously springs from the latter, so that one can never think of them as existing 
separately. When the effulgence is absent and the light is not light any longer, since it does 
not shine, and the fountain is fountain, and the river does not exist, but is dry and is called 
an "empty pit", "for what does not generate from itself is not fountain".^'^ The description 
of God, then, as fountain and light can only be true i f he is understood as a generating 
essence whose offspring is none else than the Son. To think of the Father is to think of the 
Son simultaneously. In his second Epistle to Serapion he argues: " I f God is father, 
fountain and light, i t is not right to consider the fountain dry, nor the light without shining. 
^" CAR2 2:26,149B-C. 
C A R l 19:26,52A. 
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nor God without word, which would make God unwise, speechless and dark. Therefore it 
is necessary that the Son is eternal, the Father being eternal, and whatever we perceive that 
is in the Father, undoubtedly the same is in the Son".^'' 
Another implication, which comes f rom the above, is that this immediacy also 
excludes the suspicion of the Son as creature, because the idea of a created being is linked 
with two elements: the period of time when the created being did not exist - its Creator 
being alone without it , and the w i l l of the creator, which caused it to be. The light and 
foimtain paradigms not only do not contain any hint o f such notions, but on the contrary 
positively a f f i rm the opposite, that is, eternal coexistence as a natural attribute. The 
effulgence is not an acquisition of the light f rom without after a deliberate creation of its 
existence, but they naturally coexist as one reality: "Let them in their madness say 'There 
was once when he was not' and 'before his generation Christ was not' and again let them 
declare that the fountain did not beget wisdom from itself, but acquired i t f rom without, t i l l 
they have dared to say 'the Son came of nothing', whence it w i l l fol low that there is no 
longer a fountain, but a sort of pit, as i f receiving water f rom without and usurping the 
name of fountain". 
Departing f rom the notion of creature on the basis of these arguments, Athanasius 
uses the paradigms to illustrate further the concept of the Son's generation. Having 
followed the explanation of the significance of the Word concept, he makes apparent a 
different understanding of the generation that pertains to its nature and of the manner in 
which it takes place. The same understanding is further reinforced by the use of the 
paradigms, namely by putting aside the elements of temporal secondariness, passion and 
division, which are associated with the generation in the context of the father-son analogy. 
Athanasius clearly asserts that the biblical intention of using such images is to carry the 
SER2 2:26,609B; see also similar statements in CAR2 32, DECK 12. 
D E C K 15:25,441B-C; see also C A R l 27, SYNO 52. 
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undersanding o f the divine existence beyond the human model of generation, which 
although applicable, is not sufficient to convey in its fullness the meaning of the divine 
generation. He establishes the foundations of the function of these images in his De 
Decretis saying, "Mean, indeed, and very dim is the illustration compared with what we 
desire, but yet i t is possible from it to understand something above man's nature, instead of 
thinking the Son's generation to be on a level with ours. For who can ever imagine that the 
radiance o f light ever was not, so that he should dare to say that the Son was not always, or 
that the Son was not before his generation? Or who is capable o f separating the radiance 
from the sun, or of conceiving of the fountain as ever void of l ife, that he should madly 
say 'the son is from nothing', who himself says ' I am the life'?".^°' The features which 
Athanasius takes up from these images and applies to the generation of the Son are the 
fol lowing: a) the Son as the effulgence of the divine Light coexists with its source 
eternally, his generation being a continuous event, and more precisely, an event that 
franscends the human definition of time, since it takes place in eternity, where no temporal 
definitions apply, b) The generation of the efftilgence from the light does not involve 
passion or division, since not only is it thought not to diminish the essence of the light, but 
in fact is the very reason for which the light is perceived to shine and to exist, c) The 
immaterial nature o f the light and its effulgence portrays a more comprehensible picture of 
God, for the human mind, which comes closer to apprehending his bodiless and purely 
spiritual nature. Therefore, it represents a generation "appropriate to God" (©EO) TipETiov), 
whose nature becomes in turn the regulative principle for the definition o f the notion o f 
generation.^"^ The fol lowing text summarizes Athanasius' understanding of the paradigms 
in relation to the generation of the Son: 
"Yet, though we have already shewn their shallowness, the exact sense of 
these passages themselves and the force of these paradigms w i l l serve to 
DECK 12:25,437A. 
CAR128,CAR2 33,DECR12, SYN0 51. 
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shew the baseless nature of the loathsome tenet. For we see that the Word is 
ever and is from him and proper to his essence, whose Word he is, and does 
not admit a before and an after. So again we see that the effulgence from 
the sun is proper to it and the sun's essence is not divided or impaired, but 
its essence is whole and its radiance perfect and whole, yet without 
impairing the essence of light but as true offsrping from it. We understand 
in like manner that the Son is begotten not from without but from the 
Father, and while the Father remains whole, the expression of his 
subsistence is ever and preserves the Father's likeness and unvarying image, 
so that he who sees him, sees in h im the subsistence too, o f which he is the 
expression... Therefore, let this Christ-opposing heresy attempt first to 
divide the examples found in things originate and say 'once the sun was 
without radiance' or 'radiance is not proper to the essence of light' or 'it is 
indeed proper, but it is a part of light by division. Let it also divide the 
Word and pronounce that i t is foreign to mind or that once i t was not or that 
i t was not proper to its essence or that i t is by division a part of mind. And 
so of his expression and the Light and the Power, let it do violence to these 
as in the case of Word and Radiance and instead let it imagine what it w i l l . 
But i f such extravagance is impossible for them, are they not greatly beside 
themselves, presumptuously intruding into what is higher than things 
originate and their own nature and essaying rnipossibilities?".^"^ 
2.3.3 'Image' ( E I K O V , Col. 1:15) 
The argument about the possibility of the vision o f God though his effulgence, 
which is the Son, is further reinforced also by the Pauline Christological statement that 
Christ is "the image o f the invisible God" (eiKcbv), for which Athanasius also demands the 
generic identity of the Son with the Father as its fundamental connotation. The 'image' 
paradigm is more suitable to develop the idea of the Son's 'likeness' (6^0l6xrlc;) to the 
Father on the basis o f their common essential attributes. The argument is based on the 
absolute ontological distinction between two kinds of being, the created and the uncreated. 
The comparison of the essential attributes of the Son with those of God the Father and 
creatures serves to identify the kind of his essence, according to the principle: "Those to 
whom we are alike and whose identical nature we share, with these we are one in essence 
[oixoouoioi]".^ '"' The result of this comparison, as we shall also see in detail in the next 
CAR2 33:26,217C. 
SER2 3:26,612B. 
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part, puts the Son in the same category of being with the Father which, in turn, vindicates 
his characterization as the 'image' of the Father. For, in order to be the image of the Father, 
the Son must possess all the essential attributes of the Father which can be transmitted only 
through generation. So, Athanasius regards i t as logically imperative to include the essence 
of the Father among the connotations of the term 'image', i f one thinks of the Son as the 
"complete" (oXoKXripov) and "perfect" (xeXeiov) unage of the Father. He backs up this 
argument wi th Col. 2:9, Jn. 1:16 and 14:9 saying, "For, i f the Son is not according to 
essence like, he is surely unlike and the unike cannot be an image. And i f so, then it does 
not hold that 'He who has seen the Son, has seen the Father', there being then the greatest 
possible difference between them, or rather the one being wholly unlike the other. And 
'unlike' cannot be possibly be called 'like'. By what artifice then do you call 'unlike' 'like', 
and consider 'like' to be 'unlike' and pretend to say that the Son is the Father's image? For 
i f the Son is not like the Father in essence something is wanting to the image and it is not a 
complete image, nor a perfect effulgence. How then do you read 'In him dwells all the 
fulness of the Godhead bodily' and ' from his fiilness we r ece ived" .The re are two 
fundamental points that come out of this text and define the understandmg of the Son as 
the image o f the Father: a) i t is the fulness of the Son's revelation of the Father according 
to Jn. 14:9 that demands his absolute identification with Him, for in order to be the perfect 
image that resembles H i m he has to be alike in every respect ("He is the whole as an icon 
o f the whole") :^°* "We proceed then to consider the attributes of the Father and we shall 
come to know whether this image is really his. The Father is eternal, immortal, powerful, 
light, King, Sovereign, God, Lord, Creator and Maker. These attributes must be in the 
SYNO38:26,760C. 
"oXoc; ecTiv oXou eiKcbv Kai anauyaoHa", CAR3 :26,569. E.R. Craven considers that the link 
of the concept 'likeness' with the 'homoousion' negates its understanding as denoting 'numerical oneness': 
"It would be impossible, for intrinsic reasons", he argues, "to harmonise the phrase 'the same in [or by] 
likeness' with the system which affirms numerical sameness" ("The Nicene doctrine...", p. 725). 
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image to make it true that 'he who has seen the Son has seen the Father".^"^ b) The notion 
of 'likeness' of two beings to each other is based on and refers to their generic relations and 
not to relations of creator and creature, since image of an human being is called only its 
offspring and not the product of its technical skills.^"* Therefore when 'likeness' refers to 
the being or the essence of elements, which are to be compared, it suggests identity 
(xauxoxriQ) and not shnply 'likeness' (6|a,oi6xTic;). This idea of identity is conveyed by 
Athanasius with the qualifier 'unvarying' (aTtapdXX-aKxog), whenever he refers to the 
'image' and the 'likeness', and with the 'homoousios', which in this account is vindicated 
against the alternative semi-Arian 'homoiousios'.'"' 
On the basis of this understanding of image Athanasius clears three fundamental 
objections o f the Arians. The first one refers to the designation of human beings as 
'images' o f God according to 1 Cor. 11:7 ("For a man is the image and the glory of God") -
an interpretation which they also presented at the Council of Nicea.^'" He argues that the 
predicate image is not attributed to men on their own account, but because they have been 
created by God according to the Image of God (Gen. 1:26), which is none else than the 
Word and Son. Therefore, i t might be attributed to all of them, but never individually to 
any o f the saints of the Bible or the followers of Christ, otherwise God would be described 
as having many images. Christ is the only one to be called the image of God and this is 
proper, because, since God is one, he must have only one image. 
C A R l 21:26,56A. In the next part of this thesis we shall present in full this comparison on the 
basis of Jn. 16:15 and with reference to the biblical texts which he recalls. 
"For man too both builds a house and begets a son and no one would reverse things and say that 
the house or the ship were begotten from the builder and the son were created or made by him; nor again 
that the house was an image of the maker and the son unlike him who begot him; but rather one will 
confess that the son is an image of the father, and the house a work of art, unless his mind is disordered and 
he is beside himself (DECR 13). 
Athanasius offers a M l explanation of the difference between the two terms in SYNO 
53:26,788Bf 
D E C R 20:25,452A. 
CAR3 10:26,344A. 
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The second objection refers to the designation of God as 'Ingenerate' (ayevriTog), 
which the Arians regarded as the primary attribute of God that ontologically differentiated 
h im from any other 'generated' being (Y8v[v]riT6v). Athanasius argues that the term 
'ingenerate' refers to the relations of God with created beings and not with his Son, who, in 
turn, is the only image of Him. Because the notion of image coheres with Jn. 16:15 ("Al l 
that the Father has is mine"), the Son must also possess the same attribute and be 
distinguished from created beings as being himself uncreated: "And being his image, he 
must be distinct from things originated and from everything; for whose image he is, his 
property and likeness he has, so that he who calls the Father ingenerate and almighty, 
perceives in the ingenerate and the almighty, his Word and Wisdom who is his Son".^'^ 
Thirdly, the Arians inferred from the above that the Son must also have the 
attribute of begetting, i f he is to have all that the Father has. Athanasius responds that this 
k ind o f understanding o f God imposes on h im a human pattern o f existence and considers 
h im a bodily being. But even according to that, they should also try to find a father for the 
Father and sons of the Son, carrying away the inquiry to the infinite. 'Begotten' and 
'Unbegotten' or 'Ingenerate' are attributes which distinguish the Son from the Father, who 
exist as such eternally: "It is not so in the Godhead, for God is not as man. The Father is 
not from a father, therefore he does not beget one who shall become a father; nor is he the 
Son from effluence o f the Father, nor is he begotten from a father that was begotten. 
Therefore neither is he begotten so as to beget. Thus it belongs to the Godhead alone that 
the Father is properly Father and the Son is properly Son and in them, and them only, does 
it hold that the Father is ever Father and the Son ever Son".^'^ 
This use o f the Christological titles and paradigms in Athanasius' argumentation 
about the generation o f the Son, as the foregoing exposition has shown, provides us with 
DECR30:25,472B. 
C A R l 21:26,56A; S E R l 16:26,569B. 
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greater insight into his understanding of the biblical teaching on the subject. The original 
notion of the generic continuity from the Father to the Son, with which we began our 
discussion, has been modified in so far as to detach our conception from the particular 
event o f human generation, which takes place in space and time and is ontologically 
defined as resulting in two separate individuals, and to direct it to the "peculiarity of 
nature" ((puaiKTi iSioxric;)."'' Athanasius holds a dynamic view of the essence of God, 
which is regarded as "firiitbearing" (KapTcoyovoQ) and "generative" (yevvTiTiKfi), thus as 
being the way in which God exists (tpOTiog GeotriTog)."^ The offspring of this 'activity' 
is the Son, who, being generated from God, is himself also God.^^^ The beginning of his 
existence is in the inner being of the Father, therefore he is "of the same nature" 
(6|iO(pufi(;) and "of the same essence" (onoouoioc;). He is "simple and pure offspring"^ 
the Father's essence "proper" and "own" (tSiov) attribute, who exists simultaneously and 
always with the Father, since "when light exists, there be withal the effulgence as its image 
and a subsistence existing, there be of it the entire expression, and a father existing, there 
be his truth. Let them consider what depths of irreligion they fall into, who make time the 
measure of the image and the kind [eiSog] of the Godhead".^'* The generic identification 
then, is positively and intensely associated with the 'homoousios', being an intrinsic 
element o f its meaning that maintains its original significance: 
"For i f the Word were a work and foreign to the Father's essence, so that he 
is separated from the Father by the difference of nature, he cannot be one in 
essence with him, but rather he is homogeneous by nature with the works, 
though he surpasses them in grace. On the oher hand, i f we confess that he 
is not a work, but the genuine offspring of the Father's essence, it would 
fo l low that he is inseparable from the Father, being connatural, because he 
E.R. Craven, although acknowledging the unportance of the Christological titles and paradigms 
for the illustration of the Son's generation, still considers the father-son analogy as the most important of 
all, because it renders clearer his firm conviction to the 'homogeneity', which he calls 'specific identity', 
conveyed by the Nicene-Athanasian 'homoousion' ("The Nicene", p. 754). 
SYNO 52:26,7853. 
"For he is God, bemg the Son of God" (CARl 49:26,113C); "For if he is the Word of the Father 
and true Son of his, he is God of God" (CARl 10:26,32B). 
SYNO 52:26,788A. 
CAR120:26,53B. 
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is begotten from Him. And being such, good reason he should be called 
homoousios".^" 
The interpretation o f "homoousion" in the generic context of birth-giving was very 
important, because Athanasius managed to maintain the balance of the tinderstanding of 
the Son between two extremes: on the one hand, through the sharp distinction between 
Father and Son, he delivered "homoousion" from the connotations of the Sabellian 
"Son-Father", which denied the Son as true being. On the other hand, he maintained the 
consubstantial nature o f the being of the Son with that of the Father against the absolute 
alienation which Arius supported. However, although Athanasius frequently puts great 
emphasis on the distinction between Father and Son, he never uses language which could 
suggest division. In the last section of this first part we have seen the vital importance of 
the concept o f unity between the Begetter and the Offspring. He further expounds on it 
through another set of appropriate biblical texts that complete the meaning of 
"homoousios" in the divine dimension, as we w i l l see next. 
SYNO 48:26,7770. 
3. THE "HOMOOUSION" AND THE UNITY 
OF THE SON WITH THE FATHER 
In the foregoing pages we followed the development of Athanasius' argument on 
the generation o f the Son and discerned the beginnings of the doctrine of unity as the 
qualifier of it. The combination of the two doctrines is evident in the extract from the De 
Decretis to which we referred at the outset of our investigation, and which is appropriate to 
repeat at this point: 
"They [the Nicenes] were compelled immediately to collect the mind of the 
Scripture and what they were saying earlier, they said and wrote again with 
more clarity, that the Son is homoousios with the Father; [in this way,] they 
would indicate that the Son is not simply like the Father, but has identical 
likeness, which he received from the Father and that the likeness and 
immutability o f the Son is different than our imitation, as it is called, which 
we acquire through the observance of the commandments. For i t is possible, 
bodies, which are like one another, be divided and distant the one from the 
other, as the human sons are from their begetters, according to what is 
written about Adam and Seth, who was begotten from him ' in his own 
likeness, after his image'. But because the generation of the Son from the 
Father is different from human nature, he is not only like, but also 
indivisible from the essence of the Father and he and the Father are one, as 
he said, and the Word is always in the Father and the Father in the Word, as 
is the effulgence in the light, for this is what the term designates. The 
Council having understood this, wrote the homoousios correctly, so that it 
would abolish the wickedness of the heretics and show that the Son is other 
than the creatures".'^" 
As we have said, the "homoousios" was the answer to the Arian problem of 
compromising the oneness of God with the Father-Son duality. According to this text, the 
content which Athanasius gives to the term is the combination of the doctrines of the 
generation and unity. Crucially important in the process of understanding both of them was 
the relation o f the term "ouoia" with the term "one". As in the context of generation, so 
DECR 20:25,452B-C. 
The Unity of the Son with the Father 13 9 
here, Athanasius defines "ouoia" according to the spiritual nature of God which exists 
beyond the limited definitions of created reality. 
I n ontological terms, scholars identify this problem as distinction between "ousia" 
and "hypostasis": are the Father and the Son to be understood as one with reference to the 
'ousia' o f God, that is, as generically identified as two individuals of the same species, 
resulting thus in ditheism, or with reference to the "hypostasis" of God, resulting in denial 
o f their duality in the Sabellian sense?^ '^ "Ousia" is generally accepted as conveying both 
meanings and the distinction between the two terms as not existing at all during the 
controversy. The Arians rejected both the above options and alienated the Son from the 
Father ontologically, so that the he would not relate with anything that refers to the very 
being and existence of the Father. As a consequence, they attributed to the Son God-like 
qualities which were granted to h im by God as a token of virtue by means of which he 
maintained a moral unity with Him. 
Thus Athanasius, having to deal directly with the second problem and indirectly 
wi th the first, develops his argument clarifying both. First, he wants to prove that the 
doctrine of unity between the Father and the Son the Bible teaches (the Arians would not 
deny that), is not adequately interpreted as simply being a unity of a moral nature, but 
demands a unity which refers to the inner being of the Son. Secondly, he also had to 
explain the terms in which the duality of persons is compromised with the oneness of God, 
but he does not appear to use "ousia" and "hypostasis" as synonymous .The 'homoousios' 
was the most appropriate term to express comprehensively both concepts. In fact, it was 
the conviction of Athanasius that, having proved the two above points, the acceptance of 
the 'homoousios' would naturally come out of it. 
Cf. the inquiries we set at the Introduction concerning the 'homoousios'. 
'^ ^ This is the prevailing idea among scholars; see: E . Craven, op. cit., .p. 71 Iff; R.P.C. Hanson, op. 
cit, p. 445; J.N.D. Kelly, Creeds, p. 250; C. Konstandinidis, "Ousia and Hypostasis", p. 579f; T.B. Strong, 
"The history of substance", pp. 35-39. 
The Unity of the Son with the Father 140 
As for the first, the primary source for his biblical material is the Gospel according 
to John, which is especially featured as the Gospel of unity between the Father and the 
Son.^ ^^ The two main ideas of Athanasius' argument are developed around the key verses 
Jn. 10:30: " I and the Father are one" and 16:15: " A l l that the Father has is mine", which he 
backs up with Jn. 14:9,10. He aims to prove that any kind of external unity manifested in 
the Bible cannot but f low out o f unity of essence and nature, because the Son is begotten 
and yet has never been separated from the Father. Those verses, which are the most 
characteristic ones, combined with several others clearly and intensely suggest a mutual 
indwelling and interaction. The Prologue of the Johannine gospel, with the central figure 
of the Word of God and the paradigms of the 'light-effulgence' and 'fountain-river', 
complete his biblical argument and the explication of the significance and consequences of 
the unity o f nature o f the Son with the Father. 
As for the second, he qualifies the meaning of the term "one" when it applies to 
God and its relation to the 'homoousios'. He extensively explains the unity of God in view 
of the duality of persons. The term "homoousios" gives compact expression to this 
understanding and in fact replaces the definition of the term "one" by Arius as "Monad". 
Athanasius understands "one" in terms of "6 |X0-" (= together, co-) which negates its 
definition in the human dimension but without losing the significance of oneness. The 
important point to note here is that, as in the context of generation, the term "ouoia" is the 
element o f the divine being which can be transferred and communicated, so in the context 
o f unity i t is the same element that can be common to and possessed by both persons. 
There is no similar reference to the term 'hypostasis' whatsoever.^" 
T.E. Pollard has shown the centrality of the Fourth Gospel in the theological controversies of the 
first four centuries in his PhD thesis The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel in the Arian Controversy (St. 
Andrews, 1956). He remarks that "it was the Fourth Gospel that raised in their most acute form the 
problems which forced the Church to work out its doctrine of the Trinity, and that, at the same time, it was 
the Foiuth Gospel that provided the Church with the data, in their clearest form, from which to construct 
that doctrine" ("John x. 30", p. 335, n. 1). 
See his Letter to Alexander, op. cit. 
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Unlike the doctrine of generation the counter argument of the Arians at this point is 
very limited and not very much exegetical debate goes on. The Arians completely ruled 
out any sense of unity in being or essence between the Father and the Son, therefore they 
advanced only some minor points about some sort of ethical unity without ever mixing the 
Son wi th the Father in their inner being. Athanasius develops the f u l l understanding of the 
dogma of the Trini ty clearing the confiision of the alleged contradiction with the dogma of 
monotheism. As in the first part, so here, we shall maintain the same structure in 
presenting the material, examining firstly the particular biblical texts, secondly the 
Christological titles Word and Wisdom and finally the paradigms light and fountain. 
It is this point we think that has skipped the attention of scholars who base their view of the 
identification of the two terms by Athanasius on their alternative use in the generic context of the 
'homoousios': the two primary references to the Athanasian works in support of this identification are the 
defence of the anathema of the Creed ('from another ousia or hypostasis", DECR 20:25,452C) and the 
explanation of the meaning of 'ousia' in AFRO ('ousia and hypostasis is existence [unap^K;]'; C f J.N.D. 
Kelly, Doctrines, p. 247). But as we have already explamed in the appropriate place, this is highly 
justifiable in that context because both are ontological terms that denote existence as opposed to nothing. 
The terms are used alternatively only when the main idea conveyed is that of origination or procession, 
when the Son is said to come from the Father. This does not happen when the main idea is that of the unity 
of the Son with the Father, that is, when it is rather static and does not include movement. The Son is never 
stated or even hinted that could possess the 'hypostasis' of the Father, but only his 'ousia'. G.D. Dragas 
asserts that the case in the above mentioned Athanasian texts is not to "deal with the question of one or 
three hypostases but with the existential meaning of the term which is rejected by the Arians" ("The 
homoousios in Contta ApoUinarem 1", Arianism, p. 241, n. 37). 
3.1 The Biblical Texts 
3.1.1 Jn 10:30,14:9,10 
3.1.1.1 Unity of essence as opposed to unity of will 
Jn 10:30, with 14:9 and 14:10, carries the bulk of Athanasius' argument.^^* I t is a 
characteristic verse, very powerful in its meaning and condensed in its expression with a 
long exegetical tradition and theological application. As T.E. Pollard has shown, i t appears 
in all the confroversies o f the first centuries and it was used by the Church leaders against 
the heresies o f the two extremes, both Monarchianism and Arianism. This is due to the fact 
that i t maintains in a remarkable fashion both the distmction and the unity of the Son with 
the Father in equal terms and does not allow wavering toward either side.^" 
The particular context into which the verse emerges in the Johannine gospel is 
especially important. I t is worth taking a brief look at it , because it reveals the background 
as well as the particular connotations with which the verse is charged, and demonstrates 
how it played such an important role in the course o f the later developments. 
Jn. 10:30 belongs to the wider context of the verses 22-39, in which an 
exceptionally dramatic crisis takes place. The Jews address to Jesus Christ a critical 
question expressed in a very intense way: "How long w i l l you keep us in suspense? I f you 
are the Christ tell us plainly" (vs. 24). The answer of Jesus consists of three parts; First, he 
claims his works as witnesses of his identity (vs. 25b); secondly, he explains the reason for 
Athanasius argues that the "mind" (= sense) of these three verses is one (CAR3 5:26,3290). 
T .E . Pollard commenting on the crucial theological importance of Jn. 10:30 points out that "Both 
the Western and the Alexandrian Churches sought to refute Monarchianism by maintaining both the 
distinction between the Father and the Son and their unity one with another. In both Churches John 10:30, 
which asserts both the distinction and the unity, was one of the main weapons against the heresy which 
sought to preserve the unity by denying the distinction...This same text was to prove equally crucial in thhe 
Church's resistance to Arianism which strove to preserve the distinction by denying the unity" (The 
exegesis of John X. 30, p. 339). 
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which they do not accept him as Christ (vs. 26); and thirdly, he distinguishes the Jews 
from his "own sheep", which enjoy the security of the protection of his Father and himself 
(vss. 28-29). The high point is the concluding statement " I and the Father are one" (vs. 30), 
which reveals Christ's full self-confidence and self-consciousness, and seals his answer by 
giving the reason of the last argument. The full religious significance and theological 
implications of this statement are crystal clear in the reaction of the Jews; they 
immediately take up stones to stone him on the accusation of blasphemy: "It is not for a 
good work that we stone you, but for blasphemy, because you, being a man, make yourself 
God' (vs. 33). Jesus, instead of defending himself, repeats his controversial claim 
pronouncing this time the identity of his works with those of the Father, which reveals a 
reciprocal indwelling of the one in the other (vs. 37-38; cf 14:10). The Jews are again 
stirred up and make an unsuccessful attempt to arrest him. 
The Johannine narrative makes obvious that the verse is one of the most 
characteristic ones which gives a straight forward and authoritative answer by Jesus Christ 
himself to the question: "What or who is he?". It was professed in the midst of a crisis 
among the Jews and continues to be in the centre of the theological controversies between 
Church leaders and dissenters in the following centuries. 
The sequence of the text supplies to Athanasius the main guidelines upon which he 
constructs his arguments. The first point which he takes up, solidly maintains and 
constantly reiterates is the fundamental principle that Jn. 10:30 refers to the being of the 
Son and consequently of the Father. It was an answer to the question which he had also to 
answer against the Arians, of who the Son is. It also states that he and the Father are one 
and the Jews understood that he made himself God. Clearly all these phrases signify the 
Son in his very being and existence in relation to the being of the Father."' The second 
We believe that it is particularly important to emphasize the significance of this point, especially 
against certain views expressed by a number of modem scholars (19th cent, onwards). From what we said, 
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point, which closely relates to the previous one as its presupposition and also its proof, is 
the fact that Jn. 10:30 is expressed without any qualification and unconditionally, or 
accordmg to Athanasius' expression "loosely" (a7toA.£X,u)iiEVcog). The importance of this 
observation, as we have noted earlier, is that it leads Athanasius to construct a group of 
similarly expressed verses, which he ascribes to the divinity of the Son according to the 
distinction he made on the basis of the "scope of fa i th" .Such verses are Jn. 1:1, 14:9-10, 
the " I am" verses in Jn. 8:12, 14:6 etc., Prov. 8:25 etc. He justifies this point with the 
argument that this is an implicit way of expressing the fact that what we know about the 
being of the Son is that he simply exists as God beyond any reasoning or purpose. To 
render this observation clearer he compares this group with another group of verses which 
refer to the Son's humanity and Incarnation: verses like Jn. 6:39, 12:46, 18:37, 1 Jn 3:8, 
Prov. 8:22 etc."° He remarks that all of them include reasoning for his becoming a human 
being, which is "the need of men" {x\ T © V dvGpcoTicov xpsla), i.e., the need of "eternal 
life", "resurrection", "light", "truth", "abolition of the works of the devil". The Incarnation 
is an event in the being of the Son and the attributes of created nature which he appears to 
possess are acquired for a special purpose and they do not belong originally to his being. 
it becomes clear that "the question of essences" is set aheady in the New Testament and more specifically 
it is set as a Jewish question, not Greek. It appears, therefore, that Athanasius, as the first of the great 
Fathers who established the dogma of the Church, has fully realized and deeply understood this 
fimdamental doctrine of the Bible, which on the other hand slips away from the attention of modem 
scholars. It has been argued that the issues of the debates from the 4th century onwards have disorientated 
the biblical message through its subjection to a course of gradual "Hellenisation". Such an evolution was 
carried out either through a reproduction of Greek gnostic and pagan philosophies under Christian names 
(Werner, The formation, pp. 3ff; and also in him the views of Baur, Hamack, Loofs, Seeberg etc.; A. 
Hamack, History of Dogma, pp. 49ff & 107f; also cf R. Williams, Arius, pp. 6-8 & 21-25 and E. 
Miihlenberg, The Divinity, pp. 136f), or through the imposition on the Bible of notions which were not 
present in the mind of its sacred authors, but in the mind of the Greek thinking fathers and heretics (0. 
Cullman, The Christology, pp. 4-5; J. Bernard, The Gospel of John, v. 1, pp. 365f; cf also the account of 
J.D.G. Dunn, Christology, pp. 1-11 and the discussion on the use of the Greek language by R.P.C. Hanson, 
The Doctrine, pp. 41f, 53f and M. Fouyias, The Homoousion, pp. l l f ) . We think that Jn. 10:30 and its 
interpretation by Athanasius is a characteristic example of the fact that the fathers of the Church simply 
worked out the implications of what the Apostles expressed condensely in their writings, "clarifying" 
(XeuKoxepov txnzlv) their meaning. 
C f SER2 7:26,620B. 
CAR2 54:26,261A-C. 
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He argues: "For though no works had been created, still the 'Word' of God 'was' and 'the 
Word was God' [Jn. 1:1]. His becoming man would not have taken place, had not the need 
of men required it. The Son, then, is not a creature"."' His essential attributes are 
contained in the first group, of which Prov. 8:25 states the "beginning" of his being, which 
is begotten from the Father, and Jn. 10:30 states the manner of his existence, which is 
"inseparable" from the Father. 
On these grounds, he argues that the unity suggested by Jn. 10:30 must refer to the 
nature and being of the Son and the Father. They have never been and they cannot be 
regarded as separated, because they have never ceased to be one. He made the point even 
clearer by examining the consequences of the alleged moral or ethical unity, which the 
Arians supported."^ For this purpose he deploys the following arguments. 
a) Athanasius denies that Jn. 10:30 suggests a unity of likeness which all creatures 
can have with God. This alleged unity would mean that not only the saints, patriarchs, 
prophets and apostles have agreement in teaching and dogmas, but also the angels and 
divine powers, as well as the lifeless nature the sun, the moon and the stars; none of them 
ever disagrees with the wil l of God. Those who have disagreed are no longer considered 
among them, like the devil, who "fell from the heavens" (Is. 14:12, Lk 10:18). The Arian 
argument implies that any of these beings can claim oneness with the Father, without, 
however, any such claim ever having been expressed by anybody. Athanasius characterizes 
such an event as "incongruous" (atOTtov) and "immodest" (aTipSTtov)."^ 
b) Human beings achieve likeness with God on account of a constant and voluntary 
imitation, according to the biblical exhortation (Lk. 6:36, Mat. 5:48, 1 Cor. 11:1, Eph. 
CAR2 56:26,268A. 
We have gathered and we will present in a comprehensive mannner the arguments of Athanasius 
namely from the following texts: CAR3 10-16; SYNO 48-51; AFRO 7-8. C f also T.E. Pollard, op.cit,^. 
341ff 
CAR3 10:26,341A. 
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5:1). This imitation refers to the virtue and the attributes of God and not to his essence. 
Also, because it is voluntary it is mutable, since creatures can change any time in virtue of 
the fact that they have their agreement "by influence" (ev KivfioEi), "by participation" ( E V 
IXETOUoia), and "in mind" ( E V vcp). The examples of the fall of Lucifer and Adam are 
sufficient to prove the point. Moreover, they imply that men need the divine grace to 
achieve and maintain that likeness. Athanasius supports the point with three verses: 
according to 1 Cor. 11:7 men are "images of God" not in their own right, but because the 
real image of God, who is the Son, indwelt in them in their creation and through his 
Incarnation. Also, the steadfast love for Christ in Rom. 8:35 is an "irrevocable" gift of the 
Spirit and the call of God (Rom. 11:29), without which men are unable to achieve any sort 
of likeness to the Father. Finally, Jn. 10:35 clearly states that men are called "gods", 
because of the "coming" of the Word of God to them and not because they are such in their 
being. Therefore, none of the creatures was ever called "Word", "Wisdom" or 
"Only-begotten Son" of God, but only the Son who as real God is incomparable among 
men who are called gods by participation, according to Ps. 82:2 and 85:8."'' On this basis 
of these arguments he concludes that "a mutable being cannot be like God, who is truly 
immutable, neither can a creature be like his Creator... A being which partakes cannot be 
identical with or similar to the one in whom it participates"."^ 
c) The previous two arguments have shown that the oneness which Jn. 10:30 
demands cannot apply to any creature, because of their mutable nature. Therefore, the 
oneness of the Son with the Father must be much superior to any sense of oneness that 
creatures can achieve. It attaches the Son to the Father, bringing the former as close as is 
The interpretation , of Athanasius is very interesting, because he applies the comparison of these 
psabnic verses not between the God of Israel and the pagan gods, as one would expect, but between the 
Son and men, according to its association to Jn. 10:35. Apparently, it is based on the fimdamental 
existential distinction of the Son as the true God from any other occurence of the title 'god' wherever this 
might appear. Obviously it is the tenor of his argimient that demands this interpetation. 
SYN048:26,777C; AFRO 7:26,1041B-C. 
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possible to the latter. Athanasius argues that, this being the case, i f one still insists on 
considering the likeness of the Son to the Father in terms of virtue and improvement, 
which are indicative of quality, then Jn. 10:30 would suggest compositeness in God, since 
it unites essence with quality. However, the Arian argument is groundless, because the 
essence of God is by definition "simple" (a7tX,fi) and unchangeable (Jac. 1:17). The Son 
must possess the same kind of essence with the Father, so that this unity will be applicable 
and proper to God. The same kind of essence is maintained through the concept of "natural 
offspring", which proclaims the Son "i6iov" (the same, proper) and "xauxov" (identical) 
with the Father."* 
d) Athanasius detects another consequence for the Father himself, which is based 
on the distinction between essence and attributes of the essence. He argues that when the 
Arians claim that the Son is like the Father in respect of teaching and dogmas, they signify 
two things: first the Father himself, and second the teaching and dogmas which belong to 
the Father. I f the Son is like the Father according to the second, then the very name 
"Father" looses its meaning and it appears to be attributed to him conventionally. He is not 
Father in his being, but only by name. Paul had just such a likeness towards Christ because 
he professed his teaching, but he was also unlike him because he did not bear his nature. 
Of course, the Arians accepted this point, and therefore preferred the title "Ingenerate" as 
fittingly describing God in his being. In that case, however, Athanasius argues that Jn. 
10:30 again is not applicable and meaningless.'" 
e) The next argument exhibits the contradiction and disarray which the Arian 
argument causes between faith and life. Athanasius argues that i f the oneness of the Son 
with the Father is not in nature and essence and yet the Arians continue to call him "god", 
it is unavoidable for them to end up with ditheism. They appear to believe in two gods in 
AFRO 8:26,1044C. 
CAR3 11:26,344B. 
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spite of their monotheistic convictions, because although they reject two "Ingenerate" 
gods, they accept one Ingenerate and one Generated, one greater and one lesser god. 
Moreover, since they attribute divinity to more than one being, they can easily introduce 
more gods; in this respect they differ from the pagans only in that they accept just one 
second god, while they produce many more. Consequently, such beliefs also affect their 
worship through which they express their commitment to God. I f the Son is creature, then 
beside the worship of the Creator they hold the worship of a creature as pagans do."^ 
f) Finally, Athanasius argues against the soteriological implications of the Arian 
argument. A moral or ethical unity of the Son with the Father was never enough to 
accomplish the great task of the salvation of men. Salvation could be granted only by God 
himself, therefore Jn. 10:30 must refer the oneness of Son and Father to their being. It is a 
fundamental argument, which underlies the whole debate and constantly appears in the 
Athanasian works from the early On the Incarnation of the Word to the late On the Synods. 
In his first oration Against the Arians he characteristically argues: 
"You were anointed since none else but you could unite man to the Holy 
Spirit, you the image of the Father, in which we were made in the 
beginning, for yours is even the Spirit. For the nature of things originate 
could give no warranty for this, angels having transgressed and men 
disobeyed. Therefore there was need for God and the Word is God, that 
those who had become under a curse, he himself might set free. I f then he 
was out of nothing, he would not have been the Christ, being one among the 
others and having fellowship as the rest. But whereas he is God, as being 
Son of God and is everlasting king and exists as effulgence and character of 
the Father, therefore fitly is he the expected Christ"."' 
3.1.1.2 Jn. 10:30 in contrast to Jn. 17:11,20-23 
Athanasius also engages in the interpretation of Jn. 17:11,20-23, which the Arians 
quoted in order to support their point about the moral unity of the Son with the Father. 
CAR3 16:26,356B; C f the argument from worship is fimdamental in Athanasius defence of the 
divinity of the Son as he explains many times with reference to Baptism, prayer, etc. See CARl 
34:26,81B-84A; CR2 41-42:26,233Bff; DECR 31:25,473A-B. 
C A R l 49:26,113B-C. 
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They argued that the oneness of Jn. 10:30 and the mutual mdwelling of Jn. 14:10, which 
the Nicenes used to signify unity in essence, was not a distinctive attribute of the Son. Jn. 
17:11,20-23 uses exactly the same language to signify oneness of human beings with the 
Father. Using some sort of strictly logical equation, they argued that the combination of 
the two passages Jn. 10:30 and Jn. 17:11,20-23, does not allow the Nicenes to refer the 
unity of the Son with the Father to their essence. In that case they would be forced to refer 
the oneness of creatures with the Father also to then essence and to declare them gods like 
the Father. The other option which they suggested was an inversion of the final argument, 
that is, an attempt to understand the oneness of the Son with the Father according to the 
oneness of creatures with the Father, thus avoiding the previous contradiction. 
Athanasius, however, suggests a third option as an answer to the problem. He 
denies the Arian equation and he suggests that the oneness of the Son with the Father 
should be understood as being different from that of creatures: the Son is one with the 
Father in his very being, while human beings are relatively one with the Father by grace 
and through an external imitation of the divine attributes. Therefore, the first Arian option, 
which suggests equality of human beings with God in essence, strikes Athanasius not 
simply as odd, but as an extraordinary statement which flows out of an "evil-mind" 
( K a K O V o i a ) , "thoughtless daring and diabolic madness" (dXoyioxov xoXixav Ktti 
5ia|3oX,iKfiv dTtovoiav).'"" For Athanasius it carries the same weight as the original claim 
of Lucifer: "We will ascend to heaven, we wil l be like the Most High" (Is. 14:14). He 
asserts that the Arian exegetical error lies in the fact that they absolutize realities which are 
relative and they take attributes which are granted to men by divine condescension to be 
equal to the attributes of God himself. 
CAR3 17:26,360A. In the next pages we will follow the sequence of the Athanasian argument in 
CARS 17-25. 
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Athanasius contends that the same case applies also to the interpretation of Jn 17; 
the Arians accept as reality what Scripture has given as relative image of reality. That 
means that the oneness of the Son with the Father expressed here has to be understood as 
the perfect example and the reality which men should aim to accomplish and not as 
identification. He argues that the method of using images is not alien to Scripture to which 
"it is a custom to takes the things of nature as images and illustration for people". The aim 
of this method is to "reveal" realities which are abstract and spuitual through the attributes 
of images which are visible and comprehensible to human minds. Scripture gives such 
examples when it wants to describe disposition or moral impulses of the human soul, for 
which it very frequently uses animals, as in Ps 31:9, Jer. 5:8, Lk 13:32 and Mat 10:16. 
Obviously, the exhortation of Scripture here is not to become animals as such, but to avoid 
the bad attributes or acquire the good ones which primarily characterize those animals. In 
the same pattern, the exhortation in Lk 6:36 and Mat 5:48 for men to become like God 
does not mean that they wil l really become like God in his essence. Such a perception is 
totally impossible and unacceptable. The vast ontological difference between God and 
men, who are created by God out of nothing, is the safety valve that secures those verses 
from any misunderstanding. They refer, therefore, to the imitation of God's "beneficient 
acts" (EUEpYEolai) on account of which men became gods not as the Father or his Word is, 
but to the degree that God himself has granted. 
Athanasius asserts that Jn 17:11,20-23 belongs to the same category. It does not 
suggest that men will become one with the Father as the Son is, but it uses the image of the 
Son's oneness with the Father as example of the oneness which they should achieve to the 
extent that their nature allows. Such an oneness refers to the "unanimity" (6|J.o\|/uxia) and 
"consent of spirit" (xfi T O O TtVEUjiatoc; E V O T T I T I ) that men can have with one another and 
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by which they can resemble God, but it can never refer to their essence. He proceeds to 
prove the point by means of three theological arguments. 
a) He focuses on the sharp distinction and total unlikeness of men to the Word 
recalling the manner with which Scripture addresses them. He argues that the identity of 
species ((puaic; xoO YEVOUQ) between men and the Word, which the Arians allege, would 
demand a common name to describe it.'"*' Such a name does not exist in the Bible although 
men and the Word are generated from the Father. This implies that they are generated 
differently and consequently they are different in nature. Therefore the names with which 
they are known are different; the former are called "men" (avGpcoTioi) and the latter is 
called "Only-begotten", "Word", "Wisdom". As creatures, men are created from the 
ground, while the Son is God's own Word and Wisdom and therefore true God. Because 
the Arians used the Gospel of John, Athanasius recalls the evidence of other Johannine 
texts to prove his point. 1 Jn. 5:20 and Jn. 1:12 state that the Son is "true God", while men 
became gods by grace and participation to his true godhead; Jn. 14:6 and 17:17 state that 
the Son is himself the "Truth", while men become righteous through unitation of his 
goodness. 
b) Presupposing this unlikeness between the Word and men one cannot allege the 
same kind of unity with the Father, because they belong to different species and their unity 
has to be according to it. One can be united with another who is similar according to 
Athanasius says "For it is right, that they who have one nature should have a common name"; 
According to Kittel's account {Theological dictionary, "Name") the link between name and nature occures 
only in the Hellenistic thought. However, we think that such an emphasis is due to the special philosophical 
elaboration to which the two notions were subjected in the Hellenistic context. The belief that a name 
characterizes a certain reality-nature is a fundamental principle in the very structure of every language. 
Moreover, a closer examination of the Old Testament discloses that similar to the Hellenistic imderstanding 
is also Hebrew thought: a name represents or corresponds to the particular personality or character of its 
bearer; a change in the personality is followed by a change of the corresponding name. C f for example the 
change of the name of God from "God the Almighty" into "1 am who 1 am" (Ex. 3:13-17), which signifies 
his new function as the God who would lead them out of Egypt (R. de Vaux, The Early History of Israel, 
vol. I, London 1978, pp. 338-357 and especially 355ff). Cf also the change of Abram into Abraham (Gen. 
17:5) and of lacob into Israel (Gen. 32:28), which exresses anew reality that applies to them. 
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species and therefore men are united essentially only with one another and with God as far 
as their nature allows. Athanasius argues: 
"And becoming one as the Father and the Son, we shall not be such as the 
Father is by nature in the Son and the Son in the Father, but according to 
our own nature and as it is possible for us to be moulded by them and to 
learn how we ought to be one, just as we learned to be merciful. For things 
alike are naturally one with one another, because all beings are ranked 
together according to species. The Word is unlike us and like the Father, 
therefore, while he is in nature and truth one with his own Father, we, as 
being of one kind with each other (for we were all made from one and one 
is the nature of all men) become one with each other in disposition, having 
as our model the Son's natural unity with the Father" (ch. 20). 
In other words, Athanasius draws two parallel lines of unity between the Son and 
the Father on the one hand and human beings and the Father on the other, which are 
according to the kind of their nature. 
c) Finally, Athanasius argues that Jn. 17:11, 20-23 neither crosses those lines nor 
confuses the nature of the Son and the creatures, but introduces the natural and undivided 
unity as the example of men's unity with each other and with the Father. This unity is the 
objective of men's imitation of God and apphes to their "disposition" (5id0EOiv) towards 
each other and towards the Father: "So also here, wishing that our disposition to each other 
should be true, firm and indissoluble, he takes the pattern fi:om himself and says 'that they 
may be one as we are', whose oneness is indivisible". Such an example was necessitated by 
the fact that, because the divine nature is unchangeable, it would be "safer" 
(docpaXEaxEpa) for men to contemplate it and make their choices between "good" 
(PsXTioxa) and "evil" ((paOX,a). 
Athanasius turns next to the interpretation of the particular verses which 
demonstrate the exegetical aspect of his arguments. Its characteristic feature is the high 
degree of care and discernment with which he identifies the subtle variations of meaning 
which suggest decisive differentiations in sense and implications. 
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The first point which Athanasius examines, is the expression "in us" in vs. 21. He 
argues that i f it suggested that men will be in the Father as the Son is, it would read "they 
wil l be in you as the Son is in the Father". Literally, the phrase "in us" conveys the 
meaning of example. It stands instead of "Let them learn of us" and occws in other places 
in the Bible, like 1 Cor. 4:6 where Paul exemplifies the situation of the Church of Corinth 
"in" himself and Appolos. As such it implies that real and perfect unity applies between 
Son and Father and that this unity is presented as example to men. Men are united with the 
Father through the Son. 
Athanasius suggests one more interpretation which also is based on and which 
emphasizes the principle that men acquire unity with the Father by grace and do not 
possess it by nature. He argues that "in us" might mean "in our power", because, whatever 
men are able to accomplish, they do so on account of the grace of God. He remarks that 
this view is also aligned with the rest of the biblical doctrine, recalling the evidence of Ps. 
59:14 and 43:6. 
Then, Athanasius turns to vs. 22, which he characterizes as an extension of the 
previous notion. Again he makes two literary observations: firstly, he argues that the Lord 
did not say "so that they will be in you as I am", but he said "as we are", making clear that 
he does not consider himself apart from the Father, because he is fully self-conscious of 
his natural identity with him (dX.Ti6cbc; xauxoxTixa xflg (puaecoc;). Secondly, the adverb 
"as" (KttGcbg) also signifies an example or image of the reality to which it refers and not 
identification with that reality. 
Athanasius finds the solution of the problem in vs. 23, where the relationships 
among the three participants -Father, Son and men- are clearly explained. The 
hermeneutical key is the double nature of Jesus Christ; as eternal Son of God he is one 
with the Father and as the Incarnate Son of God he is one with men on account of the 
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humanity which he took up through his incarnation. Hence, men become one with one 
another as members of the one body of Christ and one with the Father in the power of 
Christ's unity with the Father. Athanasius argues as follows: 
"Here the Lord asks something greater and perfect for us. It is clear that the 
Word has come to be in us for he has put on our body. 'And you Father in 
me' because I am your Word and since you are in me, for I am your Word, 
and I in them for the body and because you have perfected the salvation of 
men in me, therefore I ask that they may also become one according to the 
body that is in me and according to its perfection; that they too may become 
perfect having oneness with it and having become one in it; that as i f all 
were put on by me, all may be one body and one spirit and may grow up 
unto a perfect man. For we all, partaking of the same, become one body, 
having the one Lord in ourselves" (ch. 22). 
Finally, summing up his interpretation, Athanasius stresses two points. First, he 
underlines the significance of the use of exemplifying language in the verses and secondly, 
he explains in what manner Scripture describes the possibility of man's achieving oneness 
with the Father. 
Elaborating further on the first point and adding to what he said so far, he argues 
that the adverb "as" (KaOcbg) excludes any sense of identification or equality, because it is 
applicable only to different natures, that is, "other and other" {aXKo KOX aXko). 
Therefore, it is a mistake to confuse the relationships of the Son with the Father with those 
of creatures with the Father, because they are of different kinds. The former are the perfect 
image, which exist on their own right, while the latter are in need of a perfect image, 
because they are imperfect in their nature: " I f we too become one as the Son in the Father, 
we shall not be like the Son nor equal to Him; for he and we are but parallel. Therefore 
and on this account the word "as" is applied to us, because beings which are different from 
others in nature, became like them, when viewed in a certain relation. Thus, the Son 
himself is simply and without condition in the Father, because he has this attribute by 
nature. Ourselves, though, who do not have the nature, we need an image and example". 
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He explains further the point of achieving oneness with the Father with the 
evidence of 1 Jn. 4:13: "By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has 
given us of his own Spirit". This verse, says Athanasius, shows clearly that men's 
participation in God takes place not because they desire it, as the Arians implied, but 
because God desires it. It is a gift of the Spirit. Because the Spirit is God's Spirit and is 
granted to men, men unite with the Father in the power of his abiding Spirit. It is never 
stated, though, that the Son participates to the Father in the same manner. It is rather 
confessed that he is the one who supplies the Spirit (Jn. 16:7) and the Spirit is the one who 
takes from him (Jn. 16:14-15). Athanasius, therefore, strongly emphasizes the fact that 
"On the one hand, the Son is in the Father as his own Word and effulgence. On the other, 
when we are apart from the Spirit, we are strange and distant from God, whereas when we 
participate to the Spirit, we are knit into the Godhead. Hence, our being in the Father is not 
ours, but the Spirit's which is in us and abides in us, as far as by true confession we 
preserve it in us" (ch. 24). 
Concluding his argument Athanasius summarizes his interpretation, imderscoring 
the two crucial points which determine the meaning of the verses and consequently the 
whole doctrine that flows out of it. First, the very fact that human beings are one with the 
Father is not an attribute of their own nature, but a gift which is granted by the Spirit. The 
Spirit, who abides in the Father and is sent through the Son, is the cause of men's oneness. 
Second, the phrase "as we are" (KaGcoQ fmeig) does not identify the Son's oneness with 
the Father with that of men, but conveys the meaning of an example. It denotes the 
"mfallibility" (dSidTixooxoc;) and "urevocabiHty" (d^iExaixeXrixoc;) of the gift of the Spirit 
to men, which resembles the immutable and indivisible natural unity of the Son with the 
Father. 
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The argument of Athanasius so far has clearly shown that he makes a sharp 
distinction between the likeness of the Son fi-om the likeness of creatures to the Father on 
account of their different nature {aXko K a i aXko). However, he proceeds further to prove 
the point by means of a carefiil comparison of the attributes of the Son with the attributes 
of creatures and the Father respectively. The comparison takes place on solely biblical 
grounds through a massive collection of the most characteristic biblical verses which apply 
to each of the three parts. Jn. 16:15 is the key verse, which reveals that the likeness of the 
Son to the Father is in essence and not through an imitation of his attributes. 
3.1.2 Jn 16:15: identity of attributes 
In contrast to those of Arius, the principles adopted by Athanasius neither forcibly 
affect any of the compared beings, nor subordinate them to a particular mode of existence 
or description defined by philosophical speculation, but allow them to unfold their identity 
freely, as has been revealed in the Bible. Such an attitude is due to two fundamental 
presuppositions which underlie his thought. The first one consists of the sharp ontological 
distinction between two "kinds" of beings, the uncreated and the created, that is, God and 
whatever God created. Apparently, any middle condition or "demi-being" is strictly 
excluded, in contrast to the Arians who inclined to accept the middle posistion, thus 
betraying strong influences of Greek philosophy and the same structure of thought which 
produced the pagan "theogonies". Athanasius' argument is simple: since there are only two 
kinds of being, the Son will belong either to the one or to the other, or in other words he 
wil l "coexist" (o^ioO) either with the Father or with the Father's creatures. It is worthy to 
note that in the following quotation he uses the terms "of the same nature" (6|J.0(pufic;) and 
"of the same species" (6|J.OY£vfic;) in parallel with "homoousios". 
" I f the Word is a creature and foreign to the Father's essence, so that he is 
separated from him by the difference of nature, he cannot be one in essence 
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with him [ofioouaioc;], but rather he is of one species [6|ioyevTic;] by 
nature with the creatures, although he surpasses them in grace. On the other 
hand, i f we confess that he is not a creature but the genuine offspring of the 
Father's essence, it would follow that he is inseparable from the Father, 
being of one nature [6|J,0(pUTic;], because he is begotten from him. Being 
such, he should obviously be called of one essence [onoouaiOQ]".'"^ 
The second principle refers to the attributes that describe every kind of existence 
and identify them as such. He argues that every being shares the same essential attributes 
with other beings of the same species, which distinguish species from species and do not 
allow their identities to mix. On this basis one identifies God, angels, human beings and 
any other group of beings of the same nature (6|J,0(pufi). Therefore, in order to answer the 
question whether the Son is like the Father or creatures, one has to discern carefully the 
attributes of each being and classify it to its own category of species. Thus, Athanasius 
argues, "We are of the same essence [6|4,oouoioi] with those whom we are alike to and 
identical with. We are human beings and we have the same likeness and identity and we 
are of one essence, because mortality, perishability, mutability and [generation] out of 
nothing apply to all. The same happens to the angels with one another and to all other 
beings, which are of the same nature".^ ''^  
From this premise Athanasius goes on to deploy in full his argimient. In the first 
place, he compares the attributes of the Son with those of the creatures on the basis of the 
biblical evidence. He underlines the most characteristic attributes of the created nature as 
the above text showed. The elements which he discerns are the following.^'*'' 
a) None of the creatures is self-sufficient or can sustain itself or others in existence. 
They all belong and are under the sway of God. In one word, they are all "slaves", while 
the Son is called the Lord the Almighty. For the attributes of creatures he uses the 
following psalmic verses: 
Ps 18:1: "The heavens are telling the glory of God" 
SYNO 48:26,7770; C f also SER2 3:612B. 
SER2 3:26,612B. 
C f SER3-4:26:612B and AFRO 8:26,1044A. 
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Ps 23:1: "The earth is the Lord's and the fuhiess thereof 
Ps 113:3: "The sea looked and fled" 
Ps 102:21: "Bless the Lord all his hosts, his ministers that do his will" 
For the Son considers it enough to use Ap. 1:8: " I am [the one] who is and who was and 
who is to come, the Almighty". Apparently, the contrast is sharp and clear. 
b) Creatures have mutable nature (xpETrxd) and they all change (dA,A,oiou|i£va), 
while the Son is immutable and unchangeable. To prove the point Athanasius uses one 
example from every kind of creatures, that is, he refers to Job 25:5 ("the stars are not clean 
in his sight") for the lifeless creation, to the fall of Lucifer (Is. 14:12 "How did Lucifer fall 
from heaven, who dawns in the morning", Lk. 10:18 " I saw Satan fall like lightning from 
heaven") for the spiritual angelic beings and the fall of Adam (Gen. 3) for the human 
beings. Created nature as a whole is by definition imperfect and therefore changeability is 
one of its attributes, as Athanasius asserts: "and everything is changeable". On the other 
hand he uses for the Son the Christological application of Ps. 101:26-28 by Paul in Heb. 
1:10-12 ("You, Lord, have founded the earth in the beginning and the heavens are the 
work of your hands; they will perish, but you remain") and the Christological confession in 
Heb. 13:8 ("Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever").^ ""^ 
c) Creatures have the beginning of their existence at a chronologically and 
ontologically specified point for they have been created by God out of nothing. The Son, 
who is the God of all (Rom. 9:5), is not created or made but indeed the Creator and Maker 
of all beings. He supports this distinction with the following verses: 
Rom. 4:17: "[God] who calls into existence things that do not exist" 
Gen 1:1: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" 
Is. 66:2: "My hand has made all these things" 
The selection of these verses has been carefully made and aims to demonstrate the 
main points of God's creative activity, which is creation out of nothing (Rom. 4:7) that 
Cf. also C A R l 35:26,84Cf. 
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includes all beings (Gen. 1:1) and has been done by the Hand of God (Is. 66:2). He 
ascribes the role of divine Creator to the Son through the verses: 
Rom 9:5: "Christ, who is God of all be blessed for ever" 
Heb 1:2: "through whom he made the ages" 
Jn 1:3: "all things were made through him" 
Heb 1:10 (Ps 101:26): ""You, Lord, have founded the earth in the beginning 
and the heavens are the work of your hands" 
d) Finally, and in effect of the previous, he refers to the disputable title "god", 
which appears to apply not only to the Son, but also to the creatures. Trying to explain 
how they came to be called "gods" and the difference between this and the Son's godhead, 
he lays the emphasis on two points. First, he stresses the fact that creatures were not called 
gods at the very first moment of their existence, which would have implied that it was an 
essential and immanent attribute of them, but they acquired various names descriptive of 
their species, like heavens, earth, stars, angels, men etc. Second, the title "god" is attributed 
to human beings afterwards and is due to the grace of God and participation to his Word 
according to Jn. 10:35: "He called them gods, to whom the Word of God came". This fact 
does not abolish creaturehood, because it is a mutable gift. The Bible maintains and 
emphasizes the distinction, especially in two characteristic verses, which Athanasius 
quotes Ps. 81:6-7 ("You are gods and sons of the most high, but you die as men"). 
On the other hand, the divinity of the Son is essential, because he is only confessed 
in the Bible as God through various ways. Athanasius quotes again, 
1 Jn 5:20: "He is the true God and eternal life" 
Ps. 44:7: "Your throne, O God, endures for ever and ever. Your royal 
sceptre is a sceptre of equity". 
The point is more powerfully reinforced through a remarkable exegetical transition 
from the notion of the "God of Israel" (for whom, obviously the Arians would not raise 
any objection about false godhead), to Jesus Christ as Son of God. He quotes Is. 45:14-15 
("The wealth of Egypt and the merchandise of Ethiopia and the Sabeans... shall come over 
in chains and shall bow down to you... for God is in you. You are the God of Israel, whom 
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we did not know"), from which he picks up the phrase "for God is in you" to combine with 
Jn. 14:10 and draw the conclusion: "For who else is that God, in whom God is, than the 
Son, who says / am in the Father and the Father is in meT. 
With this account, Athanasius completes the ftrst part of his comparison, from 
which he reaches the conclusion: "So, let the curious ones investigate whether there is 
likeness of the Son to the creatures and whether they can find in the creatures those which 
are in the Son, so that they would dare to call the Word of God creature. But, they will not 
be able to find anything, the ones who are insolent in everything and in error about 
piety".'' ' 
In the second part of his argument Athanasius compares the attributes of the Son 
with those of the Father. The situation here appears completely the opposite; he confirms a 
perfect identification of names, acts and authority. However, he does not allow himself to 
be carried away to the Sabellian error by overemphasizing the unity at the expense of the 
distinction between Father and Son on account of a strong anti-Arian concern, as Arius did 
against the previous heretics. Athanasius considers both extremes equally erroneous, and 
although the refutation of the Arian positions is constantly his main interest and aim, his 
clear-sighted and discerning interpretation does justice to the biblical text and does not 
twist it to fit his views, and so maintain the balance between unity and distinction. This is, 
from our point of view, the significance of the crucial observation with which he sets out 
to demonstrate the common attributes between Father and Son from the Bible: "He [the 
Son] has equality with the Father by titles expressive of unity and what the Scripture says 
for the Father, it says for the Son too, with the only exception that he is not called 
Father".'''^ This single point of distinction carries, for Athanasius, the same weight as the 
multitude of verses which speak about the unity of the Son wth the Father. 
SER2 3:26,612B. 
SYNO 49:26,780B. 
The Unity of the Son with the Father 161 
Having, then, established the distinction between the two, he precedes to 
demonstrate the community of attributes, which Father and Son share, specifying the 
particular ones to which Jn. 16:15 ("all that the Father has is mine") points. In fact the 
neuter gender of the pronoun "all" (TidvTa) extends the common attributes to all those 
which characterize God as such. Athanasius maintains this neuter gender as well as the use 
of pronouns, like "all" (Ttdvxa, ooa) and "those" (a, xd), avoiding any technical term 
which could in any way render a limited characterization on philosophical grounds. The 
only "term" he uses is the noun "xd i5icb|j,axa", or, alternatively, the adjective "xd t5ia", 
which preserve the general character of the pronouns.^ "* Another important point is the fact 
that he takes for granted the consensus with the Arians with regard to those attributes, 
which are considered as the proper ones for God and thus the Father. Therefore, he does 
not give any biblical proof those which belong to the Father, but only for those which 
belong to the Son. In particular, he pinpoints the following.^"' 
a) Eternity (diSiov): 
Heb 1:2: "Through whom he also created the ages" 
Rom 1:20: "His eternal power and godhead" 
Jn 1:1: "In the beginning was the Word" 
Jn 1:9: "The true light that enlightens every man who is coming into the 
worid" 
b) Creatorship (Ttoirixfic;):^ '^' 
Jn 1:3: "All things were made through him" 
Jn 5:19: "For whatever he [the Father] does, the Son does likewise" 
c) Common names: 
God {0Ed<;): 1 Jn 5:20: "We are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. 
This is the true God and eternal Hfe" 
Jn 1:1: "The Word was God" 
Phil 2:6: "He did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped" 
Ps 117:27: "The Lord God has appeared to us""^ 
Although we will use the English translation "proper" for "i5iO(;" and "attributes" for "idvcbuaxa", 
as the most commonly accepted, we do not regard either of them as adequate to convey the meaning of the 
Greek terms, which also include the notions of intimate link between the subject and its attributes, 
expression of an inner reality and possession. 
Cf. SYNO 49:26, 780B and SER2 2:26,609B. 
CARS 14:26,349C. 
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Ps 83:8: "The God of gods will be seen in Zion" 
Almighty (IJavTOKpccTCopy. Rom 9:5: "Christ, who is God over all, be 
blessed for ever" 
Ap 1:8: " I am [the one] who is, who was and who is to come, the Almighty" 
Lord (Kupiog): Gen 19:24: "The Lord rained brimstone and fire from the 
Lord" 
1 Cor 8:6: "One Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things", like the 
Father as in Is 45:5: "1 am the Lord" and Am 5:16: "Thus says 
the Lord" 
Light {06}q): Jn 8:12: " I am the light" 
Heb 1:3: "The effulgence of his glory" 
d) Equality of honour and mastership over the angels: 
Heb 1:6: "Let all God's angels worship him" (Ps 96:7) 
Mat 4:11: "Angels came and ministered him" 
Mat 24:31: "He will send out his angels" 
Jn 5:23: "That they all may honour the Son as they honour the Father" 
e) Authority for the remission of sins: 
Mic 7:18: "Who is a God like thee, pardoning iniquity" 
Mat 9:5: "Your sins are forgiven" 
Mark 2:10: "The Son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins" 
f) Royalty (BaoiX,£ia): 
1 Tim 1:17: "To the Kings of ages" 
Ps 23:7: "Lif t up your gates, O rulers and be lifted up O eternal gates, that 
the King of glory may come in" 
Dan 4:3: "His kingdom is everlasting" 
Dan 7:14: "his kingdom shall not pass away" 
Athanasius recapitulates the significance of this community of attributes between 
Father and Son in the following conclusions: 
a) The Son appears to be "like" (OHOIOQ) the Father. This likeness cannot be 
external or only in appearences, but has to be "m essence" (oiiOiog Kax' oualav). It is 
only in this respect that Athanasius accepts the term "onoioc;". He argues that such an 
understanding is necessary for two reasons. First, because Col. 1:15 and Heb. 1:3 proclaim 
the Son to be the "image" and "effulgence" of God. I f the essence of God were excluded, 
then neither would the image be complete nor the effulgence perfect. Second, Col. 2:9 and 
Cf. the meaning of the verb "enecpavev": not "shined" or "gave light" as English translations 
suggest, but rather "appeared", as in Tit 2:13. This is the meaning that Athanasius supports and constructs 
the whole argument like this: Christ is the one who appeared, the Psahn states that God will appear, thus 
Christ is God; Cf. also the next verse Ps 83:7. 
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Jn. 1:16 suggest that the Son has the fullness of the godhead, which necessarily includes 
the essence of God.^ ^^ 
b) The community of attributes provides the content and correspondence to reality 
of Jn. 14:10 and Jn. 10:30. The kind of relationship that those verses proclaim, that is, 
mutual indwelling and indivisible unity, can only be meaningful in a unity of attributes. 
They spring from and manifest that relationship. However, he intensifies the importance of 
this point arguing also that Jn. 14:9, "whoever sees me sees the Father", implies not only 
that the Son simply possesses the attributes of the Father, but, furthermore that he does so 
in his own right. Reversing the order, he asserts that whatever one knows about the 
attributes of the Father, one knows because one has seen them in the Son. In other words, 
since the Son reveals the Father, any knowledge that human beings can acquire about the 
Father is due to the fact that they saw the Son. Therefore, the Son has to be full God like 
the Father, because in the opposite case the knowledge of men about the Father could not 
be complete.^" 
c) The high point of his argument is the fact that Athanasius rejects the 
fiindamental Arian position that the Son carries all the divine attributes even though he is a 
creature in his nature. For Athanasius, people who hold such views are "mindless" 
(acppovec;). A created being can never in any sense claim that it holds all that God himself 
holds for two reasons. Firstly, it cannot make this claim because of the way that beings 
exist. Their nature has a beginning and therefore by definition cannot hold the eternity of 
God. Secondly, all the attributes described above constitute the elements through which 
God himself is acknowledged as God; i f a created being could possess them then God 
would appear to differ in nothing from creatures. By the same token, neither could any 
other being, which is in essence other than the Father also hold them. Athanasius expresses 
SYNO 38:26,760B. 
SER2 2:26,609B-612A. 
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this otherness with the terms "exspocpueg", "dX.X.OTpiouoiov", "exepoouoiov", 
"dvoM,oiouoiov", "dvoixoiOYEVEc;", which cover any possible ontological status. 
Whatever belongs essentially to God cannot be shared or possessed by anybody else. 
Athanasius recalls Is. 42:8 " I give my glory to no other", to which he renders full 
ontological significance. And he concludes: "But i f this is immodest [ctTtpeTiEQ], it is clear 
that the Son is not unlike in essence, but homoousios with the Father; for i f what the 
Father has is by nature the Son's and the Son himself is from the Father and because of his 
oneness of godhead and of nature he and the Father are one and that he who has seen the 
Son has seen the Father, reasonably is he called by the fathers homoousios; for to what is 
other in essence, it does not belong to possess such attributes''.^ '^' 
d) Consequently, Athanasius also denies the Arian position that all these attributes 
are acquired by the Son through participation ((xexouoia). He asserts that they hold such 
views because their understanding of the notion of participation is also erroneous. He 
argues that whoever participates in the Father does so through God's Word. The Word, 
therefore, does not participate in God in the same way, because what belongs to him is his 
own, and as such he is the very lightening and deifying power of the Father, without whom 
the Father does nothing. Therefore, these attributes have to be essential property, so that he 
wil l be able to communicate them to the participants. In this respect it is necessary for him 
to be of exactly the same essence as the Father. Apparently, the soteriological aspect 
underlies Athanasius' argument once again, as one can see from the following quotation: 
"For by participating to him [the Son] we participate to the Father, because 
the Word is the Father's own [1610c;]. So, i f he were himself also from 
participation and the essential Godhead and image of the Father were not 
his own, he could not deify being deified himself For it is not possible that 
he who merely possesses from participation can communicate to others, 
because what he holds is not his, but belongs to the giver and whatever he 
has received is barely the grace sufficient for himself'.'" 
SYNO 50:26,784A. 
SYNO 51:26,784B. 
3.2 The Christological Titles 
The major weight of Athanasius' argument for the unity of God is carried by the 
Christological title 'Word' and the associated titles and paradigms of 'Wisdom', 'power' and 
'image'. He argues for his viewpoint against a specific interpretation of the same data used 
by the Arians who also appealed to a quite extensive set of biblical texts in support of their 
standpoint. Athanasius particularly underlines the different presuppositions of the Arians 
in approaching the biblical texts. He demonstrates the legitimacy of his point of view by 
carefully selecting biblical texts and backing them with exegetical and theological 
observations that provide a full and coherent account of the biblical doctrine of the Word 
of God. 
3.2.1 Word (AoYoq) 
The structure of Athanasius' argument on the doctrine of 'Logos' is dictated by his 
intention of countering the major Arian objections to what he maintamed as its traditional 
understanding. The Arian understanding of the 'Logos' and of the associated divine titles 
had been presented at the Council of Nicea and supported with various biblical texts. 
While Athanasius does witness this in the De Decretis,^^^ he had aheady, in the Contra 
Arianos, encountered and refuted their interpretation by the Arians on a biblical and 
theological basis."^ This is probably why in the De Decretis he does not get involved in 
fiirther exegesis of them, but simply produces the response of the Nicenes, which 
suggested an altogether different approach to the understanding of the 'Word'. 
As we explained in the first part of this thesis, the Arians erred inasmuch as they 
employed an anthropological approach to the biblical designation of the Son as 'Word'. 
D E C K 20:25,452A. 
CAR2 37-41:26,225Aff. 
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They viewed the Son and the Father as two sharply distinguished individuals, who in order 
to maintain their individuality had to be distinguished in their essence as two entirely 
different beings. Therefore, Arius could not accept the possibility either of attributing to 
the Son the adjective 'proper' (i5iog) to the Father, or of identifying him with the Word of 
the Father in one ontological reality because this would be literally and rationally 
inconsistent."^ The term 'word' signifies an impersonal energy of human beings that is 
proper to their essence. Thus he held that both the Son and the Father are individual beings 
and have their own essential attributes and therefore Christ can be called 'word', 'wisdom' 
and 'power' only conventionally or to put it in Athanasius' words "KaxaxprioTiKcbg, or 
KttTCX laeTOUoiav".'" Arius identified two 'words' and 'wisdoms' in God: the one is always 
existing with him 'dyevvriTCOc;' as an energy of his essence, and the other is the Christ who 
is called after the first one because he participates m it ( K a t d ustouolav) in a unique 
manner.'^" Athanasius ascribes the biblical background of this point of view to a literary 
observation on 1 Cor 1:24 by Asterius the Sophist, who argues that the Apostle preached 
Christ as "power and wisdom" of God and not as "the power and the wisdom". The 
omission of the article, he claimed, implied a distinction between the immanent and 
coexisting power and wisdom of God itself and Christ, one of those beings called powers 
of God, exceptionally though superior to them because he is "firstborn" and 
"only-begotten". 
As the Arians explained at the Council of Nicea, creatures which are called 'power' 
of God are those which serve or are used by God for special missions. They are attributed 
the same predicates "like", "image", "always", "power" and "in him", which the Nicenes 
See R. Williams, The Logic, pp. 58-62 for a full account of the significance and meaning of the 
term 'proper' according to Arius. 
C f Arius' Thaiia in C A R l 5:26,21Af; 9:26,32A. 
C A R l 32:26,77A; CAR2 37:26,225A. 
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used to denote the natural divinity of the Son and his unity with the Father. The Arians 
appealed for support to the following biblical texts: 
1 Cor 11:7: "[the man] is the image and glory of God" 
2 Cor 4:11: "while we live we are always" 
Acts 17:28: "In him we live" 
Rom 8:35: "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?" 
Joel 2:25: "the years which the swarming locust has eaten, the hopper, the 
destroyer, and the cutter, my great power" 
Ex 12:41: "Al l the power [hosts] of the Lord went out from the land of 
Egypt" 
Ps 45:8: "The Lord of powers [hosts] is with us" 
On these grounds they argued that the likeness of the Son to God does not differ 
from the likeness of all those creatures to God. Therefore, none of the names which the 
Nicenes used for supporting the "homoousios" could be exclusively used only for the Son. 
The Son could not possess in his being the divine essence, because he would be considered 
as "homoousion part" of it and consequently a divisive factor for the divine being. The 
unity between them should be external, as we have aheady seen, i.e., agreement of 
teaching, and the title "Word" should not be understood as having ontological significance, 
but only metaphorical. The Son as the "Word" of God that created the world acted as 
mediator who received from God the art of creating. This was the only way that Arius 
could use the term "Word" because, as he argued, i f it were to be taken literally, it would 
be impossible to identify which one of the many words that God utters is the One and Only 
Word, which Athanasius and his party supported.^*' 
As Athanasius explains, such an argument implies an anthropological 
understanding of the Word of God, who is confused with the words of human beings. 
Trying to clear the confusion, he argues that athough the term 'Word' is to be taken 
literally it does not apply anthropological patterns of existence to God because it is the 
biblical description that presents God speaking and the world coming into existence 
through his Word. Nevertheless, the attributes of the nature of the Word of God are not to 
D E C R 16:25,444A. 
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be defined by the attributes of the human word but by the biblical description itself, so that 
this image would not impose created mode of existence on the uncreated God. The title 
'word' has to be understood both in its literal and metaphorical sense, paying special 
attention to what point the one or the other should refer.'^^ He establishes the metaphorical 
conception of the Word on God's different nature from the human.''' He asserts that these 
differences are made evident from the different manner in which the Bible talks about the 
Word of God and the different attributes of nature which it ascribes to him. The 
Christological criterion is again the regulative factor that determines the Athanasian 
interpretation. The identification of the Word of God with Jesus Christ, which the New 
Testament teaches (Jn. 1:1,3, 1 Cor. 8:6b, Col. 1:16), constitutes the premise from which 
he starts in listing the differences of the Word of God from the word of human beings and 
the words of God. 
Referring, firstly, to the contrast of the attributes of the Word of God with the 
words of human beings Athanasius makes the following clarifications. 
a) Human word consists of "syllables" and its only effect is to give expression to 
the mind of the speaker. The divine Word lives and acts (evepyei) with immediate 
existential effects because He creates beings. Human bemgs use their hands to produce 
The understanding of the 'word'm its literary and metaphorical sense is what Athanasius expresses 
as "to take rightly what is written and to dwell upon our word as an illustration" (CAR2 3626,224B). To 
discern the degree of metaphor and the right place to apply it to, is the most difficult aspect of the 
interpreter's task, which requires long experience and deep assimilation of the biblical revelation. In fact, 
the hermeneutical dispute between Arius and Athanasius, as we have seen in most of cases, lies exactly in 
the different points to which they applied either of the two methods. 
^" Athanasius' reference to the divine nature brings forth the generic sense of identification of the 
Father and his Word: "For such as he that begets, the same of necessity is the offspring; and such as is the 
Word's Father, the same must be also His Word" (CARl 35). The divine nature however is by definition 
incomprehensible and therefore the inquiries to it should have constant reference to this: "Nor must we ask 
why the word of God is not such as our word, considering God is not such as we, as has been said before; 
nor again is it right to seek how the word is from God or how is he God's radiance or how God begets and 
what is the manner of his begetting...It is all one as if they sought where God is and how God is and of 
what nature the Father is. But to ask such questions is irreligious and argues an ignorance of God, so it is 
not holy to veture such questions concerning the generation of the Son of God, not to measure God and his 
wisdom by our own nature and infirmity" (CAR2 36:26,224A). 
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things, because their word does not have 'energy' (oi)58V slai eiQ evspyeiav), whereas the 
Word of God is both sufficient and capable of this.'^ 
b) Since human beings are of created nature, come out of nothing and live in time, 
their word has the same attributes: it is temporary, it appears and disappears, in fact it does 
not constitute an ontological reality (oux ucptoxaxai). On the contrary, the Word of God 
according to Heb. 4:12 ("For the Word of God is living and active sharper than any 
two-edged sword...") and Ps. 118:89 ("The Word of God endures for ever") exists 
eternally. The generic identification with the Father is the only explanation for attributing 
to the Word such qualities: "Such as is the Word's Father, such must be also His Word". 
c) The perishable nature of human words produces multiplicity: human beings 
'think and re-think' (X-oyi^ovxai Kai eTtiXoytJ^ovxai) and utter many words which 
multiply as time and seasons pass away. Their words are imperfect and they need one 
another to express a fiill conception. The Word of God, because He belongs to God, is 
perfect, He does not need complementing elements or second words, and therefore is One 
and Only: "God's Word is one and the same, as it is written, 'The Word of God endures for 
ever', not changed, not before or after another, but existing the same always. For it is 
fitting, whereas God is One, that his Image should be one also and his Word One and One 
his Wisdom".^^^ 
d) The fact that the Bible identifies the Word as the Son of God and both titles with 
Jesus Christ implies that He is not a mere impersonal energy, but is substantiated into a 
concrete being and He is identified as an individual who lives and acts like the Father. 
Athanasius expresses this understanding with the terms 'substantive wisdom' (svouoioc; 
oocpia), 'living word' (Cwv Xoyoc;), 'substantive energy' (svouoioc; evepyeia).^*^ We 
CAR2 35:26,221C. 
CAR2 36:26,224C;Cf also DECR 15. 
SYN0 41:26,768A. 
The Unity of the Son with the Father 170 
consider this to be the high-point of Athanasius' argimient which suggests a dynamic view 
of the divine being according to which being and act transcend their definition by human 
experience and designate an incomprehensible unity of existence. 
Maintaining this understanding of the Word of God steadfastiy, Athanasius did not 
ignore the biblical description of God uttering many words that are similar to those that 
human beings utter. The Arians, who could not think in terms of transcending the biblical 
data in a way that is not under the control of the human mind, contested the exclusiveness 
of the Athanasian 'Word' on the grounds that it is impossible to identify one of the divine 
oracles as the Word of God in Athanasius' sense because of the multiplicitiy of the words 
of God as they appear in the Bible.'^^ In view of this objection Athanasius asserts the 
uniqueness of the Word of God as follows: 
"For first, using such language about God, they conceive of him almost as a 
man speaking and reversing his first words by his second, just as i f one 
word of God were not sufficient for the framing of all things at the Father's 
wil l , and for his providential care for all. For his speaking many words 
would argue a feebleness in them all, each needing the service of the other. 
But that God should have one Word, which is the true doctiine, both shews 
the power of God and the perfection of the Word that is from Hkn".'^^ 
And with these explanations he continues, 
"For there are not many Words, or each would be imperfect, but one is the 
Word that he only may be perfect, and because, God being one, his image 
too must be one, which is the Son. For the Son of God, as may be learnt 
from the divine oracles themselves, is himself the Word of God, and the 
Wisdom and the Image and the Hand and the Power; for God's offspring is 
one and these titles are token of the generation from the Father".'^ ^ 
This synthesizing exegesis of these Christological titles is based on the conception 
of God creating the world, for evidence of which Athanasius refers, namely, to Is. 48:13, 
51:16, Ps. 103:24, Prov. 3:19, Jn. 1:1-3, Heb. 1:1-2, 1 Cor. 8:6b, and Col. 1:12-17. On this 
D E C R 16-17:25,444A-B. Athanasius accuses the Arians of being "ignorant of the truth and 
inexperienced of the divine Scriptures". 
D E C R 16:25,444A. 
D E C R 17:25,4440. 
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basis we may observe that the distinctive understanding of the Word of God in contrast to 
the words of God is founded on two principles. 
a) The Word of God finds its meaning in the creation of the world. He is 
comprehensively understood as the divine act that creates the universe and substantiates 
the will of God. God's only Word is the one that realizes the biblical phrase "God spoke" 
in the context of the creation of the world which is indicated by the phrase "and it was 
so"."" 
b) The Word of God has its reference directly to God the Father as his offspring o 
the grounds of which He is identified as the Only-begotten Son of God. Both titles 'Word' 
and 'Son' attribute to the Father the act of generation and describe in human terms the 
intimate and mutual relations of the Father to his offsrping (Jn. 14:10)."' 
On this basis, the Word of God is distinguished from the many words that God 
speaks, because the latter are words that God addresses to human beings. Their point of 
reference, that is, is not the Father himself as in the phrases 'Let us make man' or 'God 
spoke', but to human beings who are willing to listen and reply to them. Therefore, they 
are very frequently followed by conversation, as for example, God conversing with 
Abraham, Moses, Zachariah, etc. Ultimately, Athanasius argues, these words are mediated 
through the only Word and Wisdom of God who knows the will of the Father and through 
whom the Father is solely revealed. '^^  
"° CAR2 31:26,212B. 
"For if God is the Father of a word at all, wherefore is not he that is begotten a Son? And again, 
who should be the Son of God, but his Word?" (DECR n.ibid.). 
For the continuation of Athanasius' understanding at this point compare the following statements: 
"For each of these [words] has the mediator Word and the Wisdom of God which makes known the will of 
the Father" (CARl'iV.ibid.) and "...while all things origmated have by participation the grace of God, he is 
the Father's Wisdom and Word of which all things partake; it follows that he, being the deifying and 
enlightening power of the Father, in which all things are deified and quickened, is not alien in essence from 
the Father, but homoousios" (SYNO 51:26,784B). 
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3.2.2 Wisdom (Zo(pia) 
As he did for the titie 'Word', so for the title 'Wisdom', Athanasius tries to prove 
that the biblical references to it convey a different meaning when they refer to God from 
the meaning they have in other contexts. He makes similar observations for 'Wisdom' with 
those of 'Word' especially with reference to the creation of the world. He distinguishes the 
creative Wisdom of God, which brings things that do not exist into existence, from the 
wisdom of men which is a reflection of the divine Wisdom."' On this distmction he 
establishes the unity of the divine essence of the Father and the Son. 
The verses which he most frequently uses for the Son as the Creative Wisdom of 
God are the following: 
Ps. 103:24: "In wisdom you have created them all" 
1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ the power of God and the Wisdom of God" 
Prov. 3:19: "The Lord by Wisdom founded the earth; by understanding he 
established the heavens" 
Prov. 8:27: "When he established the heavens I was there" 
They appear in the same lists with the other verses on the biblical description of the 
creation of the world by God through his 'Hand', his 'Word', or Jesus Christ."'' Therefore, 
he deploys the same arguments as we saw earlier about the Word or the Son as the Creator 
of the world. A l l these titles are interchangeable in Athanasius' argument, although there 
are some peculiarities to each one of them, connected with the special shades of meaning 
that they convey. 
As regards the Wisdom of God, Athanasius deals with the Arian interpretation 
involving the mediator in the creation, as he did when dealing with the 'Word'. However, 
with reference to Wisdom, the Arians explained the manner in which this 'mediator' 
operated: distinguishing two wisdoms of God, the one which is the ingenerate attribute of 
C f H. Jaeger's analysis of the understanding of 'wisdom'm rabbinical exegetical tradition which 
denotes both the "active presence of God" and the "capacity for understanding better more deeply what the 
indwelling divine spirit teaches the soul" ("The Patristic conception of Wisdom", pp. 96-97). For the 
Athanasian exegesis cf P. Sherwood, "St. Athanasius concerning the Wisdom of God", pp. 271-276. 
CAR2 71, DECR 17, SER2 8 etc. 
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the divine essence and the one which is the generated mediator, they held that the latter 
learned from the former the art of creating and thus "ministered" God. God needed such a 
minister because, being uncreated himself, he could not create the world."^ Athanasius 
regards this description as product of mere speculation which lacks any footing in the 
biblical description of creation, therefore he abolishes it altogether by denying first of all 
the fundamental distinction between the two 'wisdoms' of God. For this purpose he deploys 
the following arguments."^ 
a) There is no evidence anywhere in the Bible about two 'wisdoms' of God. As the 
above cited texts show, the Wisdom of God is One and Only, and only in this Wisdom 
God created the world. On this ground, examining the implications of the Arian mediator-
'wisdom', he argues firstly, that the ability of creating out of nothing is not a matter of 
knowledge, but an attribute of the uncreated nature of God. I f it was a matter of 
knowledge, then it could be equally plausible to argue that God also creates having learned 
the art of creating. Secondly, the so-called 'wisdom', which learned to create, is not real 
wisdom (ouoicbStiQ oocpia), since it needs lessons of unprovement. Moreover, knowledge 
which has been acquired and is not an attribute of nature, is liable to be lost, because it 
depends on the ability of the subject to maintain it. The association of such a 'wisdom' with 
God is an 'impious' act (5uooe|3ec;) and belongs to Hellenistic mythology, rather than 
Christian theology. Thirdly, this understanding attributes to God "jealousy" ((pGovov) and 
"weakness" (doGeveia), because it presents him giving this gift only to one of his 
numerous ministers and being in need of an assistant for a work that he could not 
accomplish on his own. The assumption of the Arians that God could not create, is, for 
Athanasius, fundamentally erroneous, in the first place, because God is by definition 
"But they say though he is a creature and of things originate, yet as from a master and artificer has 
he learned to frame and thus ministered God who taught him", CAR2 28:26,205Cf; C f also C A R l 32. 
See CAR2 28-29:26,205Cf. 
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self-sufficient and without need of anything (dvEvSsfic;). He often uses the reference to Jn. 
5:17 ("My father is working still and I am working") to prove the point. In any case, 
Athanasius argues that even the very teaching of the Arians that God created the Son, 
abolishes their own argument, since he appears able to create, having already created his 
Son. 
b) The Arian distinction between the two wisdoms of God is according to the 
model of human wisdom which is also erroneously understood, because they take it for 
granted and as the basis of interpreting the divine Wisdom. Athanasius argues that human 
beings are not 'wise' on their own right, because their wisdom is a gift of God granted to 
them at their creation in his Wisdom (Ps. 103:24).'" It is the Wisdom of God which is the 
model of human wisdom and in her human beings have to participate (nexEXOVXEc;) in 
order to be called wise; this is in effect a passion of the imperfect human nature because it 
is created. In contrast, the creative Wisdom of God does not need to participate in anything 
else in order to be 'wise', because she draws this attribute directly from God who is by 
definition the ultimate self-Wisdom (aOxooocpia). Athanasius, in other words, also 
identifies two wisdoms: the uncreated 'Wisdom of God', to which he refers as 
'self-Wisdom' (auTOCO(pia) and 'Only-begotten' (iiovoyevri), and the created wisdom that 
exists in the world. He gives more explanations when he interprets Sir. 1,9-10 ("He poured 
her out upon all his works; she is with all flesh according to his gift and he has given her to 
them that love him"), which appears to be interpreted by the Arians parallely with Prov. 
8:22 ("The Lord created me") in support of their view that the Wisdom of God is also 
created.'^ ^ He argues that the wisdom which exists in the world (1 Cor 1:21, Wisd. 6:24, 
Prov. 14:6, 24:3, Eccl. 8:1, 7:10), is not the result of God's "pouring into the worid the 
C A R l 28:26,69C-D. 
It is not certain that the Arians actually used this text. It rather sounds as Athanasius' selection, but 
it is in accordance with the main topic that he discusses, i.e., the creation of wisdom. 
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essence of his self-wisdom" (eKXuaig xflg oi)oia<; xf\c, auxooocpiat;), so that any sort of 
created wisdom would have the ability to create, but it is the result of God's creating 
human beings which he equipped with a "type" (tuTioc;) and "image" ((pavxaoia) of his 
own Wisdom, so that they would be able to know him: "For as our word is an image of the 
Son of God regarded as the Word, so the wisdom which is implanted to us is an image of 
the same Son regarded as Wisdom; in which wisdom we have the power of knowledge and 
thought, and become recipients of the All-framing Wisdom"."' Therefore, the wisdom 
which created the world cannot be created because every notion of created wisdom was 
created as an image of the uncreated Wisdom of God which pre-exists he world. Prov. 
8:22 does not relate the creating Wisdom with the created world as a part of it, because it 
states that she was created 'for the works' (eig spya), which implies that it existed before 
'the works' and in consequence before the very event of the creation of 'the works'. This is 
indicated by the chronological definitions "before the mountains", "before the earth" etc., 
in the verses that follow. Since it precedes the creation of the world, then, the Wisdom of 
God is attached to the Father of whom she is offspring (yevvrma) and not creature. 
c) On this basis Athanasius asserts that Prov. 8:22 does not refer to the creation of 
the being of God's Wisdom in order to become the 'begmning of ways' (dpXT) 65cov), but 
to the work which the Wisdom undertook for the sake of the creation that started with the 
Incarnation. The Incarnation marks the beginning of God's knowledge through a concrete 
being, Jesus Christ, who, according to Athanasius' characteristic term, is the 'oxoixeicooic;' 
(= to become an element) of the Wisdom of God for the knowledge of God.^^° He 
illustrates this distinction with two texts: Prov. 1:7 ("The fear of the Lord is the beginning 
of wisdom") indicates the knowledge of God which human beings acquire exercising their 
spiritual power, but in Jn. 14:9 ("He who has seen me has seen the Father") and 1 Jn. 2:23 
CAR2 78:26,312C. 
CAR2 80:26,316C. 
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("He who acknowledges the Son has the Father also") Jesus Christ himself is designated as 
the knowledge of God. 
The soteriological imperative of human beings that necessitated the 'condescension' 
(oiKovo|J,la) of the Incarnation of the Word is in effect the regulative principle of 
Athanasius' interpretation. He further establishes it as the central concept of the 
controversial passage Prov. 8 by interpreting Prov. 8:23 ("He founded me before the 
ages") and 9:1 ("The Wisdom built herself a house"), in the light of 2 Tim. 1:8-10'^ ' and 
Eph. 1:3-5.^ ^^  The plan for the deliverance of human beings from death through the 
Incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ had to be founded before the creation of the world, 
for two reasons: a) because God would otherwise be proved ignorant of the evolution 
which was to follow and b) because the life which human beings were destined to live was 
eternal and beyond time and therefore it had to be established in eternity. Such a mission, 
however, could solely be accomplished by the Word himself because human beings were 
created in his image: "Though the earth and the mountains and the shapes of visible nature 
pass away in the fulness of the present age, we on the contrary may not grow old after their 
pattern, but may be able to live after them, having the spiritual life and blessing which 
before these things have been prepared for us in the Word Himself according to election. 
For thus we shall be capable of a life not temporary, but ever afterwards abide and live in 
Christ; since even before this our life had been founded and prepared in Christ Jesus. Nor 
in any other way was it fitting that our life should be founded, but in the Lord who is 
"Share in suffering for the gospel in the power of God, who saved us and called us woth a holy 
calling, not in virtue of our works but in virtue of his own purpose and the grace which he gve us in Jesus 
Christ ages ago, and now has manifested through the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who abohshed 
death and brought life". 
"Blessed be Lord the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with 
every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, even as he chose us in him before the foxmdation of the 
world, that we should be holy and blameless before him. He destined us in love to be his sons through Jesus 
Christ". 
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before ages and through whom the ages were brought to be; that, since it was in him, we 
too might be able to inherit that everlasting life".^*' 
The understanding of 'Word' and 'Wisdom' as attributes of essence constitutes for 
Athanasius a model that secures the unity of the divine being, because it skips off temporal 
and spatial divisions which bodily beings suffer. With the explanations he gave on the 
subject he excluded any possibility of division of God or unity of created essence with 
God, because the biblical description does not portray him as acting in cooperation with 
another being but always by speaking; neither as having many words which is a sign of 
weakness but only one, nor as ever being 'speechless' (aXoyoc;) or 'unwise' (aGO(poc;). The 
notions 'word' and 'wisdom' are associated with the concept of generation, because this is 
the manner in which human word and wisdom are manifested and the divine Word and 
Wisdom exists. The ontological significance of this model is that there is only one reality 
to be acknowledged. Therefore, there is also one Wisdom and Word of God who is 
"proper" to the Father's essence, in whom he does everything. The different attributes 
which the divine Word and Wisdom exhibits according to the biblical descriptions, in 
comparison to the human word, designate him to be of different nature also. Thus, he is 
not a mere attribute or impersonal energy of the essence of the Father, but a concrete being 
and a distinct individual like the Father, with his own essential attributes which are totally 
identifiable with the Father's. Therefore he is not a second God, but being the Word and 
Wisdom of God, God is maintained one and acknowledged as the Father and the Son 
simultaneously. This understanding of unity of the divine being as the result of the 
implications of the Wisdom and Word images is clearly exhibited in the following text: 
" I f God be Maker and Creator, and create His works through the Son, and 
we cannot regard things which come to be, except as being through the 
Word, is it not blasphemous, God being Maker, to say that his framing 
Word and his Wisdom once was not? It is the same as saying that God is 
not Maker, i f he did not have his proper framing Word which is from him, 
CAR2 76-77:26,309B. 
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but that That by which he frames accrues to him from without and is alien 
from him and unlike in essence... I f the Word is not with the Father from 
everlasting, the Triad is not everlasting; but a Monad was first, and 
afterwards by addition it became a Triad... But it is not so: perish the 
thought; the Triad is not originated; but there is an eternal one Godhead in a 
Triad, and there is one Glory of the Holy Triad... For the Son is eternal, as 
is the Father, of whom he is the eternal Word".^*'' 
CARl 16-18:26,45Bf; Cf also: "If he is the illuminating and creative [attribute] specially proper 
[iSiauaxov] to the Father, without whom he neither frames nor is known (for all things consist through 
him and m him), wherefore perceivmg the fact, do we declme to use the phrase conveying it? For what is it 
to be thus connatural [6noq)ufi(;] with the Father, but to be homoousios with him?" SYNO 52:26,788A; see 
also CAR2 31:26,212B; CAR3 13:26,349. 
3.3 The Biblical Paradigms 
The same model of the unity of the divine being is also conveyed for Athanasius by 
the theological application of the paradigms 'light-effulgence', 'fountain-river' and 
'hypostasis-character'. He lays very much emphasis on them as the fact that they are 
constantly recurrent throughout his anti-Arian works shows. As we have seen, he uses 
them in the context of the generation of the Son to distinguish it from the spatial and 
temporal divisions which the bodily model of generation involves. The fact that the 
generation of effulgence from light and of river from fountain neither affects or diminishes 
the existence of their sources, nor suggests division of them, is taken ftirther by Athanasius 
to show that both elements are still considered to constitute one indivisible reality, 
although they are specifically identified as two elements. The main function of these 
paradigms is to detach the human mind from a bodily understanding of God and guide it to 
perceive concepts of purely spiritual nature in a spiritual manner: 
"They consider God to be material and they do not understand what is 'true 
Father' and 'true Son', nor 'light invisible' and 'eternal' and its 'radiance 
invisible', nor 'invisible subsistence' and 'immaterial expression' and 
'immaterial image'. For did they know, they would not dishonour and 
ridicule the Lord of glory, nor interpreting things immaterial after a 
material manner, pervert good words",^ ^^ and also, 
"Let us not fall upon human senses and imagine partitions and divisions of 
the Godhead, but as having our thoughts directed to things immaterial, let 
us preserve undivided the oneness of nature and the identity of Hght".^ ** 
In the theological application of these paradigms, the light-effulgence paradigm 
which he relates with Jn. 14:9 ("He who has seen me has seen the Father") and explains 
through the process of vision, appears to be especially convenient. The argument of 
Athanasius is that because seeing God involves the same procedure as that of seeing light, 
that is, as one sees light through its effulgence, so one sees God through his Son, the Son 
of God must have the same kind of relationship with the Father as the light with the 
CAR3 1:26,324A. 
DECR24:25,457C. 
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effulgence.The features of this relation which he consistently identifies are "eternity" 
( d £ i ) and "coexistence" (ouvuTtdpxov),^*^ "propriety" (iSiov) or "attribute of nature" 
((puoiKT) i5i6xr|g),^^' and "unity of nature" (evoxric; cpuaecoc;)."'' The unity of nature and 
being is manifested for Athanasius m the unity of action and revelation. Under the light of 
the revelation of Christ as the Son of God, the conception of God creating, enlightening or 
giving his grace to human beings is no longer tied up with the image of an act of an 
individual human being, but is considered an act that takes effect as a unified act of the 
Father through the Son. To acknowledge God as Father implies for Athanasius 
acknowledging the existence of the Son simultaneously, so that God is to be known as 
Father and Son.''' Athanasius sees this is as the significance of the light-effulgence 
paradigm and therefore it is also very appropriate for him to express this understanding of 
the divine nature: 
"When the Apostle said 'Grace unto you and peace from God our Father 
and the Lord Jesus Christ', the blessing was secure, because of the Son's 
indivisibility from the Father and because the grace given by them is one 
and the same. For though the Father gives it, the gift is through the Son, and 
though the Son is said to vouchsafe it, it is the Father who supplies it 
through and in the Son... And this one may see in the instance of light and 
effulgence; for what the light enlightens, that the effulgence illumines and 
what the effulgence illumines from the light is its enlightenment. So also 
when the Son is beheld, so is the Father, for he is the Father's effulgence. 
And thus the Father and the Son are one".''^ 
3 " "Who, thus considering the effulgence relatively to the sun and the identity of the light, would not 
say with confidence, 'Truly the light and the effulgence are one and the one is manifested in the other and 
the effulgence is in the sun, so that he who sees this, sees that also? But such an oneness and natural 
property what should it be named by those who beUeve and see aright but offspring one in essence?" DECK 
24:25,457C. 
DECR 20:25,452A; ENCY:25,568. 
DECR 24:25,457B. 
"Let a man venture to make the distinction, that the sun and the effulgence are two lights or two 
essences, or to say that the effulgence accrued to it over and above and is not a pure and simple offspring 
from the sun; such, that sim and effulgence are two, but the light is one because the effulgence is an 
offspring from the sun. But whereas not more divisible, nay less divisible is the nature of the Son towards 
the Father and the godhead not accruing to the Son, but the Father's godhead being in the Son, so that he 
that has seen the Son has seen the Father in Him; wherefore should not such an one be called homoousiosT 
SYNO 52:26,788B-C. Cf the comments by R.P.C. Hanson, "Transformation", p. 102. 
"He who calls God Father, there by conceives and contemplates the Son" CARl 33:26,80B. 
''^  CAR3 13:26,349B. R.W. Fox regards the indivisibility of the Son with the Father as the major 
significance of the 'homoousion' that appeals to "modem mind", because it secures the gift of salvation 
granted to human beings by God through Christ ("The Athanasian meaning", p. 215). 
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In the following text Athanasius combines all the biblical titles attributed to the 
Son, explaining the way in which God acts and reveals himself as one being: 
" I f then as we have stated and are shewing, what is the offspring of the 
Father's essence be the Son, we cannot hesitate, rather we must be certain 
that the same is the Wisdom and the Word of the Father, in and through 
whom he creates and makes all things; and he is brightness too, in whom he 
enlightens all things and is revealed to whom he will; and his expression 
and image also, in whom he is contemplated and known, wherefore 'he and 
his Father are one' and whoso looks on him looks on the Father; and the 
Christ in whom all things are redeemed, and the new creation wrought 
afresh".^ ^^ 
Although it is not formulated technically, it is clear that the most appropriate term 
for Athanasius to express this understanding was the term 'essence' and not the term 
'hypostasis', because while the former refers to the inner being, to the very existence (TO 
eivai) of an object, since it derives from the verb 'to be' (Ex. 3:14), the latter refers to its 
external manifestation, since it comes from the verb 'to subsist' (ucpiOTTini).^'" The 
'homoousios' holds together both the unity and the multiplcity of the divine being without 
mixing or subordinating the one to the other, exactly as the biblical description of the 
divine persons never does so. The divine persons are portrayed in the Bible to act 
independently, but not separately, and as the foregoing pages have shown, there are many 
explicit and implicit ways in which it expresses this kind of operation. Therefore, the 
prefix '6|io' neither subordinates Father, Son and Spirit to a logically defined 'Monad', 
eliminating their distinction, nor keeps them apart as three separate individuals, because, 
combined with the term 'essence', maintains their absolute equality and unites the three in 
one indivisible existence, one essence and one godhead which acts and manisfests itself as 
the One God, Father, Son and Spirit. In the following text from the Contra Arianos the 
interaction between unity and duality is characteristically explained; although the term 
CARl 16:26,45C. 
See T.B. Strong, "The history of substance", p. 36. 
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'homoousios' itself is not present, all the biblical doctrine that it stands for are deployed in 
detail:^'' 
"For the Son is in the Father, as it is allowed us to know, because the whole 
being of the Son is proper to the Father's essence, as effulgence from light 
and river from fountain; so that whoever sees the Son, sees what is proper 
to the Father and knows that the Son's being, because from the Father, is 
therefore in the Father. For the Father is in the Son, since the Son is what is 
from the Father and proper to him, as the sun is in the effulgence, and the 
thought in the word and the fountain in the river. For whoever thus 
contemplates the Son, contemplates what is proper to the Father's essence 
and knows that the Father is in the Son. For whereas the form and godhead 
of the Father is the being of the Son, it follows that the Son is in the Father 
and the Father m the Son. On this account and reasonably having said 
before ' I and the Father are one', he added ' I am in the Father and the Father 
is in me' by way of showing the identity of godhead and the unity of 
essence. For they are one, not as one being divided into two parts and these 
nothing but one, nor as one thing twice named, so that the same becomes at 
one time Father and at another his own Son, for this Sabellius holding was 
judged an heretic. But they are two, because the Father is Father and is not 
also Son, and the Son is Son and not also Father; but the nature is one - for 
the offspring is not unlike its parent, for it is his image - and all that is the 
Father's is the Son's also. Wherefore neither is the Son another God, for he 
was not procured from without, else where there many, i f a godhead were 
procured foreign from the Father's; for i f the Son is other, as an offspring, 
still he is the same as God, and he and the Father are one in propriety and 
peculiarity of nature and in the identity of the One godhead, as has been 
said. For the effulgence is also light, not second to the sun, nor a different 
light, nor from participation in it, but a whole and proper offspring of it. 
And such an offspring is necessarily one light; and no one would say that 
they are two lights, but sun and effulgence two, yet one the light from the 
sun enlightening in its effulgence all things. So, also the godhead of the Son 
is the Father's; whence also it is indivisible and thus there is one God and no 
other but He. And so, since they are one and the Godhead itself one, the 
same things are said of the Son, which are said of the Father, except his 
being said to be Father". 
CAR3 3-4:26,328Af. 
4. CONCLUSIONS - ASSESSMENTS 
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1. The meaning of the "homoousion" and its biblical dimension 
1. The meaning of the 'homoousion' in Athanasius is not an 'either...or' case, but 
rather a 'both...and' one. This means that it does not imply either generic or numerical 
identity, as modem textbooks handle the matter, but rather both generic and numerical 
identity. The principle that Athanasius applies is that any such terms as the modem 
'generic' (i.e., Athanasius' Father-Son, generation) and 'numerical' (i.e., unity, oneness), are 
terms produced by the human mind and therefore carry connotations from the created 
world. When they are applied to God they immediately lose their strict meaning and 
acquire a certain amount of metaphorical nuance or transcendence and therefore more 
terms are needed in order to describe the divine reality with more precision. 
On the one hand, the fact that Athanasius acknowledges the Father and the Son as 
numerically two clearly and sharply distinct beings in a fully ontological sense, as is also 
acknowledged by all parties throughout the Arian controversy, immediately implies that 
the term One Godhead does not denote a single object but a different reality. In human 
terms two distinct persons can be still united generically, as belonging to one and the same 
species or as sharing the same kind of essence or being. The 'generic identity' is 
intrinsically linked with the 'homoousios' and therefore it cannot be abandoned. 
On the other hand, the fact that Athanasius also acknowledges the oneness of the 
Godhead implies that the distinction does not imply a division of the divine being into two 
gods, but a duality in unity and vice versa. Thus, although Athanasius deals with the Father 
and the Son as two completely distinct individuals even comparing their attributes 
separately, he never uses language which could imply even the slightest sense of division. 
In tum, whenever he speaks about the One God he identifies him wdth the Father and the 
Son, or with the Trinity. 
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2. When the 'homoousion' comes to the fore the same idea is conveyed. In fact, it 
appears to be the most appropriate term for giving a compact expression of this 
understanding and betrays a wise choice on the part of the Nicenes rather than confusion 
and ignorance. The terms did not cause confusion, but rather gave expression to the 
already existing one in the mind of those concemed with the explanation of the mystery of 
the divine revelation. The selection of this particular term implies the clarity of teaching 
which the Nicenes wanted to formulate: on the one hand, they wanted to express the 
oneness of God, but did not choose to use such terms as 'one' (ev-), 'alone' (laovo-) or 
derivatives. They chose 'co-' (6|J,o-), 'together', because it implies both equality and 
coexistence of the Father and the Son to whom it is applied. The reason for doing so was 
obviously the fear of avoiding future misunderstandings which could deny the real 
distinction between the two persons of the Trinity and reintroduce the heresy of 
Sabellianism. The 6|a,o- maintains the distinction, because it implies two or more beings 
and puts them on a par with each other. As all compound words with '6|io-', so the 
'homoousios', demanded a common element to be shared between the beings designated as 
'6|a.o-'. This element could not be other than the very being of the Son, who was confessed 
in the Church as tme God. Thus the Nicenes did not choose the term 'hypostasis' 
(UTtooTaoit;), but the term 'essence' (ouaia), because this latter designates the very 
existence of a being, what a being is in itself, and also the element which categorises 
beings and is shared among them. This in tum implies that the disticntion between the two 
terms was already there, but not yet technically defined. 
3. This 'vagueness' of definition the 'homoousion' implies was beneficial in that it 
did not force the Father and the Son to fit into logical models of existence. Besides, this 
was in accordance with the 'vagueness' of the biblical statements themselves which does 
not define either God or his relation to the Son. The sfrong generic character that the very 
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title 'Son of God' applied in a unique way to Jesus Christ together with the explicit doctrine 
of his unity with the Father, especially in the Gospel of John, are the indisputable contents 
of the biblical message. The 'homoousion' gave full expression to both concepts and their 
combination. Thus it did not constitute an import from Hellenistic philosophy or 
development of primitive teaching, but represented a new expression of the traditional 
faith, since its main connotations were appropriate to the biblical doctrine. Dealing with 
'essences' and 'hypostases', Athanasius neither introduced, nor followed philosophical 
patterns of thought, but rather rejected philosophy and philosophers on the grounds that 
'they do not know the Word'."* He rather reaffirmed in contemporary terminology the 
answer to the question to which Jesus Christ himself and his Apostles were challenged to 
respond: "Who do people say that / ami" and "Tell us i f you are the Chirst, the Son of 
God" (Mat. 16:13, Marc 8:27, Lk. 9:18, Mat. 26:63, Jn. 10:24, etc.). The 'homoousios with 
the Father', as Athanasius presents it, first of all affirms that the Son is an 'essence', a term 
that designates his isness (eivai), the fact that he is. Then, '6|J,o-' denotes that the kind of 
this isness is like the Father's, the Son is as the Father is and together with the Father. On 
this ground, Athanasius makes evident the link of the 'homoousios' with the biblical 
doctrine not only internally, i.e., by expounding the same teaching, but also externally, 
since most of the biblical texts he uses either come from contexts where the subject matter 
is the identity of Jesus Christ (e.g. Jn. 6:46, 8:42, 10:30, etc.), or contain as their basic 
element the verb 'to be' as some sort of definition of his divine status (e.g. Mat. 3:17, Heb. 
1:3, etc.). 
2. The Athanasian exegesis 
As it concerns the method of biblical exegesis by Athanasius we could draw four 
general but fundamental hermeneutical principles: 
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a) Christ is the key to the Scriptures, because he is the 'aim' (oKOTiog) of the Old 
Testament prophesy and the content of the New Testament history. The Incamation of the 
Word of God by which God the Creator of the world took up a body and was united with 
human beings divides biblical data into two categories: those which refer to his divine 
nature and describe his glory and power as Son of God and those which refer to his 
humanity and describe his humility and weakness as a human being. Each biblical text has 
to be carefully examined and placed in its appropriate category so that the doctrinal 
outcome wil l be in accordance with this principle which defines the distinctive 'character 
of Christian faith'. 
b) Biblical language and imagery does not define, but describes the divine reality 
because the latter is incomprehensible to the human mind. Each description seen on its 
own reveals partially the mystery of God and therefore is inadequate to express the 
fullness of theological tmth. This fullness can be achieved through a synthesizing exegesis 
of all of them which Athanasius calls 'collection of the mind of Scripture'. Combined 
biblical images gathered together on the basis of the Christological criterion qualify one 
another, as they put together the various aspects of tmth they convey to constmct a more 
accurate image of God. 
c) Decisive factor for determining the precise meaning of biblical texts is their 
narrower and broader context, with which they have to be in accord. On the basis of 
Athanasius' exegesis we could identify three concentric circles of contextual, reference: 
The first one is the immediate context of a particular text which comprises its natural 
environment. It is a decisive one, because it defines its meaning according to the particular 
circumstances which many times may render a different notion from the one that is at first 
sight recognisable. The second one is the broader biblical context in its thematic definition 
which comprises the doctrinal environment. It is a cmcial one, because it defines the 
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interpetation of a particular text according to the overall biblical witness on the same 
subject. The basis of this is the principle of the unity of biblical witness to the mystery of 
God that harmonizes biblical texts to a coherent whole. Failure to ful lf i l this principle 
suggests revision of exegesis. Finally, there is the circle of the results of previous 
accredited exegetical attempts which comprise the ecclesiastical environment. This has a 
double function and a single purpose; it functions both as guide and as a seal of accuracy 
because it harmonises contemporary exegesis with that of preceding exegetes approved by 
the Church creating a consistent and unbroken line of biblical interpretation (tradition). 
Biblical exegesis serves the saving ministry of the Church in the world and not academic 
speculation of intellectual thinking. 
d) The contribution of ontological or philosophical definitions to biblical exegesis 
is negative, because it blurs the clarity of the biblical message by the imposition of 
anthropological models of existence to God. Biblical language has to be understood both 
in its literal and metaphorical sense. The literal sense has the function of negating attempts 
of associating or ascribing non biblical concepts to God by which, or by implication of 
which, biblical terms are threatened to be abolished or deprived of this meaning. The 
metaphorical sense has the function of positively understanding biblical terminology in its 
spiritual dimension which is defined by the ultimately transcedent being of God. Metaphor 
in fact consists of the effort which the exegete has to put in order to go beyond the limits 
of created existence and understand the purely divine reality solely through his spiritual 
powers. At this point ontological definitions do not apply because they have been defined 
according to the experience of the created world which involves bodily beings, whereas 
God is by definition beyond definition. Biblical terms then have to be understood as 
expressing or describing relations of the divine persons rather than define their mode of 
being. 
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Dogmatic theology is the outcome of constructive and comprehensive biblical 
exegesis by means of which a systematic account of biblical witness is produced. These 
accounts, after having been tested and approved for their biblical origination, they become 
a sort of shorthand theological norms that safeguard biblical exegesis by means of making 
immediately evident its accuracy. The interpreter has greater freedom in using broader 
vocabulary which is means of clarifying or summing up the meaning of biblical 
terminology, given the fact that it conveys the same doctrinal pattern. The interaction 
between biblical and dogmatic theology is constant so that the one tests and verifies the 
accuracy and genuiness of the other. 
We believe that St. Athanasius managed to demonstrate successfiilly in all its glory 
the strength of the Church's coherent doctrine and unbroken tradition, and thus he not only 
laid the foundations of the development which was unmediately to follow him, but also 
deposited basic hermeneutical keys to responding to the contemporary quest for unity of 
doctrine and life in the Christian Church. 
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